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Domino 
NOVEL TOOLS TO EVALUATE ATM SYSTEMS COUPLING UNDER FUTURE 
DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS 
 
This deliverable is part of a project that has received funding from the SESAR Joint Undertaking under 
grant agreement No 783206 under European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme. 
 
 
Abstract  
This deliverable presents the results from the analysis of the model executing the investigative case 
studies. The document focuses on the validation activities and the results for the three mechanisms 
modelled in Domino in the unitary case studies. 
The three mechanism are: 4D Trajectory Adjustment, which focuses on the use of dynamic cost 
indexing and wait-for-passengers rules; Flight Prioritisation, which considers the possibility of slot 
swapping at ATFM regulations; and Flight Arrival Coordination, which models different optimisation 
approaches E-AMAN could consider. Each mechanism has three levels of implementation: Level 0 
(with current capabilities), Level 1 (with more advanced features) and Level 2 (more explorative). The 
traffic is set on a given day (12 September 2014) considering flights and passengers’ itineraries. Two 
levels of delay are considered: default and stressed. In total 14 scenarios have been modelled and 
analysed. 
This deliverable presents the use of classical and network metrics (centrality and causality) on the 
outcome of the whole European level agent-based model. The model still requires further 
development and adjustment, but results show that it is already capable of capturing complex 
interactions among the ATM elements. Finally, the network metrics are already presenting their 
potential to capture non-direct interactions between elements in the system. 
The results have been shared with experts and airspace users at two workshops. The feedback 
obtained and the results of the analysis and validation activities will be considered for the final 
version of Domino. 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
4 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The opinions expressed herein reflect the authors’ views only. Under no circumstances shall the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking be responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained 
herein. 
 
  
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
5
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 3 
Executive summary ................................................................................................................. 10 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 14 
1.1 Investigative case studies ............................................................................................. 14 
1.2 Model calibration ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.3 Classical and network metrics ...................................................................................... 15 
1.4 Structure and contents of this deliverable .................................................................... 15 
2 Scenarios modelled and analysed ..................................................................................... 16 
2.1 Default scenario .......................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Stressed scenario ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.3 4DTA mechanism ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Level 0 ............................................................................................................................................. 17 
2.3.2 Level 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 19 
2.3.3 Level 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 20 
2.4 FP mechanism ............................................................................................................. 20 
2.4.1 Level 0 ............................................................................................................................................. 20 
2.4.2 Level 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 21 
2.4.3 Level 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 21 
2.5 FAC mechanism ........................................................................................................... 22 
2.5.1 Level 0 ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
2.5.2 Level 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
2.5.3 Level 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 24 
3 Model calibration .............................................................................................................. 26 
3.1 Data used for calibration ............................................................................................. 26 
3.2 Results of calibration ................................................................................................... 30 
3.2.1 Delay structure ................................................................................................................................ 30 
3.2.2 Distributions .................................................................................................................................... 33 
4 Investigative case studies results ...................................................................................... 37 
4.1 Metrics ........................................................................................................................ 37 
4.1.1 Delay metrics ................................................................................................................................... 37 
4.1.2 Passengers metrics .......................................................................................................................... 38 
4.1.3 Cost metrics ..................................................................................................................................... 38 
4.1.4 Centrality metrics ............................................................................................................................ 39 
4.1.5 Causality metrics ............................................................................................................................. 41 
4.1.6 Restricted samples .......................................................................................................................... 43 
4.2 Summary of key results................................................................................................ 43 
4D Trajectory Adjustments ........................................................................................................................... 47 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
6 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
4.2.1 Flight Prioritisation .......................................................................................................................... 48 
4.2.2 Flight Arrival Coordination .............................................................................................................. 49 
4.3 Detailed analysis of results .......................................................................................... 50 
4.3.1 4D Trajectory Adjustment ............................................................................................................... 50 
4.3.2 Flight Prioritisation .......................................................................................................................... 79 
4.3.3 Flight Arrival Coordination .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 147 
6 Next steps and look ahead .............................................................................................. 149 
7 References ...................................................................................................................... 150 
8 Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ 152 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1. Probabilistic distribution for deciding on the delay recovery ................................................ 18 
Figure 2. Extended Arrival Manager scope. .......................................................................................... 22 
Figure 3. FAC Level 1 messages at planning horizon ............................................................................. 24 
Figure 4. FAC Level 2 messages at planning horizon ............................................................................. 25 
Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of departure delay in the simulations ............................................. 33 
Figure 6. Cumulative distribution of arrival delay in the simulations ................................................... 34 
Figure 7. Distribution of gate-to-gate time in the simulations ............................................................. 34 
Figure 8. Distribution of difference in flying distances ......................................................................... 35 
Figure 9. Distribution of travelling time difference ............................................................................... 36 
Figure 10. Summary of results changes ................................................................................................ 47 
Figure 11. Percentage change with respect to the corresponding baseline ......................................... 51 
Figure 12. QQ-plots comparing departing ............................................................................................. 52 
Figure 13. QQ-plots comparing arrival delay ........................................................................................ 52 
Figure 14. Violin plot of the percentage speed selected by flights ....................................................... 53 
Figure 15. Violin plot of the delay expected to be recovered ............................................................... 53 
Figure 16. Change in passenger delay for 4DTA: ................................................................................... 60 
Figure 17. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in 4DTA ......................................................................... 61 
Figure 18. Cost of delay for 4DTA. ......................................................................................................... 62 
Figure 19. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 1 baseline comparing the distribution of costs ............................ 66 
Figure 20. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 2 baseline comparing the distribution of costs ............................ 66 
Figure 21. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 1 stressed comparing the distribution of costs ............................ 67 
Figure 22. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 2 stressed comparing the distribution of costs ............................ 67 
Figure 23. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in 4DTA scenarios .................................. 68 
Figure 24. Average passenger centrality loss 4DTA .............................................................................. 70 
Figure 25. Trip centrality loss comparison 4DTA ................................................................................... 71 
Figure 26. Percentage variation of Granger causality in mean for 4DTA .............................................. 73 
Figure 27. Percentage variation of Granger causality in mean cost of delay for 4DTA ........................ 73 
Figure 28. Percentage variation of the selected metrics of the Granger causality in tail 4DTA ........... 75 
Figure 29. Number of reciprocal links (4DTA) ....................................................................................... 75 
Figure 30. Distribution of reciprocity for 4DTA delay ........................................................................... 76 
Figure 31. Percentage variation of the selected metrics of Granger causality in tail 4DTA .................. 76 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
7
 
 
Figure 32. Number of reciprocal links at the different levels of implementation 4DTA ....................... 77 
Figure 33. Distribution of reciprocity for 4DTA cost of delay ................................................................ 77 
Figure 34. Change in passenger delay for FP......................................................................................... 89 
Figure 35. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FP .............................................................................. 90 
Figure 36. Cost of delay for FP............................................................................................................... 91 
Figure 37. Cost of delay for FP restricted regulated flights. .................................................................. 91 
Figure 38. Cost of delay for FP restricted non-regulated flights. .......................................................... 92 
Figure 39. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in FP scenarios ....................................... 99 
Figure 40. Average passenger centrality loss FP ................................................................................. 100 
Figure 41. Average passenger centrality loss FP ................................................................................. 102 
Figure 42. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in FP scenarios ..................................... 102 
Figure 43. Percentage change flight delay in FAC. .............................................................................. 105 
Figure 44. QQ-plots flight delay distributions default scenario FAC ................................................... 110 
Figure 45. QQ-plots flight delay distributions stressed scenario FAC ................................................. 110 
Figure 46. Percentage change flight delay in FAC restricted to airports with FAC. ............................ 111 
Figure 47. QQ-plots flight delay distributions default scenario FAC restricted airports with FAC ...... 116 
Figure 48. QQ-plots flight delay distributions stressed scenario FAC restricted airports with FAC .... 116 
Figure 49. Change in passenger delay for FAC .................................................................................... 118 
Figure 50. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC ......................................................................... 119 
Figure 51. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC ......................................................................... 119 
Figure 52. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC ......................................................................... 120 
Figure 53. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC ......................................................................... 120 
Figure 54. QQ-plot of costs in FAC baseline ........................................................................................ 127 
Figure 55. QQ-plot of costs in FAC stressed ........................................................................................ 128 
Figure 56. Percentage change average passenger centrality loss FAC ............................................... 129 
Figure 57. Comparison change average passenger centrality loss FAC .............................................. 130 
Figure 58. Comparison change average passenger centrality loss FAC restricted flights arrival FAC . 132 
Figure 59. Percentage change of the average trip centrality loss all airports with α=0.2 .................. 133 
Figure 60. Percentage change of the average trip centrality loss all airports with α=0.02 ................ 133 
Figure 61. Change of centrality loss with respect to the baseline for the airport of Edinburgh. ........ 138 
Figure 62. Percentage change Granger causality in mean FAC ........................................................... 139 
Figure 63. Percentage change Granger causality in mean FAC airports not implanting FAC ............. 140 
Figure 64. Distribution of reciprocity Granger causality in mean FAC ................................................ 141 
Figure 65. Number of reciprocal links (GC in mean network built with the state of delay) ............... 141 
Figure 66. Change of the mean degree (for GC in mean) ................................................................... 142 
Figure 67. Percentage change of Granger causality in tail network ................................................... 144 
Figure 68. Change of the mean degree (for GC in tail) FAC ................................................................ 144 
Figure 69. Percentage change of Granger causality in tai network only airports with FACl ............... 145 
Figure 70. Change of the mean degree (for GC in tail) stressed case FAC .......................................... 145 
 
List of tables  
Table 1. Scenarios parameters considered ........................................................................................... 16 
Table 2. Processes model in Domino with distributions. ...................................................................... 26 
Table 3. Calibration parameters considered for targets. ...................................................................... 28 
Table 4. Parameters from the distributions .......................................................................................... 29 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
8 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
Table 5. Model calibration summary. ................................................................................................... 30 
Table 6. Distribution of delays among the main reasons of delay. ....................................................... 32 
Table 7. Comparison of delay in the simulation and empirical data ..................................................... 32 
Table 8. Departure delay statistics for the 4DTA scenarios .................................................................. 54 
Table 9. Arrival delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios ............................................................................... 56 
Table 10. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios .................................................................. 58 
Table 11. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios ......................................... 58 
Table 12. Passenger indicators statistics for 4DTA mechanism. ........................................................... 59 
Table 13. Detailed costs by considering all flights 4DTA ....................................................................... 63 
Table 14. Detailed costs 4DTA considering flights with delays<300 min, excluding cancelled flights. . 64 
Table 15. Average passenger centrality loss, 4DTA ............................................................................... 69 
Table 16. Average trip centrality loss in 4DTA scenarios ...................................................................... 70 
Table 17.Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network 4DTA (delay) ......................................... 72 
Table 18. Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network 4DTA (cost of delay) ............................ 72 
Table 19. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail 4DTA ...................................................................... 74 
Table 20. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail 4DTA extreme events ............................................ 74 
Table 21. Departure delay statistics for the FP scenarios ..................................................................... 79 
Table 22. Arrival delay statistics for FP scenarios ................................................................................. 81 
Table 23. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FP scenarios ....................................................................... 82 
Table 24. Cancellations and reactionary delay statistics for FP ............................................................ 83 
Table 25. Departure delay statistics for the FP scenarios restricted..................................................... 83 
Table 26. Arrival delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted ................................................................. 85 
Table 27. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted ....................................................... 87 
Table 28. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted ............................. 87 
Table 29. Passenger indicators statistics for FP mechanism. ................................................................ 88 
Table 30. Detailed costs by considering all flights FP ............................................................................ 92 
Table 31. Detailed costs FP considering all regulated flights ................................................................ 94 
Table 32. Detailed costs FP considering flights with delays<300 min excluding cancelled. ................. 95 
Table 33. Detailed costs FP considering all regulated flights excluding cancelled ................................ 97 
Table 34. Average passenger centrality loss for FP ............................................................................... 99 
Table 35. Average passenger centrality loss for FP for airports with regulations .............................. 101 
Table 36. Average trip centrality loss FP ............................................................................................. 103 
Table 37. Average trip centrality loss FP restricted to airports with regulations ............................... 103 
Table 38. Departure delay statistics for the FAC scenarios ................................................................. 105 
Table 39. Arrival delay statistics for FAC scenarios ............................................................................. 107 
Table 40. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FAC scenarios ................................................................... 108 
Table 41. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for FAC scenarios ......................................... 109 
Table 42. Departure delay statistics for the FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC ............... 111 
Table 43. Arrival delay statistics for FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC ........................... 112 
Table 44. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC ................. 114 
Table 45. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics scenarios restricted to airports with FAC .... 115 
Table 46. Passenger indicators statistics for FAC mechanism............................................................. 116 
Table 47. Detailed costs for flights with delays<300 min FAC ............................................................ 121 
Table 48. Detailed costs with flights with delays<300 min restricted arriving at airports with FAC. . 122 
Table 49. Detailed costs excluding cancelled flights FAC .................................................................... 124 
Table 50. Detailed costs excluding cancelled flights restricted arrival airports with FAC ................... 125 
Table 51. Average passenger centrality loss all airports FAC .............................................................. 129 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
9
 
 
Table 52. Average passenger centrality loss all airports FAC airports with FAC ................................. 130 
Table 53. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.2 ...................................................... 133 
Table 54. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.02 .................................................... 134 
Table 55. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.2 restricted airports with FAC ......... 134 
Table 56. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.02 restricted airports with FAC ....... 135 
Table 57. Average trip centrality loss Edinburgh ................................................................................ 137 
Table 58. Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network FAC (delay) ........................................ 138 
Table 59. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail network FAC (delay) ............................................ 143 
 
  
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
10 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
 
Executive summary 
This deliverable presents the first results of the full Domino model. It focuses on the investigative 
case studies and on the impact of each of the three mechanisms selected and modelled in Domino. 
The model focuses on the traffic of the 12th September 2014 considering flights and passengers’ 
itineraries. This operational environment has been used for the calibration activities which are 
presented in this document. The calibration of the model has been performed only approximately for 
this deliverable, due to foreseen changes in the code. The model has been adjusted considering 
historical values and, in particular, delay statistics from EUROCONTROL CODA [1]. Some 
shortcomings of this calibration are highlighted and will be considered for the final version of the 
model (e.g., higher cancellation rate than desired; lack of earlier-than-scheduled departures in the 
model, while present in the historical data). 
The three mechanisms that are considered in Domino are: 
• 4D Trajectory Adjustment (4DTA), which focuses on the use of dynamic cost indexing and 
waiting for passenger rules at hubs; 
• Flight Prioritisation (FP), which considers the possibility of slot swapping when ATFM delay is 
assigned due to regulations at the arrival airport; 
• Flight Arrival Coordination (FAC), which considers the implementation of E-AMAN at selected 
airports with different prioritisation strategies to create the arrival sequence. 
Each mechanism is modelled with three incremental levels of complexity: 
• Level 0, aimed at capturing the current operational environment; 
• Level 1, with improvements that could be achieved in the short term in the context of SESAR; 
• Level 2, with more advanced features to provide exploratory results. 
The detailed description of the mechanisms are provided in D3.1 (Architecture definition [2]). 
Finally, two levels of system stress (i.e., delay) are considered: 
• default, where delay in the system is similar to a nominal operating day; 
• stressed, where delay has been artificially increased (by selecting high ATFM regulations, and 
lower airport capacity), in order to assess how the mechanisms perform in these situations. 
This is more aligned with expected traffic growth and capacity-demand stresses in the 
system. 
With these considerations, a total of 14 scenarios are analysed and presented in this deliverable: 
• default: all three mechanisms at Level 0; 
• ‘unitary’: all three mechanisms each at Level 1 and 2, with the other mechanisms kept at 
Level 0; 
• the corresponding 7 extra scenarios, to those above, all in the stressed case. 
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Some scenarios where more than one mechanism is activated above Level 0 have been computed 
(e.g., tactical scenario where 4DTA and FAC are implemented at a higher level). However, due to the 
complexity of the interactions between the mechanisms and the focus here on understanding how 
the mechanisms perform and the capabilities/limitations of the model and the metrics, these are not 
presented in this deliverable. 
In Deliverable D5.1 - Metrics and analysis approach [3], classical metrics were analysed but more 
importantly, new network related metrics were presented: centrality, able to indicate how a node in 
the network is important for the connectivity of passengers, and causality, reflecting indirect 
causality relationship between nodes. In this deliverable, the usage of these metrics and their 
computational approach is presented for the different scenarios mentioned above at a European-
wide level. In this deliverable, these metrics already show their potential and highlight their possible 
evolution towards more operational indicators. The model is very detailed and low-level, which 
allows us to obtain a fine representation of many standard (e.g., delay) and advanced metrics (e.g., 
cost or passenger trip duration). 
The summary of the main findings for all the mechanisms is that in the stressed case, all advanced 
levels of all mechanisms improve the cost impact on the airlines with respect to Level 0. For some 
mechanisms, this is achieved with trade-offs with other KPIs (e.g., a worsening of the average arrival 
delay). This is expected, as different flights might experience different costs of delay and hence those 
will be prioritised when focus is put on cost, rather than delay. 
Passengers might experience longer trip times under some mechanisms. This indicates that focusing 
on airline cost does not necessarily benefit the passenger experience as airline and passenger 
objectives might not be fully aligned (in particular, when the cost of fuel is considered, the 
mechanisms might trade delay for fuel savings). 
The centrality of airports tends to improve with the introduction of the mechanisms. Interestingly, 
these effects are sometimes identified even if the airport does not implement the mechanism itself 
(e.g., airports benefiting from others having an advanced Flight Arrival Coordination in place). 
With respect to causality, results are mixed across the mechanisms and scenarios. In some cases, 
improvements are observed where causality links decrease, but in others the system gets ‘tighter’ 
(more strongly coupled), leading to a worsening of these performances. 
In general, mechanisms provide a better relative outcome with respect to maintaining current (Level 
0) implementations, under the stressed scenarios. This could be expected, as if there is not much 
delay (as in the default case), then the mechanisms do not provide a significant benefit. 
All these results indicate that, whilst the model needs some finer calibration and improvements, it is 
already able to capture the intricate effects arising from the massive number of interactions and the 
tight connection of the system elements, and to reflect the impact of changes in the ATM 
environment. 
Focusing on the different mechanisms, their main results can be summarised as follows: 
• 4D Trajectory Adjustment 
EDITION 01.00.00 
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o The implementation of advanced levels of 4DTA (Level 1 and Level 2) leads to a 
general slowing down of flights (or not speeding up that much), relative to the 
default scenario. This drives an increase in delay (for flights and passengers) and is 
due to the explicit consideration of fuel costs when deciding whether to recover 
delay. 
o While passenger delays increase, when the mechanism is implemented at Level 1, 
the metrics evaluating the preservation of passenger itineraries (i.e., the number of 
passengers with a modified itinerary and the passenger centrality metrics) show that 
passengers arrive more often at their destination using their scheduled itinerary than 
in the baseline. The mechanism is effective at prioritising and maintaining those 
connections. 
o At Level 2, however, speeding up is reassessed at top of climb, allowing the speed to 
be reduced with respect to the planned speed, thus saving fuel. The potential 
reduction in fuel costs is traded against passengers’ connectivity. Around 15% of 
flights which initially (at gate) decide to speed up, at top of climb decide to take 
advantage of the possibility to slow down and save fuel instead. This might be 
triggered due to most up to date information on passenger expected missed 
connections and costs and a better estimation of the expected inbound arrival delay. 
o The propagation of costs of delay among airports, as measured by the density of 
causal links among airports, diminishes. However, in most cases this decrease of cost 
propagation does not seem to eliminate the bidirectional propagation patterns 
measured by the reciprocity, which potentially increases costs by propagating them 
in a loop (also known as ‘back propagation’). 
• Flight Prioritisation 
o At a system level, the impact of this mechanism on the costs experienced by airlines 
is negligible. This mechanism only applies to around 2% of the flights (i.e., the ones 
which arrive at an airport that is regulated due to ATFM). Results show some 
benefits when restricted to flights that arrive at an airport implementing an ATFM 
regulation. 
o In the default scenario, the experience of passengers is worsened. However, in the 
stressed cases, there is an improvement of passenger metrics. The economic interest 
of airlines is better aligned with passengers' convenience in the high delay cases. 
o In the stressed scenarios, there is an improvement of trip centrality loss in the 
airports affected by ATFM regulations. 
o At a system level, the mechanism does not have an impact on the propagation of 
delay (measured through causality). 
• Flight Arrival Coordination 
o In the scenarios where the FAC mechanism is implemented, a decrease of average 
delay is seen at Level 1, but the mechanism is less effective on delay reduction at 
Level 2. This is expected, as in Level 2 the Arrival Coordination mechanism aims to 
minimise the airline costs and not necessarily the delay, while Level 1 focuses on the 
total delay (arrival and reactionary) at the airport. If the analysis is restricted to 
airports that implement the mechanism, the improvements are, as expected, larger, 
particularly for passenger associated costs. 
o Passenger delays decrease, especially in the stressed case. The disruption of 
passengers' itineraries, as measured by the number of passengers with modified 
itineraries and by passenger centrality loss, sees an overall improvement. 
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o Network effects are identified for this mechanism. Passenger centrality loss is 
improved for airports that do not implement the mechanism, even if they are larger. 
This indicates that introduction of FAC has positive externalities also on airports that 
do not implement it. 
o There is an overall decrease in the level of causality measured by a diminished 
number of propagation channels at the European level. Once again, some 
externalities can be quantified on the impact of the mechanism on airports that 
don't implement it. In most cases, the reduction in the level of causality has a small 
effect on the bidirectional propagation patterns measured by the reciprocity, which 
potentially enhances delays, through back propagation. 
The information presented in this deliverable has played an important role in the validation, 
dissemination and feedback activities of Domino. Domino participated in a workshop with airspace 
users and organised a dedicated full day workshop with ATM experts to present the model, the 
calibration and some of the results. More information about these activities can be found in D6.3 - 
Workshop results summary [4]. 
All the information gathered, results from the validation, shortcomings identified with the model 
from the validation and the analysis of the results, limitations and possible evolution of the metrics 
(particularly focusing on the practicalities of the operational usage of the new network metrics) and 
the selection of relevant scenarios to be modelled for the final version of Domino, will be considered 
in D3.3 - Adaptive case studies description. In this way, D3.3 will become the blueprint of the 
activities that will be undertaken until the end of the project, and the information presented in this 
deliverable is one of the key drivers of these activities. 
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1 Introduction 
This deliverable presents the calibration of the first version of the model and the results of the 
analysis of key scenarios identified in the investigative case studies. These results have been used to: 
• obtain feedback from stakeholders (some results were presented in two different workshop 
activities - see D6.3 Workshop results summary [4]), 
• along with the feedback, identify changes that need to be done to the metrics, the model 
and the scenarios for the final version of Domino. 
This introduction presents the key elements of the deliverable starting by the investigative case 
studies, the model calibration activities and the differentiation between classical and network 
metrics, and presents the structure of the document.  
 
1.1 Investigative case studies 
In Deliverable D3.1 Architecture definition [2] the different elements that will be modelled in Domino 
were identified. This included three mechanisms with different levels of implementation: 
• 4D Trajectory adjustment (4DTA): focusing on airspace users management of disruption by 
modifying, adapting their flights (i.e., dynamic cost indexing and waiting-for-passenger at 
hub); 
• Flight prioritisation (FP): this mechanism considers different alternatives to manage the delay 
assigned by ATFM regulations at destination airports (e.g., no swap allowed, swapping within 
intra-airline flights and swapping slots inter-airline); 
• Flight Arrival Coordination (FAC): FAC mechanism tries to capture different implementation 
of extended arrival managers (E-AMAN), from focusing on the runway arrival throughput, to 
considering reactionary delay at the airport or airline expected costs. 
As described in D3.2 Investigative case studies description [5], two different delay levels are 
considered: baseline and stressed, where delay is significantly increased, cases. 
This deliverable will focus on the results of unitary case studies to understand the impact of the 
mechanisms in isolation. See Section 2 for more details on the scenarios modelled and analysed. 
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1.2 Model calibration 
The ABM model described in D4.1 Initial model design [6] has been implemented. There are some 
effects that are explicitly modelled (e.g., propagation of delay due to reactionary delay), but others 
are the results of a higher abstraction (e.g., actual taxi time or turnaround times). These parameters 
are stochastically sampled from distributions that need to be calibrated. 
This has been done considering the baseline scenario which represents the current (2014) operations 
and considering the analysis from different data sources to use them as calibration targets. Section 3 
of this deliverable present these calibration activities and outcomes. 
1.3 Classical and network metrics 
As described in Deliverable D5.1 Metrics and analysis approach [3], classical metrics (delay, cost) 
have been defined in the past and used considering different stakeholders (namely flights and 
passengers). Domino goes beyond those metrics identifying and defining network metrics which 
focus on centrality and causality. The different metrics that have been computed for the different 
scenarios are summarised before presenting the scenarios results in Section 4 of the deliverable. 
1.4 Structure and contents of this deliverable 
Section 2 condenses the information on the scenarios modelled and analysed in this deliverable. 
Section 3 describes the results of the calibration activities carried out in the baseline scenario. The 
data sources used for these validation activities are also identified. 
The results of the investigative case studies described in Section 2 are presented in Section 4. In 
order to facilitate the readability of the document this section has been structured as follows: first 
the metrics that have been computed and the main assumptions for their estimation are described 
(Section 4.1). Then a summary of the key results is presented (Section 4.2). This summary highlights 
the main findings for the different scenarios and will be sufficient for readers interested in this 
comparison between scenarios. The detailed analysis of the different scenarios is then presented in 
Section 4.3, where for each mechanism implemented the results on flight and passenger delays, cost, 
centrality losses and causality analysis are described for the baseline and stressed cases. 
Conclusions of these analysis (beyond the comparison between the scenarios) are summarised in 
Section 5. The deliverable closes with Section 6 where next steps and look ahead is presented, 
Section 7 with the references and the acronyms grouped in Section 8. 
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2 Scenarios modelled and analysed 
The results presented in this deliverable have been obtained using several scenarios. In D3.1, the 
Domino project has produced a roadmap for the simulations, in order to prioritise the scenarios. In 
this deliverable, we focus mainly on producing results for the isolated mechanisms, in order to test 
and understand them, with a special emphasis on the Level 2 implementation. As a reminder, for 
each mechanism, three levels of implementation are defined in Domino following this rationale: 
• Level 0: representing current (2014) situation, 
• Level 1: advanced capabilities, 
• Level 2: exploratory approach. 
Two level of congestion are considered in the simulations: 
• Default scenario: congestion level based on 2014 data, 
• Stressed scenario: highly congested system. 
Table 1. Scenarios parameters considered 
Congestion level 4DTA FP FAC 
• Default 
• Stressed 
• Level 0 
• Level 1 
• Level 2 
• Level 0 
• Level 1 
• Level 2 
• Level 0 
• Level 1 
• Level 2 
 
Combining these features (mechanism and congestion level (as shown in Table 1)), this deliverable 
analysed the following scenarios: 
1. Default scenario (with all mechanisms at Level 0) 
2. Default scenario + 4DTA Level 1 
3. Default scenario + 4DTA Level 2 
4. Default scenario + FP Level 1 
5. Default scenario + FP Level 2 
6. Default scenario + FAC Level 1 
7. Default scenario + FAC Level 2 
and the same number for the stressed scenario, for a total of 14 scenarios. 
In the following, we describe more in detail how we built some of the scenarios, and in particular 
how we implemented the different mechanisms. 
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2.1 Default scenario 
The default scenario is based on a typical day of 2014, the 12th of September (the rationale for the 
selection of this day has been described in [2]). Individual passenger itineraries are modelled for this 
day, as well as scheduled flights (including type of aircraft and scheduled departure). These two 
components are kept constant throughout all the simulations for any scenario. To this baseline of 
schedules and itineraries, stochastic delays are added: 
• for taxi-in, taxi-out, airborne delay, non-ATFM delay, distributions from an independent 
analysis of data are modelled. 
• for ATFM delay, we use an historical sample of regulations from one year of data. 
Regulations are either modelled by explicitly assigning flights to slots (when the regulations 
are applied at arrival airports) or based on a probabilistic model (to capture weather and 
non-weather related airspace regulations). For the regulations at airports we draw at random 
the regulations which were issued at a given historical day at airports and model them in 
Domino. The days from which to draw the airport regulations are ranked by the number of 
regulations issued and a random day between the 20th and the 80th percentile is selected. 
2.2 Stressed scenario 
We built a 'stressed' scenario in order to see how the implemented mechanism will respond to this 
operational environment. To achieve this, we increase the level of delay in the system at different 
points: airborne, taxi-in and taxi-out, and also by selecting higher quantiles for the ATFM regulations 
explicitly modelled at airports. 
This creates an environment where most flights experience delay, which explores the performance of 
the mechanisms as 'delay and cost management tools', as opposed to 'smoother of operation 
management tools' in the default scenarios. As an indication, the average delay in these scenarios is 
roughly three times the delay in the default one (~30 minutes versus ~10 minutes). 
2.3 4DTA mechanism 
4DTA mechanism deal with the tactical management of delay by airlines on their flights. Two sub-
mechanisms are considered: modifying the cost index of a flight to recover part of the expected 
delay and/or actively delaying a flight to wait for connecting passengers. 
2.3.1 Level 0 
At Level 0, we use rules of thumb that serve as an approximation of the current practices in the 
airline industry for the tactical management of flight delay and waiting for passengers at the hub. 
Two sub-mechanisms are considered: 
• determining the cost index of a flight (before take-off), i.e., an increment or not on the 
cruising speed. 
• deciding whether a flight waits for delayed connecting passenger 
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The specific parameters of these mechanisms have been calibrated according to the feedback 
received from a number of experts in the industry. 
Cost index is calculated before the take-off (i.e., at push back) and it is fixed throughout the flight. To 
decide on its speed, the flight uses the information about its departure delay. At "pushback ready", 
the departure delay is assessed by comparing estimated off-block time (EOBT) with scheduled off-
block time (SOBT): 
	

     
The attempted delay recovery is then performed according to the probability distribution shown on 
Figure 1. If the estimated departure delay is smaller than 15 minutes, the flight does not try to 
recover it. If it is larger than 60 minutes, the flight will try to recover as much delay as possible (up to 
5 minutes) by selecting a higher speed than the planned one. Upon the consultation with the experts, 
we decided to never recover the delays of up to 5 minutes as it does not make economic sense. 
Lastly, the decision on recovering any delay between 15 and 60 minutes is made stochastically 
according to the linear probabilistic distribution on Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Probabilistic distribution for deciding on the delay recovery depending on the estimated 
departure delay. 
Naturally, maximum delay that can be recovered is limited by maximum additional fuel available. At 
Level 0, in order to make the application of this rule more aligned with the current practices, the 
flight never speeds up to the maximum possible speed; rather, the speeding up is capped at 90% of 
the maximum velocity. 
Note that a change on cruise speed will imply also a change on the TOD, generally increasing the 
cruise and reducing the slower descend. 
Wait for passengers is performed 5 minutes before the "pushback ready" event, and it is triggered by 
a special event called "pax check event". At that moment, we run a check that inspects which 
passengers are not at the gate ready for boarding, and we estimate how much time they need to 
make it to the gate. For this estimate, we use the information on their current position: If they 
are/were arriving on a connecting flight, the in-block time of their previous flight is used (real or 
estimated, depending on the status of the flight). In addition, the average minimum connecting time 
is taken into account for the calculation of their estimated at-gate time. The average minimum 
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connecting time has been pre-calculated for each airport and it depends on the type of connection 
the passenger is making: domestic - domestic, domestic - international, etc. 
Finally, the flight decides to wait for any passenger with a flexible ticket whose at-gate time is 
estimated to be at most 15 minutes later with respect to the flight's expected push back time. 
2.3.2 Level 1 
The cost index at Level 1 is assessed at the top of climb (TOC). Firstly, the arrival delay of a flight is 
estimated by comparing the current estimate of EIBT and SIBT (instead of the departing delay as in 
Level 0). According to that estimate, the flight performs a potential delay recovery by looking at two 
types of costs: 
• fuel cost: the cost of the extra fuel that would be needed in order to recover a delay (fully or 
partially); 
• time cost: the cost of unrecovered delay, which includes non-passenger costs (maintenance 
and crew costs), as well as passenger costs (compensation, soft costs and the costs due to 
the effects of reactionary delays). 
The two cost functions are estimated on the range of the estimated arrival delay, and the delay 
recovery is performed with a time resolution of 1 minute (i.e., the flight can only decide to recover a 
rounded number of minutes). The recovery decision is made by observing the total cost, i.e., the sum 
of the fuel and time cost. The flight chooses a recovery time (in minutes) that expects to minimise 
the total cost (on the domain ranging from 0 minutes to estimated arrival delay). 
Unlike at Level 0, there is no limitation on the maximum velocity that the flight can choose in order 
to recover delay, as the decision is purely driven by the cost and the objective to find the optimal 
solution given the estimated costs. 
At Level 1, wait for passengers is performed at the same time stamp as in Level 0: 5 minutes before 
"pushback ready". However, unlike at Level 0, at Level 1, the flights make more informed decisions 
on whether to wait for a certain passenger by looking at the costs of each decision. 
For each group of passengers (passenger with the same estimated at-gate time), two types of costs 
are estimated: 
• waiting cost: the cost of waiting a passenger group  	for  minutes with respect to EOBT. 
This wait would essentially delay the EOBT for n minutes, and thus this is the cost of delaying 
the flight (EOBT) for 	minutes. 
• not-waiting cost: the cost of not waiting a group of passengers and having to take care of 
them. This cost includes different types of care that the airline needs to provide to the 
passengers that missed their connecting flight for no fault of their own: duty of care, 
compensation cost and transfer cost. Transfer cost is calculated by searching for alternative 
itineraries for stranded passengers, estimating the cost of each itinerary and choosing the 
least expensive one. Additionally, this also includes soft costs - the cost airline will suffer due 
to a potential future loss of passengers or reputation. 
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The final decision is made by looking at all waiting and not-waiting costs (across all the delayed 
passenger groups), and the wait time that minimises the total additional cost. 
2.3.3 Level 2 
Level 2 couples the assessment of cost index and wait-for-passenger decision process via a unified 
cost function. In that way, the optimisation is improved by relying on the sum of all the costs outlined 
in the previous section (Level 1), including the possibility to recover a part of delay by speeding up 
and spending more fuel than planned. There are two points during a flight when delay is assessed 
and 4DTA mechanisms potentially applied: at "pax check event" (5 minutes before 
"pushback_ready") and the top of climb. 
At 5 minutes before a flight is ready for push back, a joined assessment of departure delay (and its 
potential recovery) and wait for passenger options is performed. Similarly as in Level 1, we assess 
current estimated departure delay and consider recovery options by speeding up (changing cost 
index before departure) through assessing the cost of those options. At the same time, the check for 
missing passengers is performed, and waiting costs and not-waiting costs are calculated for each 
passenger group (see Level 1). All those estimated costs are added and observed on the domain of 
recoverable delay (from 0 to the maximum number of minutes a flight can recover by speeding up 
and using the extra fuel available). The decision that minimises the total cost is taken, and according 
to it, cost index might be changed (speeding up) and a number of passenger groups waited for. I.e., a 
decision to wait and recover delay is performed before push back. 
Example. Let's assume that the currently estimated departure delay of the flight is 20 minutes, and 
there are 2 passenger groups estimated to be late for boarding with delays of 10 and 15 minutes 
(w.r.t. updated push back time, i.e., waiting 10 minutes will allow the first group of passengers arrive 
to the flight, waiting 15 minutes will ensure that both group of passengers can board the plane). In 
this case, all the costs are assessed on the domain of possible delays ranging from 0 (recovering all of 
the delay, which would require significant increase in velocity and thus spending a large amount of 
additional fuel, if all 20 minutes can be recovered by speeding up) to 35 minutes (meaning the flight 
is waiting for both passenger groups and deciding not to recover any delay). 
At the top of climb, the assessment of expected arrival delay potential speeding up is done as in 
Level 1. The novelty when compared to the previous level is the ability for a flight to slow down at 
the top of climb if the (currently) expected arrival time (EIBT) is at least 15 minutes before the 
scheduled arrival time (SIBT). In this case, the flight decides to slow down by adding  minutes to the 
flight, where       15. 
2.4 FP mechanism 
The Flight Prioritisation mechanism deals with the potential swap of ATFM slots at regulations 
defined at arrival airports by airlines. 
2.4.1 Level 0 
At Level 0, no swap is performed by the airlines. The delay that is assigned due to ATFM regulations 
at arrival is performed by the flight who receives it. 
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2.4.2 Level 1 
At Level 1, swaps between flights can be performed if they belong to the same airline. Every time a 
departure flight plan is submitted (whether it is the first flight plan for this flight or not), the airline 
estimates if a swap can be done with this flight if ATFM delay has been assigned. The conditions 
considered are the following: 
• both flights must be in the same regulation at their arrival airport; 
• the estimated cost of the swap must be negative (i.e., the swap has a positive impact 
overall). 
The cost of the swap is estimated using the following rule: if COBT1 is the controlled off-block time of 
the first flight, COBT2 the time of the second flight, and cost1 and cost2 the delay cost function of the 
first and second flight, then we compute: 
 !"#$ % #!" $  ! !" $ % #!"#$$ 
i.e., the total cost of delay if the COBT are swapped minus the cost of delay if they are not. The cost 
function used for this mechanism is different from the one used for 4DTA at TOC, since the 
estimation of the cost happens on the ground, before the departure of the flight. More specifically, 
the cost function is evaluated using as delay the controlled off-block time minus the scheduled one, 
and includes the following components: 
• non-pax cost (maintenance and crew); 
• passenger soft cost; 
• duty of care; 
• passenger compensation. 
Moreover, the delays for passengers are computed using the updated information on their next 
flights and worst case scenarios. In particular, when a passenger is expected to miss their next flight. 
A full 12 hours delay with overnight compensation is considered. 
Some network effects are also taken into consideration using, again, the worst case scenario. We 
gather information on the next flights using the same aircraft and consider that all of these flights will 
have the same cost than the current one. 
Note that in theory we could estimate exactly which flight will be impacted by the propagation of 
delay, in terms of aircraft and/or connecting passengers, since all information is known to the airlines 
(or can be requested from another airline). However, this information takes too long to compute, 
especially for passengers, which increases by a large factor the time of the simulation. As a 
consequence, in this deliverable the above heuristics is used for the decision-making process of 
swapping the slots. 
2.4.3 Level 2 
At Level 2, flights can be swapped among difference airlines. The mechanism works otherwise exactly 
the same. The airline starts by checking all flights in the same regulation at the arrival airports, and 
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then requests some information from another airline, if needed, in order to compute the total cost of 
the swap. The same cost function is applied, and the swap is performed is the cost is negative. 
It is clear that in reality, different airlines will never share their true cost, first because it is sensitive 
information, and more importantly because they have no incentive to not inflate their own reported 
cost. In the model, we consider that there is a market mechanism (e.g., credit system, auction) in 
place which allows us to have an efficient market for swaps and thus do a swap only if it is beneficial 
in average (for instance by giving back some money to the airline delaying its flight). This market 
mechanism might or might not be feasible in reality, which is another interesting research question. 
Thus, the model should be considered as a best case in this regard. 
2.5 FAC mechanism 
The Flight Arrival Coordination mechanism focuses on the sequencing done by the extended arrival 
manager at airports. This mechanism is only implemented in airports which have or are expected to 
operate an E-AMAN system (24 airports as according to the SESAR Pilot Common Project [7]): EBBR, 
EDDB, EDDF, EDDL, EDDM, EGCC, EGKK, EGLL, EGSS, EHAM, EIDW, EKCH, ENGM, ESSA, LEBL, LEMD, 
LEPA, LFMN, LFPG, LFPO, LIMC, LIRF, LOWW and LSZH. 
 
 
Figure 2. Extended Arrival Manager scope. 
For the above mentioned airports two horizons are defined around them: planning horizon (200 nm 
from the airport) and a tactical or execution horizon (120 nm from the airport) (see Figure 2). These 
distances are in accordance with the expected extension of the arrival managers from 100-120 nm to 
180-200 nm [7]. When flights enter the planning horizon, all the flights which are located in the 
scope of the arrival manager, i.e., between the 120 nm and 200 nm radii around the airport, are re-
optimised, i.e., assigned to the slots which are either planned or available, considering a given 
optimisation function which depends on the Level of the mechanism. The flight which triggers this 
optimisation, i.e., the one which enters the arrival manager, receives the amount of delay that it is 
expected to experience. This ensures that the best sequence is maintained within the arrival 
manager with respect to the optimisation function, and that the flight can slow down to absorb part 
of the delay saving some fuel if delay is expected. However, as the amount of delay that can be 
absorbed is very limited, only the flight which enters the arrival manager considers this speed and 
TOD variation. When flights arrive at the execution horizon, the sequence is re-optimised and the 
final arrival slot is assigned to the flight. If delay is needed, this will be done as holding. The arrival 
capacity at the airport is considered at both horizons. 
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For the airports which are not listed above, a simple arrival manager located at 100 nm from the 
airport is considered, and a first-in first-out approach modelled. The assigned delay will hence be 
done as holding. This ensures that the arrival capacity at the airport is not exceeded. 
2.5.1 Level 0 
In Level 0, current principles applied on E-AMAN systems are considered: The Flight Arrival 
Coordination tries to minimise the amount of holding delay that will be carried out at the TMA by 
minimising the total holding delay. The FAC is focused on the maximisation of the arrival throughput 
at the runway. No information from the airlines is taken into account when applying this mechanism. 
When a flight enters the planning horizon, the first slot available in the sequence from the flight 
estimated landing time is assigned. In a similar manner, once the flight enters the execution horizon, 
the first available slot is assigned and the holding delay computed. 
2.5.2 Level 1 
In Level 1, the arrival manager tries to minimise the delay that the airport will generate. This includes 
the arrival delay but also the potential reactionary delay. In order to achieve this, when the flight 
enters the planning horizon, the FAC requests from the flight the expected total delay that the flight 
will experience for each available slot (i.e., arrival delay + expected reactionary delay). The flight 
provides this information considering the EIBT for each landing slot (i.e., arrival delay) and adding the 
expected reactionary delay. The expected reactionary delay is computed by the flight by requesting 
to the AOC the time from which delay will be propagated. To do this, the AOC considers the SOBT of 
next flight of the same aircraft and the expected turnaround time (i.e., 
&'	()'	*+&+		*&	,	)-  ./	0123  	4))4	&'). 
The expected reactionary delay is then estimated by the flight for each possible slot as 
max	!0, :!&-:$ % 	&.&'  &'		)-$. 
The objective function of FAC Level 1 is then the minimisation of the expected total delay (i.e., arrival 
delay + expected reactionary delay) for all the flights in the scope of the FAC. Figure 3 presents the 
messages interchanged between the FAC, Flight and AOC agents when a flight enters the planning 
horizon. 
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Figure 3. FAC Level 1 messages at planning horizon 
When the flight enters the execution horizon, the optimisation is recomputed but considering the 
same expected delays for the different slots. I.e., the FAC does not have to request any further 
information from the flight. 
2.5.3 Level 2 
In Level 2, the same principle applies in the FAC, but in this case, instead of the expected total delay 
for each slot, the expected cost is considered. In this case the flight will: 
• Request the expected cost of delay from the AOC for each slot. 
• Compute the potential fuel savings that could be done by absorbing part of the delay 
reducing the speed. 
• Compute the cost due to the holding fuel needed for each slot. 
Consider these three points to compute an expected total cost of each slot. 
The FAC will then minimise the total expected cost for all the flights in its scope. Figure 4 presents 
the different messages exchanged. 
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Figure 4. FAC Level 2 messages at planning horizon 
As in the Level 1 implementation, when the flight enters the execution horizon, the same 
optimisation is performed with the already provided information. 
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3 Model calibration 
This section presents the process by which the model has been calibrated and the quality of the 
calibration. The current calibration has been performed considering the average values coming out 
of the simulations with the corresponding values available on the empirical dataset. Part of the 
validity of the model lies in the fact that the distributions obtained as output of the model match also 
the empirical data. A more complete calibration will be performed for the final version of the model. 
3.1 Data used for calibration 
There are many processes in the model that are represented explicitly such as turnaround times and 
hence the propagation of reactionary delay. These processes lead to the output delay from the 
simulation. Some processes, are based on statistical distributions. For example, the average wind 
encountered by flights during the en-route phase, or the amount of ATFM delay assigned to a flight 
due to an en-route regulation. Table 2 presents some of the key processes that are modelled in 
Domino, and how their distributions have been adjusted. 
Table 2. Processes model in Domino with distributions. 
Process Distribution Based on 
Taxi-in 
LogNormal distribution considering 
mean, standard deviation and 
modifier to consider baseline or 
stressed scenarios. 
IATA Summer Season 2010 from CODA [8] 
Taxi-out 
LogNormal distribution considering 
mean, standard deviation and 
modifier to consider baseline or 
stressed scenarios. 
IATA Summer Season 2010 from CODA [9] 
Climb 
uncertainty 
Normal distribution minutes 
Analysis DDR difference between planned 
and executed trajectories (m2, m3) from 
DCI4HD2D Project [10] 
Cruise Normal distribution nm 
Analysis DDR difference between planned 
and executed trajectories (m2, m3) from 
DCI4HD2D Project [10] 
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Wind 
Empirical probability distribution 
function for planned wind during the 
cruise. Used average wind between 
regions. No noise added on execution. 
For each ANSP to ANSP origin and 
destination airport consider the 
difference between requested speed and 
observed average ground speed for cruise 
segments from DDR2 analysis 
(AIRAC1409) [11] 
Turnaround 
time 
Exponential distribution considering: 
• Minimum turnaround time 
based on airport size, aircraft 
wake and type of airline (REG, 
CHT, LCC, FSC) 
Lambda which depends on scenario 
(Default or High delay) 
Analysis of turnaround times performed 
in POEM project and used in 
ComplexityCosts project [12] 
Probability 
ATFM delay 
When regulation is explicit at airport, 
the regulations are based on a given 
historical day. The days are selected 
based on their percentile ranked by 
number of regulations at airport in the 
day. There is a minimum and 
maximum percentile to be considered 
for baseline and stressed scenarios. 
For regulations in the airspace there 
are two probabilities one for 
regulations due to weather and 
another for regulations due to any 
other reason. 
Based on analysis of DDR2 (AIRAC1313-
1413 excluding days with industrial 
actions) [11] 
ATFM delay 
Empirical probability distribution 
function for regulations due to 
weather and regulations for other 
reasons. 
Based on analysis of DDR2 (AIRAC1313-
1413 excluding days with industrial 
actions) [11] 
Non-ATFM 
delay 
Exponential distribution with different 
lambda as a function of scenario: 
baseline, stressed 
- 
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Passenger 
connecting 
times 
LogNormal distribution 
Considering minimum connecting 
times per airport and type of 
connection (between national flights, 
from national to international and 
between international flights), sigma 
and percentile of passengers who 
connect in less than the minimum 
connecting time. 
Based on analysis of minimum connecting 
times at ECAC airports originally 
performed in POEM project [13] 
Variation of 
cruise length 
due to DCI 
Normal distribution nm 
Analysis of Performance using Airbus PEP 
[14] 
 
Then, there are some parameters that can be further adjusted/calibrated, in order to adjust the 
performance of the model to existing historical datasets. Table 3Table 4 presents the data sources 
used to identify the target values for key indicators. Note that we are basing the scenarios on the 
traffic of a given day. Therefore, we have been able to reconstruct the schedules of that day with the 
execution of the flights from DDR2, and use this information for the validation of the model. 
Table 3. Calibration parameters considered for targets. 
Parameter Source 
Departure delay 
Reconstructed schedules compared with AOBT from 
DDR2 (m3) 
Arrival delay 
Reconstructed schedules compared with estimated 
AIBT from DDR2 (m3) 
Delay distribution per reason (Reactionary, 
en-route, capacity, weather) 
CODA 2017 report [1] 
Flight plan length (nm) DDR2 (m1) 
Flight plan duration (min) DDR2 (m1) 
Flight execution length (nm) DDR2 (m3) 
Flight execution duration (min) DDR2 (m3) 
Taxi-in 
Reconstructed schedules compared with planned taxi 
times from DDR2 (m1) 
Taxi-out Take off time - AOBT estimated form DDR2 (m3) 
Gate-to-gate time (min) DDR2 with estimated taxi times 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
29
 
 
Cancellation rate CODA 2017 report [1] 
 
Finally, Table 4 present the parameters that have been adjusted. Some of these parameters have 
been chosen based on expert judgment, whereas others have been calibrated using some of the 
above metrics. 
Table 4. Parameters from the distributions that have been adjusted in the model as part of the 
calibration process. 
Process Parameter Possible values 
Turnaround time 
Lambda of exponential 
distribution 
• Default delay scenario value 
• High delay scenario value 
Climb uncertainty Extra climb minutes 
• Value adjusted for calibration in 
baseline scenario 
Airport capacity 
modifier 
Reduction of airport capacity 
• Default scenario value: no 
reduction 
• High delay scenario value: half 
capacity reduction 
Airport capacity 
adjustment 
Adjustment of capacity at airport 
considering demand lower due to 
non-inclusion of non-passenger 
commercial flights 
Value adjusted based on baseline 
scenario analysis of DDR2 flights 
Non-ATFM delay 
Parameter in exponential 
distribution, typical delay 
• Default delay scenario value 
(calibrated on DDR2 data) 
• High delay scenario value 
Probability of ATFM 
delay explicit at 
airport 
Day selection minimum and 
maximum percentile considered 
• Default delay scenario values (0.3-
0.8) 
• High delay scenario values (0.8-1) 
Taxi time modifier Increment of taxi time 
• Default scenario value: no 
increment 
• High delay scenario value: half 
increment 
Passenger connecting 
time 
Percentage of passengers who 
made the connection in less time 
than the MCT 
Sigma for the LogNormal 
distribution 
Value adjusted for calibration in 
baseline scenario 
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Cancellation rate Ratio of cancelled flights per day Value adjusted for calibration in 
baseline scenario 
3.2 Results of calibration 
3.2.1 Delay structure 
We first investigate the structure of the various delays and travel times produced by the model. 
Given the small number of free parameters in the model, the calibration is performed by mainly 
tuning iteratively the average of some of the delays injected into the model to match the average of 
other metrics that can be computed on the empirical data for comparison (see Table 3). Most of 
these distributions have been obtained using some analyses empirical data, as explained in the 
previous section. In practice, we used the cancellation rate and the non-ATFM delay distribution to 
calibrate the model. 
The cancellation rate has initially been set to 2%, which is the consistent with some high cancellation 
rate months observed in 2014 and 2017 [15] [1]. This value is relatively high and will be reviewed in 
the next model version. However, after the calibration of this parameter, the explicit cancellation of 
flights due to curfew was included in the model. This leads to an unexpected high cancellation rate of 
around 3.9%. The inclusion of explicit cancellations means that the statistical probability of cancelling 
a flight needs to be reviewed in next versions of the model. 
Once the cancellation rate is fixed, the distribution of the delay due to non-ATFM causes has been 
adjusted.Table 5 presents the summary of the results of the calibration. This table shows the 
departure and arrival delays ("arrival positive delay" is computed considering negative delays as null), 
gate-to-gate times, flying distances, taxi times, gate-to-gate time difference between scheduled and 
actual trajectories, and holding times. The results from the simulations are compared with the 
metrics computed form the historical data (with schedules reconstructed) for the 12th of September 
2014 (as described in the previous section (see Table 3)). The variability of the averages observed in 
the simulations is also reported in the table. Note that all simulations results are computed on the 
baseline scenario with 100 iterations. 
Table 5. Model calibration summary. 
Indicator Empirical data (based 
on historical data of the 
12SEP14) 
Simulation (100 
iterations) 
Difference Error in % Variability 
in 
simulation 
(std) 
Departure 
delay 
11.4 10.9 -0.5 -4.3 25.7 
Arrival delay 6.6 5.6 -1.0 -15.6 30.1 
Arrival 
positive 
delay 
11.6 10.9 -0.7 -5.6 10.9 
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Scheduled 
G2G time 
159.5 159.5 0 0 143.8 
Actual G2G 
time 
154.7 154.6 -0.1 0 137.8 
Scheduled 
flying time 
137.3 135.2 -1.9 -1.5 135.5 
Actual flying 
time 
137.1 135.9 -1.2 -0.9 135.6 
Scheduled 
flying 
distance 
960.6 965.6 5.0 0.5 1091.3 
Actual flying 
distance 
948.5 958.6 10.1 1.1 1094.4 
Actual taxi-
out time 
12.5 12 -0.5 -3.8 7.2 
Actual taxi-in 
time 
5.7 5.5 -0.2 -3.2 5.5 
G2G time 
diff. 
-4.8 -5.3 -0.5 -11.4 15.6 
Holding time NA 0.4 - NA 1.1 
Cancellation 
rate 
2% 3.9% 1.9% 95 NA 
 
Generally speaking, the calibration results show that flights in the model tend to have faster trips. 
First, looking at the scheduled times and distance, we can see that if the scheduled distances are 
slightly larger in the simulations compared to reality, the scheduled times are slightly smaller. This 
indicates respectively that the airlines choose trajectories which are too long, but then that they 
operate the trajectories faster than in the historical data. Some fine tuning to the trajectory choice 
and trajectory generator is thus likely necessary for the final version of the model. This could also be 
linked with necessary adjustments on the wind aloft model and on a potential lack of holding at the 
arrival airport. 
Focusing on delays, it seems that flights experience less delays in the simulations than in the 
historical data. This is due in part to the taxi-out time, which drives the departure delay down (by half 
a minute), and to the operation of the trajectory itself, probably due to the performance model. The 
total average arrival delay is short by 1 minute, roughly 16% of its target value. Note that, 
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interestingly, the issue seems to be on the negative delays, since the "arrival positive delay" is in 
average short of only 5%. 
Table 6. Distribution of delays among the main reasons of delay. 
Type of delay 
Empirical data (based on 
[1]) 
Simulation 
Difference 
Reactionary 5.1 3.1 -2 
Turnaround 4.1 4.8 
0.7 
En-route 0.9 1.9 
1 
Capacity 0.8 0.4 -0.4 
Weather 0.2 0.3 
0.1 
 
Table 6 presents the distribution of main delay reasons between the following categories: 
reactionary delay, turnaround, en-route, capacity and weather. The model assigns the total delay of 
the flight to the category which produces the greatest contribution to the delay at departure. These 
values are compared with the historical data reported in [1]. These empirical values are estimated by 
multiplying the positive arrival delay reported in Table 5 by the rations found in [1]. Note that we 
cannot compare too precisely the simulation with the empirical data: first, in the model we flag only 
the most penalising reason, whereas in reality CODA also computes fractional delays for the different 
reasons; and more importantly, we used proportions of reasons that have been computed an entire 
year here, whereas the proportions for the 12th of September 2014 can be different. 
It is, however, interesting to see that the main reason for the low delays may be due to reactionary 
delays, where a difference of 2 minutes (over 5) has been observed. This could indicate that the 
buffer we considered for the flights is too large, that the turnaround times are too short in the 
model, or just that the arrival delay is lower and hence less delay is propagated. 
Table 7. Comparison of delay in the simulation and empirical data: departure delay, en-route 
delay, and taxi delay. 
Type of delay 
Empirical data (based on 
historical data of 
12SEP14) 
Simulation Difference 
Departure delay 11.4 10.9 
-0.5 
En-route delay -0.2 0.8 1.0 
Taxi delay -4.6 -6.1 
-1.5 
Total (arrival 
delay) 
6.6 5.6 -1.0 
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Finally, in order to understand which phase is the most important to understand the differences in 
the arrival delay, we show in Table 7 the comparison between simulations and empirical data for the 
departure delay, the en-route delay, and the taxi delays (adding taxi-in and taxi-out). From this table, 
we see that the main contributor to the difference in the arrival delay is the taxi phase, where strong 
negative delays tend to decrease the total. On the other end, the en-route delay is a bit too high, 
which might be linked to the longer paths selected by the airlines, as explained previously. Overall, it 
seems that the distributions of actual taxi times need to be re-adjusted to have a better calibration. 
3.2.2  Distributions 
In order to validate the model, it is important not only to compare average values, but also the 
distributions themselves. Here we focus on a few metrics: the departure delay, the arrival delay, the 
gate-to-gate time, the difference between scheduled and actual flying distances, and the difference 
between scheduled and actual flying times. 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of departure delay in the simulations  (blue) and the empirical 
data (orange). In inset we show the QQ-plot obtained with these two distributions.  
Figure 5 allows us to compare the distributions of departure delays. Even if the average delay is only 
off by half a minute (see previous section), the distribution shows that there are other factors that 
should be considered. In particular, historical data presents negative departure delay (i.e., flights do 
their AOBT (push back) before their SOBT). The model does not allow for this to happen as flights can 
only leave their gate at the SOBT the earliest. This means also that higher delays are also experienced 
in the historical data than in the simulated one. This should be considered in the final version of the 
model allowing the departure before SOBT in some cases. 
 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
34 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Cumulative distribution of arrival delay in the simulations (blue) and the empirical data 
(orange). In inset we show the QQ-plot obtained with these two distributions.  
Figure 6 allows us to compare the cumulative distributions for arrival delay. Here the agreement is 
better than for departure delay. It is interesting to observe that in the historical data the right tail is 
fatter than in the simulated results (this is especially visible in the QQ-plot). It is not clear why this is 
the case, but it might be related to the taxi-in delay, which is probably underestimated in the model. 
This indicates that some flights experience higher delay than in the model. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of gate-to-gate time in the simulations (blue) and the empirical data 
(orange). In inset we show the QQ-plot obtained with these two distributions.  
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The actual gate-to-gate times seem to match pretty well in the simulations and the empirical data, as 
shown in Figure 7. Since the main driver for this time is the flying distance and time, this is expected. 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of difference in flying distances (scheduled minus actual) in the simulations 
(blue) and the empirical data (orange). In inset we show the QQ-plot obtained with these two 
distributions.  
More importantly than the absolute values of the flying distances and times, is the comparison 
between the scheduled flight plan distance and the one experienced during the execution of the 
flight. This is depicted in Figure 8. A first comment on this figure is that the empirical differences in 
distance seems more 'clustered' than the simulation ones. This could be due to the fact that flights 
are changing their flight plans in a more systematic way than in the model, for instance shortening 
their flight plan using always the same new trajectory for a given origin-destination pair. The 
selection of trajectory may be a lot more random in the simulations, which leads to a smoother 
distribution. 
The second comment is that the empirical distribution has much fatter tails than the simulations', 
especially on the left side. Since the trajectories in the simulations are limited in number, due to the 
fact that we used clusters of trajectories, it could happen that these 'typical' trajectories do not allow 
very short or very long trajectories. In reality, a few flights are able to shorten or lengthen 
significantly their flight plan. 
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Figure 9. Distribution of travelling time difference (between scheduled and actual trajectories) in 
the simulations (blue) and the empirical data (orange). In inset we show the QQ-plot obtained with 
these two distributions.  
Finally, we show in Figure 9 the difference between the scheduled flight plan time (from take-off to 
landing) and the actual one. This difference is the consequence of the difference in distance depicted 
in Figure 8 and of the additional noise delay happening during the flight. Interestingly, if the 
difference in distance has fatter tails in the empirical data, the difference in time is actually slightly 
thinner compared to the simulations. This could indicate some small active adjustments from the 
pilot to stick to schedule which are not properly captured by the model. This could be adjusted by 
modifying slightly the distributions used to create some delay during the flight. Note that despite the 
relatively high negative and positive delays, the simulated distribution is only off by half a minute in 
average compared to the empirical one. 
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4 Investigative case studies results 
4.1 Metrics 
This section is dedicated the explanation of the metrics that are used to analyse the model's outputs 
and how they are computed. First, we consider some baseline metrics related to delays, passengers 
and costs. Secondly, we consider the advanced network metrics of centrality and causality that were 
presented in Deliverable 5.1 [3]. In the case of centrality, an additional centrality metric, which was 
not presented in the earlier deliverable and is more focused on the passengers’ itineraries, has been 
added. 
4.1.1 Delay metrics 
For delay, we report the following baseline metrics, averaged over 100 iterations of the agent-based 
model per scenario: 
• Mean departure delay of flights 
• Number of flights with departure delay > X minutes 
• Total departure delay of flights with departure delay > X minutes 
• Mean departure delay of flights with departure delay > X minutes 
 
• Mean arrival delay of flights (early arrivals are counted as negative delays) 
• Mean arrival delay of delayed flights (early arrivals are counted as 0) 
• Number of flights with arrival delay > X minutes 
• Total arrival delay of flights with arrival delay > X minutes 
• Mean arrival delay of flights with arrival delay > X minutes 
where X=15, 60, 180 
• Mean gate-to-gate delay of flights (obtained as the difference between the scheduled and 
the realised gate-to-gate time) 
• Mean per-passenger gate-to-gate delay (for each flight, the delay is divided by the number of 
passengers on the flight. The result is averaged over all flights) 
 
• Number of cancelled flights 
• Mean reactionary delay (computed as the mean delay of flights whose main reason for delay 
is reactionary) 
• Number of flights with reactionary delay 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
38 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
For each of these metrics we show the average, the first and third quartile of their distribution over 
the iterations (see Section 4.3). The statistical significance of the differences in the averages for 
different scenarios are tested via a two-sample T-test with 5% confidence level, testing the null 
hypothesis that the difference between the two samples of size 100 has mean zero.  
Note that we consider the tail statistics (on delays larger than a threshold) for departure and arrival 
delay because often changes are observed in the tail of the distribution, while the bulk is unchanged. 
For the same reason, the delay distributions in the baseline and advanced scenarios are compared by 
means of QQ-plots, highlighting possible deviations in the tail. In a QQ-plot, the samples from two 
distributions are compared by plotting the n-th quantile of the first against that of the second. If the 
samples come from the same distribution, the points will fall on a 1:1 line. Deviations from the 1:1 
line highlight where the two distributions differ from each other. For example, if the QQ plot is 
shifted above the 1:1 line, it means that the distribution whose quantiles are represented on the y 
axis is shifted to the right with respect to the other one. If the right end of the QQ plot deviates from 
the 1:1 line by going below it, it means that the y-axis distribution has a thinner right tail. Conversely, 
if it goes above the 1:1 line it means that the y-axis distribution has a fatter tail. To compute QQ-
plots, all iterations are considered at the same time (e.g., a sample is made of the departure delays of 
all flights in all 100 iterations of one scenario). 
Flights with more than 300 minutes of delay, resulting from a fat-tailed distribution of the randomly-
generated ATFM delays (to be corrected in the future implementations of the model), are not 
considered in the analysis. They amount, on average, to less than 1‰. 
4.1.2 Passengers metrics 
We consider the following metrics related to passengers, averaged over 50 iterations of the model 
(due to technical limitations): 
• Average passenger delay. The passenger delay is computed as the arrival delay at the 
passenger's final destination and is averaged over all passengers. 
• Average positive passenger delay. The average is computed counting early arrivals as zeros. 
This metric is interesting because of its related metrics for the flight delays, used for instance 
by CODA. Note that if for a flight the early arrivals are not beneficial, and thus can be set to 0, 
they are probably important for passengers, whose utility always decreases with the length 
of the trip (this is captured in the previous average passenger delay metric). 
• Number of passengers with delay > X minutes. 
• Total delay of passengers with delay > X minutes. 
• Mean delay of passengers with delay > X minutes. 
where X=15, 60, 180 
For each of these metrics we show the average over 50 iterations, and the first and third quartile of 
its distribution over the iterations (see Section 4.3). 
4.1.3 Cost metrics 
For the costs, we report the following baseline metrics, averaged over 100 iterations of the model: 
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• Average excess cost of fuel. It is the extra cost with respect to the planned cost of fuel, which 
can also be negative if fuel was saved.  
• Average cost of compensation. 
• Fraction of flights paying compensation. 
• Average cost of transfer. 
• Fraction of flights paying transfer. 
• Average duty of care cost. 
• Fraction of flights paying duty of care. 
• Average soft costs. 
• Fraction of flights paying soft costs. 
• Average non-pax costs (crew+maintenance). 
• Fraction of flights paying non-pax costs. 
• Average total excess cost. 
All costs are in euros. Average costs are computed on all flights, including those that did not 
experience that kind of cost (counted as zero). Each metric is computed for each iteration and then 
averaged over 100 iterations, and the first and third quartile of its distribution over the iterations are 
reported under the result in tables. As for the delay analysis, flights with more than 300 minutes of 
delay are excluded. QQ-plots are also shown, to highlight changes in the tails of the delay 
distribution.  
In the model outputs the number of cancellations is too high with respect to what was observed in 
the data for the simulated day, as seen in the validation section. The cancelled flights make up a large 
percentage (~60%) of the non-fuel costs, and given that the mechanisms do not act explicitly on 
cancellations, they could cover the effects of the mechanisms. Therefore, we also present the cost 
metrics on a sample where the cancelled flights have been excluded. 
4.1.4 Centrality metrics 
We consider two types of centrality metrics. The first is trip centrality, which was introduced in 
Deliverable 5.1 [3]. The outgoing trip centrality of an airport counts all the "potential" itineraries 
having that airport as the origin, while the incoming trip centrality counts those having that airport as 
a destination. Potential itineraries are all the sequences of any number of flights that can be 
potentially taken one after the other, given their schedule. An itinerary of n legs is weighted ;., 
where ; < 1, so that itineraries made of more legs are counted less. For all the results shown in this 
deliverable ;  0.02, except for the results of the FAC mechanism, for which a comparison of results 
with ;  0.02, and ;  0.2, is shown. Note that, due to how the metric is computed (see Deliverable 
5.1 for details [3]), no upper or lower limit for the connecting time is considered, so that two flights 
can be taken in sequence as long as the second one departs later than the arrival of the first. Trip 
centrality can either count only the itineraries made of legs of the same airline or alliance, 
corresponding to setting ?  0 (see Deliverable 5.1 [3]), or count also the itineraries using two or 
more airlines or alliances. For all the results presented in this deliverable we used ?  0, therefore 
the walks counted are those within an alliance or within an airline (for airlines that do not belong to 
any alliance). 
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The second centrality metric that we consider is passenger centrality, a new metric which was not 
introduced in the previous Deliverable 5.1 [3]. In the computation of passenger centrality each 
itinerary contributes to the outgoing or incoming centrality of an airport an amount which 
corresponds to the number of passengers on that itinerary. Therefore, the outgoing passenger 
centrality of an airport corresponds to the number of passengers that depart from that airport 
(either as their first departure or taking a flight connection there) and are directed to another 
destination, either with a direct flight or with connections. The incoming centrality of an airport, 
instead, corresponds to the number of passengers that land in that airport, either as their final 
destination or to take a connection. 
For both types of centralities, we are not interested in their absolute value but in the loss of 
centrality between the scheduled and the actual network, quantifying the damage to the network 
connectivity due to delays and cancellations. For trip centrality, as explained in Deliverable 5.1 [3], 
the centrality in the actual network is computed by using the actual network structure, which 
accounts for the delays and cancellations, and by excluding from the counting the new itineraries 
that become possible due to delays. An airport's centrality in the actual network is therefore always 
smaller than its centrality in the scheduled network, therefore losses are always positive. The loss of 
outgoing trip centrality of an airport measures the loss of potential outgoing itineraries that are not 
feasible anymore (due to delays or cancellations), therefore quantifying the decrease in the potential 
to go from that airport to the rest of the airport network. For example, the cancellation of a flight 
from airport i to airport j will cause a loss of ;  0.02 in the outgoing trip centrality of airport i. If in 
airport j it was originally possible to connect to another flight, the same cancellation will also cause 
an additional loss of ;#, and so on for longer itineraries that are lost due to that cancellation. 
Similarly, if the flight from i to j is delayed, and therefore the potential connection with a subsequent 
flight departing from j is not feasible anymore, this will cause a loss of ;#, plus other losses from the 
longer itineraries depending on that missed connection. The loss of incoming trip centrality, similarly, 
measures the loss of potential incoming itineraries that are not feasible anymore (due to delays or 
cancellations), therefore quantifying the diminishing of the potential to arrive to that airport from 
the rest of the airport network. 
For passenger centrality, in the actual network we only count passengers that reach their destination 
using their scheduled itinerary. The actual outgoing passenger centrality of an airport corresponds to 
the number of passengers that were counted in the scheduled outgoing passenger centrality and 
that manage to follow their scheduled itinerary. If, for example, N incoming passengers miss their 
connection in airport i, and are rebooked to another outgoing flight, airport i will have a loss of 
outgoing centrality amounting to N. The same loss would apply if N passengers depart late from i and 
miss their next connection at another airport. Therefore, the loss of outgoing passenger centrality of 
an airport accounts both for the passenger that experience a disruption in that airport and for those 
that experience problems downstream (missed connections or cancellations). This is different from 
the loss of outgoing trip centrality, which does not account for missed potential connections in the 
airport itself. The actual incoming passenger centrality of an airport, instead, corresponds to the 
number of passengers that were counted in the scheduled incoming passenger centrality and that 
manage to follow their scheduled itinerary up to that airport. If they miss their connection there, 
there is no loss of incoming centrality. Therefore, the loss of incoming passenger centrality can be 
interpreted as the damage to airport i (in terms of passengers that cannot reach it using their 
scheduled itinerary) caused by issues upstream. 
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The information on which passengers miss their connections is included in the output of the model. 
However, in the current version of the model this information was stored in a way which made it 
extremely slow to retrieve. Therefore, in the present deliverable we assume that a passenger misses 
a connection if the incoming flight lands less than 20 minutes before the departure of the connecting 
flight. This is a lower bound for connecting times, which can be larger depending on the airport and 
due to stochasticity present in the model, therefore we obtain an optimistic estimate of the 
passenger centrality loss. This issue will be solved in the next version of the model, therefore in 
Deliverable 5.3 we will be able to use the real missed connections in the computation on passenger 
centrality loss.  
In order to interpret the results, the differences between Trip and passenger centrality should be 
kept in mind. First, the connections that are considered in passenger centrality are only those that 
passengers actually used, and therefore that imply a cost if disrupted. For this reason, they are 
explicitly considered by the mechanisms when costs are minimised. Instead, trip centrality considers 
also potential connections that are not used by passengers (at least in the considered day). These 
connections are not considered explicitly by the mechanisms. However, the mechanisms can still 
have an indirect effect also on the connections that are not used by passengers: for example, a 
general reduction of delays would improve the preservation of these connections as well. Secondly, 
while the loss of outgoing passenger centrality of an airport reflects also the missed connections in 
the airport itself, the loss of outgoing trip centrality does not. Therefore, the former would be 
interesting both for a hub and for a regional airport, while the latter would be mostly interesting for 
a regional airport, the passenger departing from which are often going to take connections 
elsewhere.   
For both types of centrality, incoming and outgoing, we look at the average centrality loss on the 
entire network. Losses are averaged over all airports for each iteration, and then the average over 
100 iterations and the quartiles are reported.  Note that, when comparing a scenario with the 
corresponding baseline, a smaller average centrality loss represents an improvement. 
Note that for trip centrality, when the centrality loss is averaged over the entire network, the loss of 
incoming centrality equals exactly the loss of outgoing centrality. In fact, each loss of outgoing 
centrality corresponds to an equal loss of incoming centrality of another airport. Therefore, in this 
case, we will refer to it as "Average trip centrality loss". Instead, when referring to a subset of the 
airports, incoming and outgoing centrality losses can be different. 
4.1.5 Causality metrics 
We consider two types of causality metrics, Granger Causality (GC) in mean and Granger Causality in 
tail. These metrics are applied to a set of subsystems whose evolution is described by some time 
series of states, e.g., the state of delay of the airport defined as the average departure delay of flights 
within some time window. The first GC metric detect the presence of a propagation channel for some 
process, e.g., delay propagation, between two subsystems, e.g., airports, while the second GC metric 
is similar, but considering only propagation of ‘extreme’ events for the process, where ‘extreme’ 
means events lying in the right tail of the distribution of states, e.g., occurrence of large departure 
delays which identifies the state of congestion of an airport. For the detailed description of the 
statistical tests of Granger causality, both in mean and in tail, see the Deliverable 5. [3]. 
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In the causality analysis presented here, we study the network of airports, i.e., the nodes of the 
network, over which some propagation process takes place. In particular, we consider that each 
node-airport is described by 
1. its state of delay, i.e., the average departure delay of flights within a time window of one 
hour; 
2. its state of the cost of delay, i.e., the average cost of delay of flights departing from the 
airport within a time window of one hour; 
3. its state of congestion, i.e., an extreme event for the state of delay, where an event is 
defined as ‘extreme’ when its value is above the 90%-percentile of the distribution of the 
states of delay in the corresponding baseline scenario. Thus, a binary time series is obtained, 
whose state is 1 if the event is extreme, 0 otherwise; 
4. its state of extreme cost of delay, i.e., an extreme event for the state of the cost of delay. 
Then, we apply the pairwise Granger causality test, both in mean and in tail, to any couple of node-
airports in the ECAC airspace (by excluding very small airports in terms of traffic size) in order to 
detect the presence of a (directional) causal link, thus constructing the corresponding network of 
causal relations. Note that the whole 100 iterations of the Agent Based Model (ABM) developed 
within the Domino project are used to build a single instance of the causality networks. In fact, each 
iteration represents a time series of 24 states for each node (i.e., 24 hours per day). Thus, 100 
iterations are used to construct a time series of 240 states for each node, in order to obtain 
statistically significant results. 
Given a causality network, we measure some network metrics (selected in Deliverable D5.1 [3]) 
which signal the presence of important linkage structures for the propagation of both delays and 
costs. The first and the simplest metric is the link density of the network, i.e., the number of 
observed links divided by the total number of possible couples of nodes: it is a measure of the overall 
level of causality of the system. Then, we consider the clustering coefficient and the number of 
feedback triplets which measure how much interconnected is the system and the presence of 
amplifying loops for delay propagation in a loop (back propagation), respectively. Finally, reciprocity 
measures how many airports are mutually linked in the causality network, thus representing 
subsystems for delay amplification in a loop because of the presence of return-trips. The measured 
value of such network metrics depends on the degree of connectivity of the network. Since link 
density may vary from one scenario to another one, for the sake of fair comparison between 
scenarios, we consider the over-expression of the described metrics with respect to some random 
baseline, here represented by the randomisation of links or, equivalently, the Erdos-Renyi graph with 
the same link density. In particular, the adopted measure for the over-expression is the ratio 
between the observed value and the expected value for the Erdos-Renyi model (with the same link 
density of the considered causality network). 
In terms of Granger causality, a given Domino mechanism at some level of implementation 
represents an improvement for the system when we observe: 
1. a decreasing of the link density, thus indicating a lower level of causality because of less 
propagation channels; 
2. a diminishing number (in absolute value) of the network metrics describing subsystems 
which amplify propagation of either delays or costs, especially for the extreme events (which 
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are associated explicitly to the occurrence of large positive values, i.e., large delays and high 
costs); 
3. a negative variation of the over-expression of the network metrics with respect to the 
corresponding baseline, which signals the disruption of such amplifying subsystems. 
In conclusion, GC in mean applied to the state of delay of the airports detects the channel of delay 
propagation, but considering both small and large delays. When restricting to the extreme positive 
events, GC in tail identifies the channels of propagation, but for the state of congestions of the 
airports. Then, a similar analysis can be applied for the cost of delay. Since the cost of delay is a non-
trivial function of the delay itself, the causality network for the cost of delay may display a different 
structure of the corresponding causality network built with the states of delay. For instance, the 
same delay propagated to the periphery or to some hub airport has significantly different impact in 
terms of costs. 
4.1.6 Restricted samples 
The FP and the FAC mechanisms do not affect all airports and flights, but only a subset. For this 
reason, in addition to the metrics computed on the entire set of airports or flights, we also perform 
analyses on restricted samples, in order to highlight the direct effects of the mechanisms and also to 
evaluate its externalities, i.e., the indirect effects on flights or airports which the mechanism does not 
affect directly.  
In the FAC case, the mechanism is only active in 24 airports [7]: EBBR, EDDB, EDDF, EDDL, EDDM, 
EGCC, EGKK, EGLL, EGSS, EHAM, EIDW, EKCH, ENGM, ESSA, LEBL, LEMD, LEPA, LFMN, LFPG, LFPO, 
LIMC, LIRF, LOWW and LSZH. For the computation of costs and delays, we consider the restricted 
sample of the flights that arrive to one of these airports. For the centrality, we compare the average 
centrality losses in the set of 24 airports in which FAC is implemented to those in the rest of the 
airports.  For the causality metrics, we consider the causality links within the FAC airports, within the 
non-FAC airports, and the one from one restricted set to the other. 
In the FP case, flight swaps can only be performed on flights that are subject to a regulation. 
Therefore, we consider a set of 50 iterations in which the same set of regulations have been applied, 
and we identify the set of airports that are subject to at least one regulation, and the set of flights 
that arrived at one of these airports and whose scheduled in-block time falls during a regulation. 
These, in fact, are the flights which can potentially apply the FP mechanism. The delay and cost 
metrics are then computed on the restricted sample of flights said above. For the centrality metrics, 
we compare the average centrality losses in airports that were subject to at least one regulation with 
those of airports without regulations. 
4.2 Summary of key results 
An overview of the key results from the analysis of the outputs of the model are presented in this 
section. The full results are detailed in Section 4.3. 
In Figure 10 presents the percentage change of some of the metrics mentioned in Section 4.1 for the 
scenarios where the mechanisms are implemented (at Level 1 or 2) with respect to their 
corresponding baseline scenario (the default baseline for the default scenarios, and the stressed 
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baseline for the stressed ones). As explained in Section 4.1, the metrics are averaged over 100 
iterations of the model, or 50 in some specific cases. The results are grouped in four categories: 
• airline centric metrics: flights delays and airline cost of delay (Figure 10.a); 
• passenger centric metrics: delays, missed connections, itineraries disrupted (Figure 10.b); 
• centrality metrics: passenger and trip centrality (Figure 10.c); 
• causality metrics: density and reciprocity in mean and in tail (Figure 10.d). 
 
a) airline centric metrics (flight delays and costs) 
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b) passenger centric metrics (delays, missed connections, itineraries disrupted) 
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c) centrality metrics 
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d) causality metrics 
Figure 10. Summary of results changes with respect to baseline (top) and stressed scenarios 
(bottom). 
4D Trajectory Adjustments 
Airline centric metrics 
In the scenarios where the 4DTA mechanism is implemented, the minimisation of fuel costs by not 
speeding up to recover delay or even slowing down implies an increase of all types of delay (flight 
and passenger), driven by an increase in the gate-to-gate delays. The increase in departure delays 
might be also partly driven by the increased use of wait-for-passengers. Correspondingly, the total 
cost diminishes, the decrease being almost completely driven by the decrease in the cost of fuel. 
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Passenger centric metrics and centrality 
While the passenger delays increase, when the mechanism is implemented at Level 1 the metrics 
evaluating the preservation of passenger itineraries (i.e., the number of passengers with a modified 
itinerary and the "passenger centrality" metrics) show that passengers arrive more often to their 
destination using their scheduled itinerary than in the baseline. Given the general increase of delays 
and the fact that the increased loss of trip centrality tells us that potential connections (i.e., all 
connections that are possible, not only the ones actually used by passengers) are increasingly 
disrupted with respect to the baseline, the improvement from the passengers point of view must be 
due to the increased use of wait-for-passengers and to the better evaluation of the possibility to 
speed up to preserve passenger connections.  
This improvement from the passengers’ point of view is however absent or very reduced when the 
mechanism is implemented at Level 2. This is probably due to the additional possibility to slow down 
that is evaluated at TOC in Level 2. In some cases, it is more economical for the airline to save fuel 
than preserve passengers' itineraries. Around 15% of flights initially deciding to speed up later decide 
to take advantage of the possibility to slow down that is evaluated at TOC. This speed change could 
be triggered for a reassessment of the impact of the expected delay on passengers and considering 
an updated expected inbound delay. 
Causality metrics 
The propagation of costs of delay among airports, as measured by the density of causal links among 
airports, diminishes. However, in most cases this decrease of cost propagation does not seem to 
eliminate the bidirectional propagation patterns measured by the reciprocity, which potentially 
increases costs through back propagation. 
4.2.1 Flight Prioritisation 
Airline centric metrics 
In the scenarios where the FP mechanism is implemented, a negligible effect on the delays and costs 
is seen at the whole system level. This is understandable, as the mechanism only can be applied to 1-
2% of the flights (i.e., the ones which arrive to an airport which is regulated due to ATFM). 
Additionally, the flight swapping reduces the delay of a flight at the expense of increasing that of 
another flight, so it is expected that few differences are seen in the average delays.  
Passenger centric metrics and centrality 
Regarding passengers, passenger delays and itinerary disruption seem to experience a worsening in 
the baseline case, but an improvement in the stressed case. This suggests that when there are large 
delays in the system, the economic interest of the airlines is better aligned with the passengers' 
convenience. 
Figure 10.c compares the average centrality loss in the set of airports subject to regulations to that in 
the airports not subject to any, as explained in Section 4.1. We find that in the stressed scenarios the 
formers have an improvement in terms of loss of passenger centrality that the latter do not have. 
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Causality metrics 
The study of the propagation of the state of delay among airports shows no impact by the FP 
mechanism at the systemic level.  Overall, however, very small changes are observed with respect to 
the baseline, proving that FP is a mechanism whose impact are mostly local, having no significant 
relevance at the whole system level. 
4.2.2 Flight Arrival Coordination 
Airline centric metrics 
In the scenarios where the FAC mechanism is implemented, a decrease of average delays is seen at 
Level 1, but the mechanism is less effective on delay reduction at Level 2. This is expected, as in Level 
2 the Arrival Coordination aims to minimise the airline costs and not necessarily the delay, while 
Level 1 focuses on the total delay (arrival and reactionary) at the airport.  
As explained in Section 4.1, we also considered the sample restricted to the flights arriving in airports 
with FAC implemented. We find that the improvements are, in percentage, larger in this restricted 
sample.  A small decrease in passenger-related costs is seen, more important for Level 2 and larger, 
in percentage, in the restricted sample. No significant changes are seen in the fuel costs, which is 
expected given that the FAC mechanism acts only on the final part of the flight, which cannot affect 
strongly the excess fuel use. Nevertheless, some fuel is saved by absorbing part of the delay by 
reducing the speed. The amount of delay that can be absorbed by this technique, in the model, and 
hence the impact on fuel, is very small. 
Passenger centric metrics and centrality 
Passenger delays decrease, especially in the stressed case. In the default case, the decrease is much 
more important for connecting passengers, while in the stressed case it is similar for direct and 
connecting passengers. The disruption of passengers' itineraries, as measured by the number of 
passengers with modified itinerary and by passenger centrality loss, has an overall improvement. 
When comparing the passenger centrality loss in airports with FAC and airports without, the 
improvements are larger in airports with FAC, but also diffuse to the rest of the system. This indicates 
that introduction of FAC has positive externalities also on airports that do not implement it. 
Improvements in the preservation of potential itineraries, as measured by the loss of trip centrality, 
are similar to the improvements in passenger centrality loss in the default scenarios, but much 
smaller in the stressed scenario. A possible explanation of this is that in the default case, when delays 
are small, the decrease of average delays obtained by FAC is effective in preserving not only 
passenger itineraries, but also potential ones, i.e., flights are maintained closer to their schedules. In 
the stressed case, instead, the decrease of delays is less effective in preserving itineraries, given that 
delays are larger, but passenger itineraries are actively targeted by the optimisation mechanism, as 
they incur in an explicit cost which is tried to be minimised, and therefore they are still preserved. 
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Therefore, similarly to the 4DTA case, the difference in the Passenger centrality and trip centrality 
results (one showing improvements and other worsening) is due to the active preservation of 
passengers' itineraries by the mechanism. 
Causality metrics 
The causality analysis of the scenarios where FAC mechanism is implemented, shows an overall 
decreasing of the level of causality, measured by a diminished number of propagation channels. 
It is worth noting that the aggregate behaviour is driven by the reduction in the number of causal 
links in both the subgraphs of airport implementing the FAC mechanism and airports without it, as 
well as in the bipartite causality structure of airports with FAC propagating delays to airports without 
the mechanism. This externality quantifies the impact of implementing the FAC mechanism in a 
subset of airports characterised by high traffic, thus being more important for delay propagation. 
However, in most cases the reduction in the level of causality has small effect on the bidirectional 
propagation patterns measured by the reciprocity, which potentially increases delays through back 
propagation. 
4.3 Detailed analysis of results 
In the following sections the detailed analysis of the model outputs are presented. The results are 
organised as follows: One sub-section is dedicated to each mechanism (4D Trajectory Adjustments, 
Flight Prioritisation, Flight Arrival Coordination); for each of these, we first present the results of 
baseline metrics regarding flight and passenger delays and costs, and then the results of the 
centrality and causality metrics. All metrics used are explained in Section 4.1. Results are shown for 
the default and for the stressed scenarios, and all mechanisms are compared to the corresponding 
baseline scenario. For the stressed scenarios, the stressed baseline scenario is used for the 
comparisons. 
4.3.1 4D Trajectory Adjustment 
4.3.1.1 Flights delays 
The following tables report the statistics relative to departure delay, arrival delay, gate-to-gate delay, 
cancellations and reactionary delay. Figure 11 summarises the percentage changes of some of the 
delay statistics with respect to the baseline, to ease the comparison. 
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Figure 11. Percentage change with respect to the corresponding baseline of the mean departure 
delay, mean arrival delay (counting early arrivals as zero), mean gate-to-gate delay and mean 
reactionary delay for 4DTA mechanism. 
Overall, the 4DTA mechanism increases all types of delays, both in average and in number. The 
percentage increase with respect to the baseline is especially remarkable for the gate-to-gate delay. 
In the default case, 4DTA at Level 1 slightly increases both the average departure and the arrival 
delays. Although it reduces the number of flights in the tail (less flights with delay >180), it increases 
the number of delays larger than 15 minutes. According to a two-sample T-test with 5% confidence 
level performed on the two samples of 100 mean delays of each iteration, these differences are 
statistically significant. The mean reactionary delay and the number of flights with reactionary delay 
both increase, the latter in a statistically significant way. 
4DTA at Level 2 slightly decreases the average departure delay and slightly increases the average 
arrival delays (counting early arrivals as zero). The average arrival delay including the early arrivals 
increases, as expected because in this scenario flights that estimate to arrive early slow down. The 
number of flights with delays larger than 15 minutes has only a slight increase, but on average the 
delays >15 minutes are smaller and the improvements in the tail are more important than in the 
Level 1 scenario. According to a two-sample T-test with 5% confidence level performed on the two 
samples of 100 mean delays of each iteration, the differences are not statistically significant. The 
mean reactionary delay and the number of flights with reactionary delay both increase, the latter in a 
statistically significant way. 
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Figure 12. QQ-plots comparing departing delay distribution in the default baseline scenario and in 
the default scenarios with 4DTA. Left: QQ-plot of departure delay; left: QQ-plot of arrival delay. 
Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The black line is the 1:1 line. 
 
 
Figure 13. QQ-plots comparing arrival delay distribution in the stressed baseline scenario and in 
the stressed scenarios with 4DTA. Left: QQ-plot of departure delay; left: QQ-plot of arrival delay. 
Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The black line is the 1:1 line. 
 
From the QQ plots in Figure 12, we see that 4DTA reduces the delays above 100 minutes, both in 
departure and arrival. Level 1 seems to be more effective on larger delays (>200 minutes) with 
respect to Level 2, which seems to be more effective on delays around 150 minutes. Level 2 reduces 
the negative delays in arrival (early arrivals), as expected. 
In the stressed case, the positive effect on the tails that was seen in the default case is barely 
noticeable: only the tail of delays larger than 180 minutes has an improvement in the Level 2 
scenario. Also in the QQ-plot (Figure 13), the thinning of the distribution for large delays is not 
observed any more. All types of delay increase on average, as well as the number of flights with 
departure and arrival delays larger than 15 minutes and 60 minutes. According to a two-sample T-
test with 5% confidence level performed on the two samples of 100 mean delays of each iteration, 
the differences in the average departure delays and in the average arrival delays (counting early 
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arrival as zeros) are statistically significant, except for the average departure delay for Level 2. The 
number of flights with reactionary delays increase significantly. 
 
 
Figure 14. Violin plot of the percentage speed selected by flights (either before departure (Level 0, 
1, 2) and at TOC (Level 2)) in the different scenarios. The horizontal lines represent the median and 
the quartiles of the distribution. A percentage speed of 1 means that the flight decides to speed up 
as much as possible (a maximum of 0.9 is allowed in the baseline scenarios (Level 0)), while 
percentages close to 0 mean the flight decides to slow down to the minimum possible speed (not 
allowed in the baseline). 
 
 
Figure 15. Violin plot of the delay expected to be recovered by changing speed in the different 
scenarios. The horizontal lines represent the median and the quartiles of the distribution. 
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The reason for this general increase of all delays lies in the different aptitude towards speeding up 
and fuel saving of the different scenarios. Figure 14 shows the percentage speed selected by flights 
when applying DCI (either at gate, or also at TOC in Level 2 scenarios), and Figure 15 shows the 
minutes of delay that are expected to be recovered with this choice. 
In the baseline scenarios, flights most often decide to speed up as much as possible to recover delay, 
as the cost of fuel is not considered in the decision, and as much as 5 minutes of delay are expected 
to be recovered on average. In Level 1 scenarios, the aptitude is more careful with respect to fuel 
consumption, as total cost is considered, therefore the percentage speed selected are typically 
smaller, and on average only 1 minute of delay is expected to be recovered. In Level 2 scenarios, 
additionally, flights are also allowed to slow down, and in fact we see that many flights choose 
percentage speeds close to zero, implying the creation of more delay (this happens especially when 
the system is not stressed, while in the stressed case hardly any new delay is created). On top of that, 
we also see flights choosing extremely high percentage speed. Note, however, that many of these 
extreme speeding up decisions are taken at gate and reconsidered at TOC, therefore their effect is 
not seen in the results. In Level 2, the mechanism evaluates delaying the flight at the gate to wait-for-
passengers and speed up conjointly. Therefore, when at the gate, the solution considered optimal is 
to wait for some passengers and then speed up to a very high speed. However, once the situation is 
re-evaluated at TOC with the passengers already on-board, the management is more conservative for 
fuel and speed more similar to Level 1 are selected. Level 2 shows larger estimated delay recovery 
than Level 1, driven by this joint assessment at the gate. 
In conclusion, the general increment of delays stems from the fact that in Levels 1 and 2 of the 4DTA 
mechanisms flights choose to speed up less with respect to the baseline, or even to slow down in 
Level 2. This increases the gate-to-gate delay, and consequently the arrival, reactionary and 
departure delays. The increase in departure delays could even be partly due to an increased use of 
the wait-for-passenger. However, this the information on how many flights decide to wait for 
passenger was not saved in the current model version, therefore this hypothesis cannot be 
confirmed. This information will be saved and analysed in the next version of the model. Finally, note 
that the behaviour observed might indicate also that the Level 0 strategy is too aggressive when 
delay is recovered and the rule of thumb is using fuel consumptions that are too high. 
Table 8, Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11 present the results for flight departure delay, flight arrival 
delay, flight gate-to-gate and cancellations and reactionary delay statistics respectively for the 4DTA 
mechanism for the three levels of implementation in the default and stressed scenarios. 
Table 8. Departure delay statistics for the 4DTA scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean 
departure 
delay (min) 
10.5 11.0 10.5 25.9 27.7 26.1 
 10.1 10.6 10.1 25.2 27.0 25.5 
 10.7 11.2 10.7 26.3 28.2 26.6 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
55
 
 
#flights with 
dep.del>15 
min 
6143.9 6536.5 6174.5 13560.2 14345.4 13643.4 
 6037.5 6419 6079.5 13411 14252.5 13544.5 
 6239 6653.5 6272.5 13700.5 14457 13774.5 
Total dep 
delay >15 min 
200178.1 212282.1 198568.3 614651.3 664525.9 620008.2 
 189484.1 202108.7 189795.9 596452.8 645840.4 603559.0 
 204517.8 219114.4 206148.7 626200.1 679045.3 633010.0 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >15 
min 
32.9 32.5 32.2 45.33 46.3 45.4 
#flights with 
dep. del >60 
min 
450.6 476.0 432.8 3013.1 3387.3 3065.8 
 366.5 395.5 368 2834.5 3239.5 2952.5 
 490 530.5 486 3124 3521 3194 
Total dep. 
delay >60 min 
40172.9 41194.8 37198.4 274106.6 305022.7 278014.2 
 29543.6 31658.0 29662.0 255304 285237.4 261200.8 
 43460.1 44313.6 41228.1 285799.5 320625.4 291322.8 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >60 
min 
89.2 86.6 85.9 91.0 90.1 90.7 
#flights with 
dep.del>180 
min 
18.8 13.6 12.9 83.4 84.2 80.3 
 4 3 3.5 51.5 54.5 49.5 
 12.5 12 11.5 94 105.5 97.5 
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Total dep. 
delay >180 
min 
4161.9 3007.1 2906.0 18017.0 18118.7 17391.3 
 777.3 600.4 753.6 11078.2 11656.2 10381.0 
 2734.5 2711.2 2440.8 20037.1 22434.7 21550.9 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >180 
min 
221.3 220.5 224.9 216.1 215.3 216.6 
 
Table 9. Arrival delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios where it is implemented and the corresponding 
baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean arrival 
delay (min) 
5.18 5.86 5.84 29.09 31.55 30.05 
 4.81 5.46 5.5 28.43 30.86 29.4 
 5.35 6.13 6.08 29.56 32.08 30.54 
Mean arrival 
delay of 
delayed flights 
(min) 
10.49 10.99 10.56 30.87 33.12 31.58 
 10.1 10.62 10.24 30.22 32.43 30.94 
 10.64 11.2 10.79 31.33 33.64 32.07 
#flights with 
arr.del>15 min 
6614.13 6960.16 6696.11 15930.43 16634.67 16099.35 
 6504 6839 6615.5 15800 16538.5 16021.5 
 6674 7045.5 6784 16035 16723 16191.5 
Total arr. 
delay >15 min 
220541.86 233849.61 222649.26 758486.18 819811.72 777518.1 
 210083.98 224242.83 214234.72 740924.41 802431.3 761954.34 
 225008.08 239974.11 229238.37 770880.74 835011.18 793228.29 
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Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >15 
min 
33.34 33.6 33.25 47.61 49.28 48.29 
#flights with 
arr. del >60 
min 
523.45 566.69 526.58 3944.73 4501.68 4137.13 
 440.5 490.5 466.5 3797.5 4359 4010.5 
 565.5 607.5 574 4067.5 4631.5 4277.5 
Total arr. 
delay >60 min 
45928.83 48349.54 44604.46 360514.68 409531.33 377380.37 
 35987.14 39552.64 37640.9 340020.67 390113.28 359110.5 
 50130.78 51100.06 48361.74 372987.32 425905.81 393059.91 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >60 
min 
87.74 85.32 84.71 91.39 90.97 91.22 
#flights with 
arr. del. >180 
min 
19.51 14.77 13.95 108.15 111.83 105.88 
 4.5 4 4 72 77.5 74 
 14.5 13.5 12 124.5 130 124 
Total arr. 
delay >180 
min 
4323.19 3245.96 3138.04 23307.19 24037.01 22840.83 
 989.74 989.02 940.06 15350.88 16417.31 15576.3 
 3228.24 3033.68 2722.33 26928.5 27652.4 26676.01 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with arr. del. 
>180 min 
221.59 219.77 224.95 215.51 214.94 215.72 
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Table 10. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean gate-to-
gate delay 
(min) 
-5.3 -5.1 -4.6 3.3 3.9 4.0 
 -5.4 -5.2 -4.7 3.2 3.85 3.9 
 -5.3 -5.1 -4.6 3.3 3.93 4.0 
 
Table 11. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for 4DTA scenarios where 4DTA is 
implemented and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
# cancelled 
flights 
1087.95 1075.06 1083.42 1160.20 1157.05 1165.21 
 1026.50 1027.50 1033.00 1096.50 1098.50 1103.50 
 1136.00 1121.00 1121.00 1185.00 1207.50 1199.50 
Mean 
reactionary 
delay (min) 
17.72 18.10 17.75 38.44 40.72 38.86 
 15.11 15.48 14.89 35.07 37.22 35.50 
 16.90 16.91 17.08 39.07 41.27 38.84 
# flights with 
reactionary 
delay 
2888.71 2986.47 2919.47 7197.35 7464.97 7308.00 
 2823.50 2922.00 2871.00 7114.00 7384.00 7233.50 
 2947.00 3044.00 2966.00 7268.50 7528.00 7363.00 
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4.3.1.2 Passengers delays 
Table 12 reports metrics related to the passenger arrival delay for different scenarios linked to the 
4DTA mechanism 
Table 12. Passenger indicators statistics for 4DTA mechanism. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean delay 17.2 17.6 18.3 40 42 40.9 
25% perc. 
delay 
-9.4 -9.1 -9.1 4.7 5.8 5 
75% perc. 
delay 
15.2 15.9 15.6 44.8 47.9 46.2 
Positive 
mean delay 
23.6 23.9 23.9 42.4 44.1 42.9 
Positive 25% 
perc. delay 
0 0 0 4.7 5.8 5 
Positive 75% 
perc. delay 
15.2 15.9 15.6 44.8 47.9 46.2 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>15 
859784.1 892452.8 877714.2 2005583.6 2084142.6 2030892.7 
Total delays 
with 
delay>15 
74470449.7 75315812.7 75319356.9 138623108 144701628.5 140463044.9 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>15 
86.6 84.4 85.8 69.1 69.4 69.2 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>60 
188560.8 192402.6 192295.4 561065.1 614159.1 583253.5 
Total delays 
with 
delay>60 
55486051.8 55286443 55739860.1 91227358.5 95640736.3 92477631.4 
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Mean delay 
with 
delay>60 
294.3 287.3 289.9 162.6 155.7 158.6 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>180 
142665.4 141242 142924.6 158099.6 157273.1 155240.2 
Total delays 
with 
delay>180 
51765630 51136593.1 51790382.8 56374057.5 56048900.5 55472940.6 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>180 
362.8 362 362.4 356.6 356.4 357.3 
 
Considering the average delays passengers experience worse or similar performance when the 
mechanism is in place. The number of passengers delayed by the different threshold tend to increase 
or stay constant when the mechanism is implemented, with the exception of the very high delays in 
the stressed scenario, in which case 4DTA seems to reduce the number of affected passengers. Note 
that even in this case, the average delay in this high range is still constant, denoting the fact that 
some passengers are not delayed any more, but that the situation for the ones who are does not 
improve. 
 
Figure 16. Change in passenger delay for 4DTA: the mean delay (blue) and the mean positive delay 
(orange) with respect to baseline scenarios (default on the left, stressed on the right). 
The relative changes can be appreciated in Figure 16 for the global average. In all scenarios, the 
average delay increases, reaching up to 7%. It is interesting to note that the positive delay is not 
increasing as much as the total delay (including negative delay, i.e., early arrivals). This would mean 
that the mechanism tends mainly to increase the negative delays, i.e., passengers are arriving earlier 
than scheduled. This is in line with what is observed for the flight arrival delays and is due to the fact 
that, especially at Level 2, the mechanism allows planes to slow down in order to save fuel, which 
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tends to reduce in absolute value the negative delays. If flights are expected to arrive earlier than 
their schedule, the airline decides to save fuel by slowing down the flight and still arrive on-time. 
 
 
Figure 17. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in 4DTA in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the 4DTA at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
To inspect further this fact, Figure 17 shows two QQ-plots, which help to understand the differences 
in scenarios. In the non-stressed case, the implementation of the 4DTA at Level 1 seems to have very 
little effect on the distribution of delay. On the contrary, Level 2 has a visible effect on the left tail of 
the distribution, squeezing it towards the right. This is consistent with the previous figure. 
In the stressed scenarios, the mechanism seems to have a bigger impact. On the left side of the 
distribution, the effect is similar, with a squeeze of the distribution at Level 2. On the right side, it is 
now more obvious that both levels have an effect. The tail is indeed squeezed by the implementation 
of the mechanism, even more so at Level 2 than Level 1. This means that the situation of highly 
delayed passengers is improved by the mechanism. 
In summary, the effect of 4DTA for passengers is the following: 
• for non-stressed scenarios, 4DTA increases the delays mainly in the negative part, 
particularly at Level 2. This drives the average delay up by 2-7% but its positive part only by 
1%. I.e., if as cost of fuel is considered, if flights are going to arrive earlier than scheduled, 
they are slowed down. 
• for stressed scenarios, the same effect on the negative delays can be seen, particularly at 
Level 2. Moreover, 4DTA improves the situation for very high delays, with fewer passengers 
experiencing them. 
4.3.1.3 Costs 
In this section we discuss the impact of the 4DTA mechanism on the different kinds of costs airlines 
incur due to extra fuel consumption and delay. 
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Figure 18. Cost of delay for 4DTA. Left: Percentage of the total cost represented by each type of 
cost considered in the analysis (upper pie: default case, lower pie: stressed case). Right: Percentage 
variations of the different kinds of costs with respect to the corresponding baseline scenario. 
As shown in Figure 18, the 4DTA mechanism tend to decrease the overall cost per flight, in particular 
by decreasing the cost of fuel with respect to the baseline scenario, for both default and stressed 
cases. In fact, the baseline behaviour for delay recovery is based on speeding up the flight in order to 
decrease the arrival delay up to 5 min. On the contrary, the dynamic cost indexing implemented in 
the 4DTA mechanism, both at Level 1 and Level 2, compute the cost by including considerations on 
flight connections as well as the optimal speed in order to preserve them. The cost of fuel is 
estimated and considered. Hence, connections can be preserved without consuming more fuel than 
was necessary. This is what we observe in Figure 18, where a percentage decrease of the excess cost 
of fuel is coupled with a decrease (on average) also of the passengers' costs, i.e., 'transfer', duty of 
care, and compensation. In this context, we observe instead an increase of the soft and non-
passengers’ costs: since these types of costs are increasing functions of delays, their increased value 
with respect to the baseline is expected. Nevertheless, the profit in saving the excess fuel governs 
the overall cost per flight. 
The mechanism in Level 1 and Level 2 speed up flights which provide a reduction on delay costs (e.g., 
preserving connection of passengers) but reduces the occasions where delay is recovered (at the 
expense of extra fuel consumption) without providing additional savings (e.g., connections which are 
already missed or ensured even if flight is delayed). 
4DTA: detailed analysis of costs 
Table 13 and Table 14 show the detailed values obtained by considering the flights simulated by the 
ABM. The samples of flights over which averages are computed are built as explained in the captions. 
In particular, Table 14 show the values associated to the different types of costs without considering 
in the analysis the flights which have been cancelled. This is to better capture the impact of the 4DTA 
mechanism on normal operations. However, in both cases, the results are qualitatively the same. 
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Table 13. Detailed costs by considering all flights 4DTA (with the exception of flights with delays 
larger than 300 min). 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
136.0 112.3 103.4 182.9 117.6 125.4 
 135.0 111.5 102.2 181.2 116.1 124.2 
 137.1 112.9 104.5 184.7 118.6 126.8 
Cost of 
compensation 
8.3 7.7 8.0 14.1 12.9 14.4 
 7.3 6.7 7.3 12.8 11.7 13.3 
 9.1 8.3 8.5 14.7 13.8 15.0 
Fraction of 
compensations 
1.1% 0.9% 1.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.7% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
1.8 1.6 1.7 2.9 2.1 3.0 
 1.0 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.3 1.9 
 2.4 1.8 2.1 3.5 2.5 3.5 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 
Duty of care 229.8 225.6 227.5 284.9 277.5 286.7 
 219.8 216.3 218.7 270.0 265.8 273.1 
 237.2 233.5 232.7 290.0 284.2 293.5 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
13.5% 13.2% 13.3% 20.0% 20.0% 20.2% 
Soft costs 9.1 10.2 9.2 25.9 29.9 29.3 
 3.6 3.9 3.8 10.3 11.4 10.7 
 14.0 14.7 14.3 40.9 44.5 42.2 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
46.4% 47.0% 46.4% 57.5% 57.7% 57.3% 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
64 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
64.4 66.5 67.0 134.0 142.7 137.4 
 62.3 64.5 65.5 129.9 138.9 134.2 
 64.9 67.4 67.9 136.9 145.9 139.9 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
91.1% 91.3% 91.5% 93.2% 93.4% 93.4% 
Total excess 
cost 
449.5 423.9 416.7 644.8 582.8 596.1 
 436.6 412.7 407.7 619.8 563.2 578.8 
 457.9 432.6 426.1 658.3 597.4 609.2 
 
Table 14. Detailed costs 4DTA considering flights with delays<300 min, excluding cancelled flights. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
141.6 116.8 107.6 190.8 122.7 130.9 
 140.3 115.9 106.4 188.9 121.5 129.6 
 142.6 117.5 108..8 192.8 123.4 132.3 
Cost of 
compensation 
1.5 1.0 1.4 6.9 4.8 7.1 
 1.2 0.8 1.2 6.2 4.1 6.3 
 1.5 1.0 1.5 7.4 5.2 7.7 
Fraction of 
compensations 
0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 2.1% 1.6% 2.1% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.3 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.3 1.3 
 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.2 1.1 
 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.4 1.5 
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Fraction of 
transfer costs 
5e-2% 3e-2% 5e-2% 0.2% 8e-2% 0.2% 
Duty of care 39.7 36.5 37.7 75.9 69.1 77.2 
 35 32.4 35.1 68.0 62.6 70.7 
 41 38.2 39.5 80.1 74.8 80.5 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
11.8% 11.5% 11.6% 18.2% 18.2% 18.5% 
Soft costs 7.3 8.3 7.4 24.6 28.7 27.9 
 2.9 3.2 3.1 9.8 10.9 10.3 
 11.1 12.0 11.5 38.8 42.6 40.3 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
46.1% 46.8% 46.2% 57.5% 57.7% 57.3% 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
67.0 69.3 69.7 139.8 148.9 143.4 
 64.8 67.2 68.1 135.4 144.5 140.2 
 67.4 69.9 70.6 142.7 152.2 146.2 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
94.8% 95.0% 95.2% 97.2% 97.4% 97.4% 
Total excess 
cost 
257.6 232.1 224.1 439.5 374.6 387.9 
 248.7 225.4 218.4 420.4 357.3 374.0 
 262.9 235.8 228.5 454.7 389.1 399.9 
 142.6 117.5 108..8 192.8 123.4 132.3 
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Figure 19. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 1 baseline comparing the distribution of costs (the type of cost 
is shown in each title of plots). 
 
Figure 20. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 2 baseline comparing the distribution of costs (the type of cost 
is shown in each title of plots). 
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Figure 21. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 1 stressed comparing the distribution of costs (the type of cost 
is shown in each title of plots). 
 
 
Figure 22. QQ-plots for 4DTA Level 2 stressed comparing the distribution of costs (the type of cost 
is shown in each title of plots). 
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Figure 19, Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the QQ-plots to characterise the distribution of 
each type of costs, and how they change when we move from the baseline scenario, both default 
and stressed, to the scenario with implemented 4DTA. 
With the exception of the stressed scenario with 4DTA implemented at Level 2 (results are difficult to 
interpret and more research is necessary). We observe a clear pattern for the cost of transfer whose 
distribution is characterised by a thinner right tail, i.e., smaller probability of extreme positive events 
or, equivalently, high costs.  A similar behaviour is observed for the distribution of the excess cost of 
fuel. The pattern describing the cost of compensation is less evident, whose distribution displays 
however a smaller mean with respect to the baseline. In any case (except stressed 4DTA at Level 2), 
the impact of the Domino mechanism on the total cost describes an overall improvement because 
the distribution of the sum of all the components shows a thinner right tail with respect to the 
baseline, thus pointing out a decreasing of the occurrence of extreme cost events. 
Comments 
According to the results about mean costs (diversified by type) shown in the previous Tables, we 
point out that the 4DTA mechanism tend to reduce significantly the total cost per flight by reducing 
mainly the excess cost of fuel at the expense of soft and non-passengers costs of delay, which, on the 
contrary, display an increase when we move from the baseline scenario (both in the default and 
stressed cases) to the scenario with 4DTA mechanism implemented, especially at Level 1. 
This is also confirmed by looking at the distributions of costs (QQ-plots), especially in the default 
case: the benefit of introducing the 4DTA mechanism (at both Level 1 and Level 2) is particularly 
related to a thinner distribution for the excess cost of fuel. 
4.3.1.4 Centrality losses 
 
Figure 23. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in 4DTA scenarios implemented at Level 
1 and 2, with respect to the baseline. Three types of centralities are considered: passenger 
centrality (outgoing and incoming) and trip centrality (in this case, the average incoming and 
outgoing centralities coincide). 
Figure 23 presents the average centrality loss changes for passenger and trip centrality for the 
mechanism in Level 1 and Level 2 for both the default and stressed scenarios with respect to their 
respective baseline with 4DTA at Level 0. 
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Passenger centrality 
Table 15. Average passenger centrality loss, 4DTA, incoming and outgoing. in the scenarios in 
which 4DTA is implemented and in the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
186.03 183.12 185.37 201.48 195.55 203.34 
 177.93 176.11 177.55 192.20 187.85 197.12 
 194.01 191.24 192.31 206.50 205.32 210.32 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
206.25 201.27 205.09 232.88 221.45 234.83 
 196.81 192.87 196.35 223.26 211.89 227.48 
 215.26 209.62 212.82 238.94 231.80 242.47 
 
When the 4DTA mechanism is implemented at Level 1, the average passenger centrality loss 
(incoming and outgoing) is slightly decreasing, both in the default and in the stressed scenarios 
(Table 15). The percentage decrease with respect to the corresponding baseline (see Figure 23) is 
larger for the outgoing centrality and in the stressed case.  The decrease is statistically significant for 
the outgoing centrality loss (default and stressed) and for the incoming centrality loss in the stressed 
scenario. The box plots in Figure 24 show that in the stressed case the Level 1 mechanism limits the 
outliers with large average centrality loss. 
When the mechanism is implemented at Level 2, instead, there is only a very slight, non-significant 
decrease of the average passenger centrality loss in the default case, and a slight, non-significant 
increase in the stressed case. 
The reason for the smaller effect of the mechanism at Level 2 in preserving passengers' connectivity 
might be due to the second application of DCI at TOC. In fact, at TOC flights have the additional 
possibility to slow down, which they did not have at gate. Therefore, flights that had decided to wait 
for passengers and then speed up, as that was the most convenient choice at gate, might now find 
more convenient to slow down and save fuel, even if this means disrupting some passenger 
connections. 
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Figure 24. Average passenger centrality loss 4DTA Box plots comparing the average outgoing (left) 
and incoming (right) passenger centrality loss in the scenarios where 4DTA is implemented at Level 
1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. For each scenario, the average centrality losses in each 
of the 100 iterations of the model are considered. implemented at Level 1 and 2, with respect to 
the baseline. Three types of centralities are considered: passenger centrality (outgoing and 
incoming) and trip centrality (in this case, the average incoming and outgoing centralities coincide). 
Figure 24 compares the average outgoing and incoming passenger centrality loss in the scenarios 
where 4DTA is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
Trip centrality 
When 4DTA is implemented at Level 1, there is a small but statistically significant increase in the 
average trip centrality loss, both in the default and in the stressed cases. No statistically significant 
change is seen at Level 2 (see Table 16 and Figure 25). 
Table 16. Average trip centrality loss in 4DTA scenarios and in the corresponding baselines 
passenger centrality loss, 4DTA, incoming and outgoing. in the scenarios in which 4DTA is 
implemented and in the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average trip 
centrality loss 
0.53 0.54 0.53 0.73 0.74 0.73 
 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.73 0.73 0.73 
 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.74 0.74 0.74 
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Figure 25. Trip centrality loss comparison 4DTA Box plots comparing the average trip centrality loss 
in the scenarios where 4DTA is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
For each scenario, the average centrality losses in each of the 100 iterations of the model are 
considered. 
The fact that, when 4DTA is implemented at Level 1, the loss of Passenger centrality decreases while 
the loss of trip centrality increases with respect to the baseline tells us that the mechanism, while 
introducing more delays, limits the disruption of passengers' itineraries (e.g., by using wait-for-
passengers). In fact, the increase of trip centrality loss is a consequence of the increased number of 
delayed flights, causing disruptions in the potential itineraries that are considered by trip centrality. 
However, the itineraries that are actually used by passengers are considered in the mechanism 
optimisation, as their disruption implies costs. Therefore, such itineraries are increasingly preserved 
with respect to any of the potential itineraries that trip centrality considers. As a result, passenger 
centrality losses decrease with the Level 1 mechanism. 
In summary, the effects of the 4DTA mechanisms are: 
• The passengers' itineraries are increasingly preserved at Level 1, but not at Level 2, as shown 
by the passenger centrality losses. This is in agreement with the number of passengers 
having a modified itinerary as shown in Section 4.2.1: for 4DTA at Level 1 there is a reduction 
with respect to the baseline but there is not a significant change in Level2.  
• The itineraries that are not explicitly considered in the optimisation process are slightly less 
preserved in all scenarios, with respect to the baseline, as shown by the trip centrality losses. 
4.3.1.5 Causality analysis 
In this section, we show the causality analysis applied to the scenarios where 4DTA mechanism is 
implemented and we compare the results with the corresponding baselines. In this section, we study 
the Granger causality (both in mean and in tail) networks built with simulated data. In particular, we 
consider both propagation of delays and propagation of costs of delay. Since the 4DTA mechanism 
aim to reduce the costs each airline incur, by means of a dynamic cost computation during the 
tactical phase, the study of cost propagation may reveal patterns not observed for delay propagation 
because of the non-trivial dependence of the cost of delay from the delay itself. 
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Causality in mean 
Table 17.Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network 4DTA (delay), for the baseline scenario 
(both default and stressed) obtained for the state of delay. 
Delay Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.0043 0.0034 
Mean degree 1.09 0.87 
Clustering coefficient 0.52 0.53 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
908.3 353.7 
Reciprocity 0.28 0.23 
 
Table 18. Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network 4DTA (cost of delay), for the baseline 
scenario (both default and stressed) obtained for the state of cost of delay 
Delay Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.0063 0.0053 
Mean degree 1.6 1.4 
Clustering coefficient 0.43 0.46 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
454.2 237.4 
Reciprocity 0.23 0.20 
 
In this sub-section we focus on the study of Granger causality in mean. 
Table 17 and Table 18 show the value of the network metrics, for both default and stressed baseline 
scenarios. In Table 17, we show such metrics in the case of the state of delay, while Table 18 is for 
the state of cost of delay. Notice that, in both cases, link density decreases from the default case to 
the stressed one. That is, the higher delays of the stressed scenario tend to be less correlated, thus 
the endogenous process of propagation of both delays and costs becomes less important. 
When we aim to compare the Granger causality network in mean for the two baseline scenarios for 
the state of delay and the state of cost of delay, we can use the Jaccard index to assess the similarity 
between the two networks. The Jaccard index is the ratio between the size of the intersection and 
the size of the union for the two sets of causal links defining the two causality networks. A high value 
of this index suggests that the two networks display the same channels of propagations, whereas 
small values indicate that two networks are significantly different. In this case, the Jaccard index is 
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equal to 0.4978 for the default case and 0.3995 for the stressed case, thus revealing a partial 
superposition for the propagation channels of both delays and costs. 
 
Figure 26. Percentage variation of Granger causality in mean for 4DTA for the selected metrics of 
causality in mean network, i.e., link density, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, 
and reciprocity coefficient, when we compare the scenario with 4DTA mechanism with the 
corresponding baseline (for both default and stressed case). (In order to compare metrics between 
two different scenarios, we consider the measured value of each metric but normalised by the 
expected value for the random case. This is done for a fair comparison, because link density 
changes from one scenario to another). 
 
Figure 27. Percentage variation of Granger causality in mean cost of delay for 4DTA in the selected 
metrics, i.e., link density, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity 
coefficient, of the Granger causality in mean network but built with the state of cost of delay when 
we compare the scenario with 4DTA mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default 
and stressed case). (In order to compare metrics between two different scenarios, we consider the 
measured value of each metric but normalised by the expected value for the random case. This is 
done for a fair comparison, because link density changes from one scenario to another). 
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Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the percentage variations of the network metrics for the scenarios 
where 4DTA is implemented with respect to their baseline values shown in Table 17 and Table 18. 
Hence, we can obtain some insights on the impact of the 4DTA mechanism at the global network 
level. Considering the case of Granger causality in mean, the impact of 4DTA is quite equivalent for 
the propagation of both delays and costs. We can notice that 4DTA, at any level of implementation 
and in both default and stressed cases, is associated with a decreasing level of causality, i.e., smaller 
link density. For the state of delay, this is coupled with an overall decrease of the clustering 
coefficient and smaller number of feedback triplets, but at the default Level 1. In any other case, we 
notice an increase of the remaining metrics. In particular, the over-expressions of feedback triplets 
and reciprocal links suggest that the 4DTA mechanism tends to reduce on average the number of 
propagation channels for the delay, but the subsystems of delay amplification are less affected (this 
is proved numerically below for reciprocity in the Granger causality in tail). A similar behaviour is 
observed also when studying the propagation of the cost of delay. 
Causality in tail 
In this sub-section we focus on the case of Granger causality in tail, i.e., we study the channels of 
propagation of extreme delay events or extreme cost events (see Table 19 and Table 20). 
The Jaccard index for the two Granger causality in tail networks built with simulated data of the 
baseline scenarios is equal to 0.1627 for the default case and 0.3018 for the stressed case, thus 
suggesting the presence of different channels of propagation, in particular for the default case. 
 
Table 19. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail 4DTA network for the baseline scenario (both 
default and stressed) obtained for the state of congestion. 
Delay Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.1594 0.3460 
Mean degree 40.5 87.9 
Clustering coefficient 0.43 0.56 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
3.7 1.9 
Reciprocity 0.21 0.28 
 
Table 20. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail 4DTA extreme events network for the baseline 
scenario (both default and stressed) obtained for the state of extreme event for the propagation of 
the cost of delay. 
Delay Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.229 0.3442 
Mean degree 56.6 87.4 
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Clustering coefficient 0.43 0.55 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
2.4 1.9 
Reciprocity 0.21 0.27 
 
Figure 28. Percentage variation of the selected metrics of the Granger causality in tail 4DTA, i.e., 
mean degree, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, when 
we compare the scenario with 4DTA mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default 
and stressed case). (In order to compare metrics between two different scenarios, we consider the 
measured value of each metric but normalised by the expected value for the random case. This is 
done for a fair comparison, because link density may vary from one scenario to another). 
 
Figure 29. Number of reciprocal links (4DTA) at the different levels of implementation for both the 
default and stressed case. (GC in tail network built with the state of congestion). 
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Figure 30. Distribution of reciprocity for 4DTA delay according to the Monte Carlo simulations 
compared with the observed reciprocity in the case of Granger causality in tail networks built with 
the state of congestion. 
 
 
Figure 31. Percentage variation of the selected metrics of Granger causality in tail 4DTA, i.e., mean 
degree, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, of the 
Granger causality in tail network but built with the state of cost of delay when we compare the 
scenario with 4DTA mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default and stressed 
case). (In order to compare metrics between two different scenarios, we consider the measured 
value of each metric but normalised by the expected value for the random case. This is done for a 
fair comparison, because link density may vary from one scenario to another). 
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Figure 32. Number of reciprocal links at the different levels of implementation 4DTA, for both the 
default and stressed case. (GC in tail network built with the state of 'extreme' cost of delay) 
 
 
Figure 33. Distribution of reciprocity for 4DTA cost of delay according to the Monte Carlo 
simulations compared with the observed reciprocity for the 4DTA scenarios in the case of Granger 
causality in tail networks built with the state of 'extreme' costs of delay. 
Figure 28 and Figure 31 show the percentage variations of the network metrics for the scenarios 
where 4DTA is implemented with respect to their baseline values shown in Table 19 and Table 20. 
For the propagation of extreme delays among the airports (also referred as the states of congestion 
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of airports), we notice an increase of the level of causality (with the exception a small decrease in the 
default case at Level 2) measured with the increase of the link density. This result seems to suggest a 
negative impact of 4DTA. However, notice that not all delays have the same impact on costs. 
Interestingly, we observe an overall decrease of the level of causality in the networks built with the 
states of extreme costs of delay. Hence, some 'extreme' delays propagate more through the 
network, but the corresponding channels are less important when looking at the cost of delay, whose 
propagation is in turn reduced.  For this reason, the 4DTA mechanism represents an overall 
improvement for the system in terms of costs, at the expense of an increased number of propagation 
channels for some less important delays. This is consistent with the dynamic cost index implemented 
at the AOC level, which weights the flight delays in terms of costs, e.g., reducing the propagation of 
costs between connecting flights (because of connecting passengers) and, possibly, increasing delays 
to reduce the fuel expense when there is not an significant impact for connections. 
In all cases considered in Figure 28 and Figure 31 for both delays and costs, we observe a negative 
correlation between link density and the over-expression of any other network metric with respect 
to the random case, i.e., clustering, feedback triplets, and reciprocity. For simplicity, let us focus on 
reciprocity: in fact, reciprocal links represent the subsystems most simple to analyse. In Figure 29 and 
Figure 32, we can notice that the number of reciprocal links in the Granger causality in tail networks, 
for both delays and costs, is in effect correlated with the variation of the link density. Hence, the 
4DTA mechanism reduces also the number of subsystems amplifying costs (see Figure 32). However, 
its over-expression increases. To better understand this behaviour, let us consider this simple Monte 
Carlo simulation: (i) given the network for the baseline scenario, and (ii) observed a given decrease of 
link density for one scenario with implemented 4DTA, (iii) we can randomly erase some links from 
the baseline network in order to target the same number of links of the network for the 4DTA 
scenario, and, finally, (iv) measure the network metric under investigation (when link density 
increases from the baseline to the 4DTA scenario, we simply add links, instead of removing them). 
The result of this simple Monte Carlo experiment for reciprocity is shown in Figure 30 and Figure 33 
for the Granger causality in tail networks for both delays and costs. Notice that the expected 
measure of reciprocity according to Monte Carlo simulations is always smaller than the observed 
one. This suggests that: (i) the overall number of reciprocal links decreases or increases by following 
the variation in the total number of links, but (ii) the over-expression of reciprocity is inversely 
correlated with link density because (iii) some reciprocal subsystems are unaffected from the 
implemented mechanism. 
Comments 
The causality analysis for the propagation in mean of both delays and costs suggests that the 4DTA 
mechanism has the effect of decreasing the mean level of causality by decreasing the number of 
propagation channels. When focusing on the propagation of 'extreme events', we notice an 
increased level of causality for delays, but corresponding to an improvement for costs characterised 
by a decreasing number of propagation channels. Thus, 4DTA represents an overall improvement for 
the system in terms of costs, but some subgraphs representing amplifying subsystems for cost (and 
delay) propagation are unaffected from the mechanism. 
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4.3.2 Flight Prioritisation 
4.3.2.1 Flights delays 
Table 21, Table 22, Table 23 and Table 24 report the delay statistics for the scenarios where FP is 
implemented and for the corresponding baselines. When analysing all flights, FP brings no 
statistically significant changes in the average delays, and no clear effect is seen on the tails either. 
Such results suggest that almost no consequence is seen at the whole system level, which is 
understandable given that FP is used by a very small number of flights (1-2%). To check for a possible 
local effect of FP, we restrict our analysis to the set of flights whose destination airport was subject 
to a regulation at their scheduled in-block time. For this analysis, we use a new set of model 
simulations in which the set of regulations applied is the same across iterations and across scenarios 
(although it differs between the default and the stressed case). The results, shown in Table 25, Table 
26, Table 27 and Table 28 are averaged over 50 iterations. Concerning delays, however, even after 
focusing on the flights subject to a regulation, no effect is seen. 
Table 21. Departure delay statistics for the FP scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean 
departure 
delay (min) 
10.51 10.49 10.55 25.86 25.87 25.92 
 10.11 10.12 10.17 25.17 25.14 25.3 
 10.69 10.71 10.83 26.27 26.53 26.51 
#flights with 
dep.del>15 
min 
6143.88 6154.19 6173.72 13560.2 13646.55 13655.75 
 6037.5 6054 6102.5 13411 13498 13478 
 6239 6270 6253.5 13700.5 13799.5 13810 
Total dep 
delay >15 min 
200178.08 199601.84 201382.87 614651.32 614711.9 616141.35 
 189484.14 189984.8 191497.07 596452.79 595999.28 598992.81 
 204517.78 206610.88 208518.29 626200.08 632825.28 631284.3 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >15 
min 
32.58 32.43 32.62 45.33 45.05 45.12 
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#flights with 
dep. del >60 
min 
450.61 446.79 456.43 3013.1 2998.63 2999.76 
 366.5 377.5 386 2834.5 2867.5 2862.5 
 490 502.5 524 3124 3158.5 3149.5 
Total dep. 
delay >60 min 
40172.87 39382.64 40683.73 274106.64 271114.74 272446.6 
 29543.56 31006.23 30817 255304 252138.93 254973.72 
 43460.13 43587.29 47498.69 285799.53 287599.26 287404.75 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >60 
min 
89.15 88.15 89.13 90.97 90.41 90.82 
#flights with 
dep.del>180 
min 
18.81 17.2 18.18 83.39 76.34 83.35 
 4 3 4 51.5 52 54.5 
 12.5 11.5 18.5 94 92 98 
Total dep. 
delay >180 
min 
4161.89 3838.37 4031.85 18016.96 16375.62 17891.12 
 777.3 650.36 792.59 11078.22 10966.32 11430.03 
 2734.54 2709.86 3994.83 20037.11 19648.26 20792.65 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >180 
min 
221.26 223.16 221.77 216.06 214.51 214.65 
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Table 22. Arrival delay statistics for FP scenarios where it is implemented and the corresponding 
baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean arrival 
delay (min) 
5.18 5.15 5.23 29.09 29.1 29.14 
 4.81 4.79 4.85 28.43 28.38 28.52 
 5.35 5.37 5.52 29.56 29.78 29.76 
Mean arrival 
delay of 
delayed flights 
(min) 
10.49 10.46 10.54 30.87 30.86 30.9 
 10.1 10.11 10.16 30.22 30.16 30.28 
 10.64 10.7 10.81 31.33 31.55 31.49 
#flights with 
arr.del>15 min 
6614.13 6611.44 6642.49 15930.43 15993.58 16007.64 
 6504 6520 6570.5 15800 15887 15880 
 6674 6705.5 6735.5 16035 16118.5 16145.5 
Total arr. 
delay >15 min 
220541.86 219680.99 221843.79 758486.18 758686.47 759957.83 
 210083.98 210524.58 212417.21 740924.41 739959.42 743231.18 
 225008.08 226853.11 229015.14 770880.74 777320.38 775629.12 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >15 
min 
33.34 33.23 33.4 47.61 47.44 47.47 
#flights with 
arr. del >60 
min 
523.45 517.44 532.41 3944.73 3936.19 3935.61 
 440.5 445 458.5 3797.5 3792 3798.5 
 565.5 568.5 588.5 4067.5 4097.5 4064.5 
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Total arr. 
delay >60 min 
45928.83 45055.79 46713.96 360514.68 358015.32 359009.66 
 35987.14 36030.45 36857.53 340020.67 340589.68 339663.08 
 50130.78 49249.83 52775.28 372987.32 373084.63 373454.92 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >60 
min 
87.74 87.07 87.74 91.39 90.95 91.22 
#flights with 
arr. del. >180 
min 
19.51 18.42 19.42 108.15 100.32 106.61 
 4.5 4 5 72 71.5 74 
 14.5 13 19.5 124.5 122.5 120 
Total arr. 
delay >180 
min 
4323.19 4104.25 4286.89 23307.19 21480.47 22891.87 
 989.74 935.85 1055.41 15350.88 15250.7 15816.34 
 3228.24 2960.51 4231.14 26928.5 26278.78 25290.83 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with arr. del. 
>180 min 
221.59 222.81 220.75 215.51 214.12 214.73 
 
Table 23. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FP scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean gate-to-
gate delay 
(min) 
-5.33 -5.34 -5.32 3.25 3.25 3.24 
 -5.36 -5.37 -5.36 3.2 3.2 3.19 
 -5.28 -5.31 -5.29 3.3 3.29 3.27 
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Table 24. Cancellations and reactionary delay statistics for FP  scenarios and the corresponding 
baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
# Cancelled 
flights 
1087.95 1092.14 1087.83 1160.20 1146.14 1144.46 
 1026.50 1039.50 1037.00 1096.50 1087.00 1100.00 
 1136.00 1127.00 1130.50 1185.00 1194.00 1182.00 
Mean 
reactionary 
delay (min) 
17.72 17.76 17.88 38.44 38.08 38.24 
 15.11 15.05 15.08 35.07 34.50 35.29 
 16.90 17.37 17.58 39.07 38.09 37.57 
# Flights with 
reactionary 
delay 
2888.71 2893.68 2896.96 7197.35 7217.55 7223.23 
 2823.50 2835.50 2850.00 7114.00 7121.50 7140.50 
 2947.00 2946.50 2946.50 7268.50 7320.00 7303.50 
 
Table 25. Departure delay statistics for the FP scenarios restricted sample to flights subjects to 
regulations. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean 
departure 
delay (min) 
26.19 26.10 26.31 42.26 42.30 42.05 
 25.59 25.49 25.54 41.67 41.73 41.63 
 26.73 26.50 26.92 42.94 43.09 42.46 
Mean per-pax 
dep. delay 
(min) 
2.39E-01 2.39E-01 2.40E-01 4.09E-01 4.09E-01 4.07E-01 
 2.34E-01 2.32E-01 2.33E-01 4.03E-01 4.02E-01 4.01E-01 
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 2.44E-01 2.45E-01 2.48E-01 4.16E-01 4.14E-01 4.12E-01 
#flights with 
dep.del>15 
min 
249.16 247.22 249.22 941.86 942.82 943.02 
 243.00 241.00 243.00 928.00 935.00 933.00 
 255.00 254.00 256.00 955.00 953.00 956.00 
Total dep 
delay >15 min 
13734.43 13691.22 13800.10 56372.64 56502.30 56158.41 
 13435.05 13311.17 13282.95 55550.95 55408.98 55375.03 
 14022.87 13988.40 14245.53 57570.93 57588.33 57053.97 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >15 
min 
55.12 55.38 55.37 59.85 59.93 59.55 
#flights with 
dep. del >60 
min 
85.04 84.02 85.10 363.64 362.20 357.88 
 82.00 81.00 83.00 352.00 350.00 351.00 
 89.00 87.00 89.00 375.00 374.00 366.00 
Total dep. 
delay >60 min 
8,609.26 8,591.46 8,703.75 36,393.77 36,430.72 35,920.20 
 8198.12 8103.05 8250.98 34937.05 35064.10 35064.17 
 8956.12 8948.52 9136.73 37509.00 37783.82 36884.15 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >60 
min 
101.24 102.25 102.28 100.08 100.58 100.37 
#flights with 
dep.del>180 
min 
4.34 4.74 4.78 19.24 20.40 20.34 
 3.00 3.00 3.00 16.00 16.00 17.00 
 5.00 6.00 7.00 22.00 23.00 23.00 
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Total dep. 
delay >180 
min 
916.29 998.96 1000.95 4140.82 4406.13 4389.06 
 654.92 619.03 590.83 3512.12 3457.98 3759.63 
 1144.32 1299.15 1446.68 4707.93 5066.38 5096.18 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with dep. 
del. >180 min 
211.13 210.75 209.40 215.22 215.99 215.78 
 
Table 26. Arrival delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted sample to flights subjects to regulations. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean arrival 
delay (min) 
22.24 22.25 22.48 45.82 45.89 45.68 
 21.69 21.57 21.55 45.34 45.29 45.22 
 22.76 23.01 23.42 46.43 46.62 46.08 
Mean arrival 
delay of 
delayed flights 
(min) 
24.65 24.64 24.85 46.74 46.78 46.59 
 24.15 24.08 23.96 46.21 46.12 46.2 
 25.11 25.21 25.8 47.4 47.45 47.05 
#flights with 
arr.del>15 min 
248.06 246.8 249.6 1047.46 1052.4 1052.14 
 243 240 243 1038 1042 1039 
 253 254 259 1061 1064 1065 
Total arr. 
delay >15 min 
13483.15 13460.99 13603.39 64042.66 64204.65 63907.36 
 13165.98 13057.48 12988.93 63052.1 63077.72 63033.47 
 13647.5 13794.62 14191.92 65022.37 65274.38 64723.28 
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Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >15 
min 
54.35 54.54 54.5 61.14 61.01 60.74 
#flights with 
arr. del >60 
min 
81.58 80.8 81.64 412.28 410.8 409.28 
 78 77 77 400 399 401 
 85 83 85 421 421 418 
Total arr. 
delay >60 min 
8298.4 8274.97 8384.1 42018.24 42005.81 41620.16 
 7848.45 7851.65 7894.52 40748.08 40350.03 40807.85 
 8635.57 8598.92 8866.77 43216.88 43565.68 42474.32 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >60 
min 
101.72 102.41 102.7 101.92 102.25 101.69 
#flights with 
arr. del. >180 
min 
4 4.48 4.48 26.4 27.06 27.36 
 3 3 3 23 23 25 
 5 6 6 29 31 30 
Total arr. 
delay >180 
min 
847.2 936.96 932.56 5662.99 5850.5 5895.19 
 623.6 594.15 591.68 4872.6 4888.2 5310.8 
 1056.77 1162.57 1234.95 6232.88 6711.03 6587.98 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with arr. del. 
>180 min 
211.8 209.14 208.16 214.51 216.2 215.47 
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Table 27. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted sample to flights subjects to 
regulations 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean gate-to-
gate delay 
(min) 
-3.95 -3.85 -3.83 3.61 3.64 3.68 
 -4.22 -4.04 -4.1 3.49 3.46 3.44 
 -3.67 -3.63 -3.53 3.79 3.87 3.88 
 
Table 28. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for FP scenarios restricted sample to flights 
subjects to regulations. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
# cancelled 
flights 
20.94 20.62 21.10 70.76 68.64 68.54 
 17.00 17.00 18.00 65.00 63.00 63.00 
 24.00 24.00 25.00 77.00 74.00 74.00 
Mean 
reactionary 
delay (min) 
31.82 32.42 31.34 58.79 58.69 58.31 
 29.28 29.34 29.09 56.90 57.65 56.83 
 34.40 35.23 33.63 60.29 60.64 59.26 
# flights with 
reactionary 
delay 
53.18 50.06 52.42 338.60 338.42 338.20 
 49.00 46.00 49.00 331.00 327.00 330.00 
 57.00 55.00 56.00 346.00 348.00 346.00 
 
4.3.2.2 Passengers delays 
In this section we show the same metrics presented in Section 4.3.2.1, with the FP mechanism. These 
results have also been obtained using 50 iterations. 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
88 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
On the non-stressed scenarios, the implementation of FP seems to have a small increasing effect on 
the average delay (positive or not). The number of passengers delayed in the various threshold is also 
reasonably constant. In the stressed scenarios, if the averages seem to decrease slightly, it seems 
also that the passengers involved in high delays are decreasing in number, especially for the very 
high delays (>180 minutes) (see Table 29) 
Table 29. Passenger indicators statistics for FP mechanism. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean delay 17.2 17.6 17.3 40 39.7 39.4 
25% perc. 
delay 
-9.4 -9.4 -9.3 4.7 4.6 4.5 
75% perc. 
delay 
15.2 15.2 15.3 44.8 44.5 44.3 
Positive 
mean delay 
23.6 24.1 23.8 42.4 42 41.8 
Positive 25% 
perc. delay 
0 0 0 4.7 4.6 4.5 
Positive 75% 
perc. delay 
15.2 15.2 15.3 44.8 44.5 44.3 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>15 
859784.1 862912.6 865899.5 2005583.6 1998571.9 1994573.5 
Total delays 
with 
delay>15 
74470449.7 75906819.2 74995551.2 138623108 137452785.9 136653497.2 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>15 
86.6 88 86.6 69.1 68.8 68.5 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>60 
188560.8 192384.2 191231.6 561065.1 555273.8 548116.1 
Total delays 
with 
delay>60 
55486051.8 56958103 55917776.3 91227358.5 90093683.9 89200936 
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Mean delay 
with 
delay>60 
294.3 296.1 292.4 162.6 162.3 162.7 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>180 
142665.4 146413.4 143547 158099.6 155659 154764 
Total delays 
with 
delay>180 
51765630 53213325.9 51992217.4 56374057.5 55590581.8 55315694.8 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>180 
362.8 363.4 362.2 356.6 357.1 357.4 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Change in passenger delay for FP: the mean delay (blue) and the mean positive delay 
(orange) with respect to baseline scenarios (default on the left, stressed on the right). 
In Figure 34, we show the small changes in the average delays. Interestingly, when compared to the 
4DTA case, the average on the positive delays is quite close to the non-positive one. This indicates 
that FP, on the contrary of 4DTA, does not impact the negative delays so much. This is due to the fact 
that FP is designed primarily to avoid big delays (in fact, high cost) before departure. Moreover, even 
if the variations are small, it is surprising to see that FP seems to have a benefit for passengers only in 
the stressed case. This may indicate that the airline interest (profit) is only aligned with the 
passengers' (utility) when the delays are very high. 
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Figure 35. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FP in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the FP at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
The QQ-plots in Figure 35 confirm the trends. In the non-stressed scenario, the right tail of the 
distribution seems to fatten with the implementation of FP (and more with Level 1 than Level 2). In 
the stressed scenarios the effect is the opposite, and the right tail gets squeezed, demonstrating an 
improvement of the situation for the very high delays. The effect on the average is thus mainly due 
to the effect on the right tail. 
In summary, the effect of the implementation of FP is the following: 
• for non-stressed scenarios, the implementation of FP increases slightly the average delay, 
and more at Level 1 than Level 2. This is due mainly to the fattening of the right side of the 
distribution of delay. 
• for stressed scenario, the implementation of FP decreases even more slightly the average 
delay, and more at Level 2 than Level 1. This is due mainly to the squeeze of the right side of 
the distribution. 
4.3.2.3 Costs 
In this section we present the impact of the FP mechanism on the different kinds of costs airlines 
incur because of both excess fuel and delay. 
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Figure 36. Cost of delay for FP. Left: Percentage of the total cost represented by each type of cost 
considered in the analysis (upper pie: default, lower pie: stressed); right: Percentage variations of 
the different kinds of costs with respect to the corresponding baseline scenario. The plots are 
obtained with 100 iterations of the ABM with regulations sampled randomly from historical 
observations. 
 
 
Figure 37. Cost of delay for FP restricted regulated flights. Left: Percentage of the total cost 
represented by each type of cost considered in the analysis (upper pie: default, lower pie: 
stressed); right: Percentage variations of the different kinds of costs with respect to the 
corresponding baseline scenario. The plots are obtained with 50 iterations of the ABM with fixed 
regulation. 
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Figure 38. Cost of delay for FP restricted non-regulated flights. Left: Percentage of the total cost 
represented by each type of cost considered in the analysis (upper pie: default, lower pie: 
stressed); right: Percentage variations of the different kinds of costs with respect to the 
corresponding baseline scenario. The plots are obtained with 50 iterations of the ABM with fixed 
regulation. 
 
Figure 36, Figure 37 and Figure 38 summarise the results, in particular Figure 36 is obtained by 
considering 100 iterations of the ABM model where regulations are randomly sampled from 
historical observations, whereas Figures 2 and 3 are obtained with 50 iterations of the ABM model, 
but with a fixed regulation. The choice of analysing 50 iterations with fixed regulation is to focus on 
the systemic impact of the FP mechanism on a fixed set of flights in order to exclude spurious effects 
arising from comparing different samples. The results show that the FP mechanism has no systemic 
impact overall. In fact, percentage changes in the value of costs from baselines to scenarios with FP 
are very small, with the exceptions of soft and transfer costs. However, note that these two kinds of 
costs represent the smallest percentages of the total cost. Moreover, they represent also the 
smallest costs in absolute value. Thus, the larger percentage changes with respect other costs can be 
interpreted at all effects as random fluctuations. 
FP: detailed analysis of costs 
Table 13 and Table 14 show the detailed values obtained by considering the flights simulated by the 
ABM. The samples of flights over which averages are computed are built as explained in the captions. 
In particular, Table 14 show the values associated to the different types of costs without considering 
in the analysis the flights which have been cancelled. This is to better capture the impact of the 4DTA 
mechanism on normal operations. However, in both cases, the results are qualitatively the same. 
Table 30. Detailed costs by considering all flights FP (with the exception of flights with delays larger 
than 300 min). 
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Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
136.0 135.9 136.0 182.9 183.7 183.6 
 135.0 134.6 134.6 181.2 182.1 181.1 
 137.1 137.3 137.3 184.7 185.4 185.3 
Cost of 
compensation 
8.3 8.1 8.2 14.1 13.6 13.8 
 7.3 7.3 7.3 12.8 12.6 12.5 
 9.1 8.7 8.7 14.7 14.5 14.7 
Fraction of 
compensations 
1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
1.8 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.5 2.6 
 1.0 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 
 2.4 1.9 2.3 3.5 2.9 3.2 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Duty of care 229.8 231.4 228.5 284.9 279.2 280.4 
 219.8 221.1 219.2 270.0 268.0 266.9 
 237.2 237.5 234.4 290.0 290.4 288.7 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
13.5% 13.6% 13.5% 20.0% 19.7% 19.8% 
Soft costs 9.1 9.9 9.5 25.9 30.5 35.3 
 3.6 3.6 3.6 10.3 10.5 39.8 
 14.0 14.1 14.2 40.9 41.1 41.2 
Fraction of soft 
costs 
46.4% 46.4% 46.4% 57.5% 57.5% 57.5% 
Non passenger 
costs 
64.4 64.1 64.3 134.0 134.2 134.6 
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 62.3 62.2 62.7 129.9 130.6 130.9 
 64.9 64.6 65.1 136.9 137.8 138.1 
Fraction of non 
passenger 
costs 
91.1% 91.1% 91.1% 93.2% 93.3% 93.3% 
Total excess 
cost 
449.5 451.0 448.5 644.8 643.7 650.5 
 436.6 435.9 438.1 619.8 627.3 635.9 
 457.9 459.7 454.6 658.3 654.4 665.9 
 
Table 31. Detailed costs FP considering all regulated flights (with the exception of flights with 
delays larger than 300 min). 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
135.8 133.2 136.9 192.2 193.1 193.2 
 128.8 127.7 127.6 186.3 187.1 188.4 
 140.9 137.8 146.6 196.7 200.7 199.2 
Cost of 
compensation 
14.9 14.4 15.5 37.1 37.8 40.3 
 12.0 11.4 11.1 33.4 33.5 35.2 
 17.9 17.8 19.4 40.5 42.9 44.5 
Fraction of 
compensations 
5.3% 5.1% 5.1% 6.8% 6.8% 7.0% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.9 0.9 1.1 4.9 4.8 5.2 
 0.2 0.1 0 3.0 3.4 3.7 
 1.5 1.1 1.3 5.8 6.8 6.7 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
Duty of care 256.0 250.1 233.6 443.5 428.3 432.9 
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 222.4 221.3 210.1 407.7 398.9 408.5 
 282.8 287.8 255.3 463.8 453.3 459.2 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
21.3% 21.2% 20.9% 33.9% 33.9% 34.3% 
Soft costs 47.1 46.0 28.2 52.7 57.2 44.3 
 51.1 49.1 13.2 19.2 19.4 35.2 
 55.1 54.9 52.3 77.3 77.9 44.5 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
61.1% 61.6% 61.5% 66.8% 66.9% 67.0% 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
156.7 156.6 158.8 224.8 224.6 223.7 
 154.3 153.2 155.1 219.7 220.4 220.4 
 160.8 160.7 162.2 229.4 229.0 226.6 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
95.1% 95.1% 95.0% 94.9% 95.0% 95.1% 
Total excess 
cost 
611.4 601.2 573.1 955.3 945.9 939.8 
 567.6 563.7 542.3 923.5 908.4 893.9 
 645.1 642.3 595.5 986.7 984.4 987.9 
 
Table 32. Detailed costs FP considering flights with delays<300 min excluding cancelled. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
141.6 141.4 141.5 190.8 191.6 191.5 
 140.3 140.2 140.2 188.9 189.5 188.8 
 142.6 143.0 143.0 192.8 193.5 193.5 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
96 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
Cost of 
compensation 
1.5 1.5 1.5 6.9 6.7 6.7 
 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.2 6.0 6.0 
 1.5 1.6 1.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 
Fraction of 
compensations 
0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 
 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
5E-2% 5E-2% 5E-2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Duty of care 39.7 39.3 39.1 75.9 73.6 74.7 
 35 34.9 35.1 68.0 66.8 67.5 
 41 41.1 40.6 80.1 79.6 80.2 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
11.8% 11.8% 11.7% 18.2% 18.0% 18.0% 
Soft costs 7.3 7.9 7.7 24.6 29.0 33.6 
 2.9 2.9 3.0 9.8 10.0 37.8 
 11.1 11.2 11.3 38.8 39.0 39.2 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
46.1% 46.1% 46.1% 57.5% 57.5% 57.5% 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
67.0 66.7 66.9 139.8 139.9 140.4 
 64.8 64.6 65.2 135.4 136.2 136.3 
 67.4 67.2 67.8 142.7 143.6 144.1 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
94.8% 94.8% 94.6% 97.2% 97.2% 97.3% 
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Total excess 
cost 
257.6 257.3 257.2 439.5 442.1 448.1 
 248.7 250.1 249.7 420.4 429.0 437.1 
 262.9 260.6 261.3 454.7 453.9 459.4 
 
Table 33. Detailed costs FP considering all regulated flights excluding cancelled (with the exception 
of flights with delays larger than 300 min). 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
140.5 137.7 141.7 201.7 202.3 202.4 
 133.1 132.4 131.2 195.3 195.3 197.6 
 146.4 143.3 151.2 207.4 209.9 209.1 
Cost of 
compensation 
11.5 10.7 13.2 32.2 33.1 35.2 
 9.5 8.6 9.0 27.7 29.0 29.7 
 13.4 12.3 16.5 35.8 37.8 40.0 
Fraction of 
compensations 
5.1% 4.8% 4.9% 6.3% 6.4% 6.6% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.6 0.7 0.9 3.6 3.7 4.3 
 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.2 2.8 
 0.9 1.1 1.3 4.6 5.3 5.1 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
Duty of care 89.0 87.7 160.9 203.7 204.6 206.5 
 78.6 74.4 82.4 193.2 191.2 197.4 
 98.4 98.2 233.4 216.5 214.2 214.8 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
19.9% 19.8% 20.1% 32.5% 32.5% 33.0% 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
98 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
Soft costs 45.7 44.7 27.7 52.1 56.7 43.8 
 48.9 47.4 12.9 19.1 19.3 18.6 
 53.2 53.1 52.7 76.2 77.1 75.5 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
61.0% 61.6% 61.6% 67.1% 67.3% 67.3% 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
162.2 161.8 161.2 235.8 235.3 234.4 
 159.3 158.6 155.2 231.1 230.5 231.2 
 166.1 165.6 166.1 239.5 240.2 236.9 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
98.3% 98.4% 96.7% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 
Total excess 
cost 
449.6 443.4 434.1 729.2 735.9 726.8 
 431.8 421.5 407.2 695.8 704.7 699.9 
 469.7 457.9 465.8 762.3 772.3 759.6 
 
In Table 30, Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33 we show the detailed values of all kind of costs for all 
scenarios and both default and stressed case. Notice that there are no significant variations, 
especially in the distributions characterised by the interquartile range. 
Comments 
From the considered detailed analysis on the different kind of costs, we can conclude that the FP 
mechanism has no systemic impact on the costs flights face at the day of operations, since FP does 
not affect both excess fuel consumption and delays when looking at the aggregates. 
4.3.2.4 Centrality losses 
Passenger centrality 
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Figure 39. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in FP scenarios for the analysis on all 
airports, on the airports subject to a regulation and on the airports without. 
Table 34 reports the passenger centrality loss statistics obtained averaging losses over all the 
airports. All losses are slightly increasing, except for Level 2 stressed, where they are decreasing very 
slightly, as can be also seen in Figure 39, showing the percentage change in the centrality loss with 
respect to the baseline. All changes are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34. Average passenger centrality loss for FP, incoming and outgoing. in the scenarios where 
FP is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
184.94 186.09 185.42 198.72 201.07 198.20 
 176.76 178.09 175.49 191.24 194.26 193.76 
 192.20 194.19 194.93 206.83 209.25 206.19 
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Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
204.33 205.85 204.78 228.38 230.91 228.01 
 195.92 196.86 194.34 220.24 224.11 222.84 
 211.56 214.08 215.16 236.74 239.24 235.71 
 
 
Figure 40. Average passenger centrality loss FP Box plots comparing the average outgoing (left) and 
incoming (right) passenger centrality loss in the scenarios where FP is implemented at Level 1 and 
2 and in the corresponding baselines. For each scenario, the average centrality losses in each of the 
100 iterations of the model are considered. 
Figure 40 compares the average outgoing and incoming passenger centrality loss in the scenarios 
where FP is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
We then restrict our analysis to the set of airports that were subject to a regulation, and compare it 
to the set of airport where no regulation was applied, in order to see if the first group has a more 
important improvement. The centrality losses are reported in Table 35 and the corresponding box-
plots are shown in Figure 41, while the percentage change with respect to the baseline is shown in 
Figure 39. Although the differences are not statistically significant, we remark that in the stressed 
case airports that were subject to a regulation have on average smaller centrality losses when FP is 
implemented at Level 1 and 2 with respect to the baseline, while for airports that were not subject to 
regulations the losses are slightly larger or very similar. In the default case, no improvement is 
observed except for the outgoing centrality at Level 2. The fact that incoming centrality losses 
decrease for airports subject to a regulation suggests that flight swapping improves the connections 
at the departure airport of the swapped flights. If we make a comparison at a single airport level, in 
the stressed scenarios 60-70% of the 22 regulated airports have, on average, smaller passenger 
centrality losses than in the corresponding baseline, however the difference in the averages are not 
statistically significant for any of them. In the default scenarios, instead, such percentage is smaller 
than 35% for outgoing centrality at Level 1 and close to 50% in the other cases. 
In conclusion, the FP mechanism causes a slight increase in the average centrality losses in the entire 
system, and only in the stressed case we see an improvement for the regulated airports, for which 
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there is a percentage improvement which is not seen in the non-regulated one. However, this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 35. Average passenger centrality loss for FP for airports with regulations, incoming and 
outgoing, implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(regulated airp) 
1400.27 1399.12 1399.78 1565.44 1545.75 1536.12 
 1258.14 1300.64 1281.71 1433.50 1458.27 1435.36 
 1487.07 1488.57 1547.64 1633.05 1637.27 1635.95 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-
regulated airp) 
164.29 165.48 164.79 161.87 164.82 162.13 
 156.42 159.62 156.18 155.97 157.99 156.04 
 171.33 172.20 172.65 168.10 170.42 168.97 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(regulated airp) 
1877.33 1905.96 1860.92 2161.30 2151.92 2152.54 
 1767.79 1771.50 1688.93 2037.27 2055.95 2062.82 
 2005.79 2040.21 2058.21 2257.36 2243.36 2249.41 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-
regulated airp) 
175.91 176.97 176.64 176.26 179.12 176.12 
 168.95 170.87 167.86 170.01 172.83 170.88 
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 183.15 184.00 185.27 183.94 184.54 182.05 
 
 
Figure 41. Average passenger centrality loss FP Box plots comparing the average outgoing (left) and 
incoming (right) passenger centrality loss for airports subject to a regulation in the scenarios where 
FP is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. For each scenario, the 
average centrality losses in each of the 100 iterations of the model are considered. 
Figure 41 compares the average outgoing and incoming passenger centrality loss in the scenarios 
where FP is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines on the restricted 
dataset (only considering flights which to airports with an ATFM regulation). 
Trip centrality 
Table 36 reports the trip centrality loss statistics obtained averaging losses over all the airports. All 
losses are slightly increasing, except for Level 2 default, where they are decreasing very slightly, as 
can be also seen in Figure 39, showing the percentage change in the centrality loss with respect to 
the baseline. All changes are not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 42. Percentage change in the average centrality loss in FP scenarios for the analysis on all 
airports, on the airports subject to a regulation and on the airports without. 
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Table 36. Average trip centrality loss FP at Level 1 and 2 and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average trip 
centrality loss 
0.536 0.538 0.536 0.733 0.734 0.734 
 0.530 0.532 0.529 0.729 0.730 0.729 
 0.543 0.545 0.542 0.738 0.736 0.740 
 
We then restrict our analysis to the set of airports that were subject to a regulation, and compare it 
to the set of airports where no regulation was applied. The centrality losses are reported in Table 37, 
while the percentage change with respect to the baseline is shown in Figure 42. The airports that 
were subject to a regulation have on average smaller incoming centrality losses when FP is 
implemented at Level 1 and 2 with respect to the baseline, while for airports that were not subject to 
regulations the losses are slightly larger or very similar. For the outgoing centrality, the same is true 
only in Level 2 default and 1 stressed, while for Level 1 default and 2 stressed we see a worsening 
with respect to the baseline, which is similar in regulated and non-regulated airports. All differences 
are still non statistically significant, as in the passenger centrality case. 
 
 
Table 37. Average trip centrality loss FP restricted to airports with regulations, incoming and 
outgoing, in the scenarios where FP is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding 
baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming trip 
centrality loss 
(regulated 
airp) 
4.779 4.766 4.772 5.050 5.041 5.048 
 4.662 4.688 4.661 5.002 5.006 5.005 
 4.881 4.856 4.888 5.100 5.076 5.099 
Average 
incoming trip 
centrality loss 
(non-regulated 
airp) 
0.464 0.467 0.464 0.617 0.618 0.618 
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 0.459 0.462 0.458 0.614 0.614 0.613 
 0.469 0.473 0.469 0.620 0.620 0.623 
Average 
outgoing trip 
centrality loss 
(regulated 
airp) 
5.133 5.161 5.115 5.435 5.431 5.449 
 5.040 5.070 5.015 5.381 5.382 5.414 
 5.248 5.245 5.223 5.471 5.471 5.491 
Average 
outgoing trip 
centrality loss 
(non-regulated 
airp) 
0.458 0.460 0.458 0.606 0.607 0.607 
 0.453 0.456 0.453 0.604 0.604 0.602 
 0.464 0.465 0.464 0.609 0.610 0.611 
 
In summary, the FP mechanism overall preserves slightly less itineraries, both passenger itineraries 
and potential ones. In some cases, it brings improvements locally, to the airports that are subject to a 
regulation. 
4.3.2.5 Causality analysis 
There are no measurable effects on causality due to the local application of the mechanisms (only 
applicable to flights which arrive to an airport with an ATFM regulation), and the small number of 
flights affected. For this reason, no detailed results are presented. 
4.3.3 Flight Arrival Coordination 
4.3.3.1 Flights delays 
Table 38, Table 39, Table 40 and Table 41 present the delay metrics for the scenarios where the FAC 
mechanisms are implemented. 
At Level 1, both in the default and stressed case, FAC brings a small overall improvement in arrival 
and departure delays, in the number of flights with reactionary delays and in the number of 
cancellations. At Level 2 it introduces a small overall worsening, except for the arrival delay in the 
default case and the number of cancellations in the stressed case. All differences are not statistically 
significant, except for the increase of average delays and number of reactionary delays in Level 2 
stressed and for the decrease of cancellations in Level 1 stressed. 
In the default case, the mechanism, at both levels, has a positive effect on the tails of the 
distributions: at Level 1, there are less flights with more than 15, 60 and 180 minutes of delay (both 
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in arrival and departure), and at Level 2 there are less flights with more than 180 minutes of delay, 
and also with 60 minutes in the default case. The percentage change with respect to the baseline of 
some of these metrics are plotted in Figure 43. The effect on the tails can be seen clearly in the QQ-
plots in Figure 44 as a thinning of the distribution of departure and arrival delays above 100 minutes, 
more pronounced for the Level 1 scenario (blue line). In the stressed case, only the Level 1 
mechanism retains its positive effect on the tail, which is however less pronounced, as the QQ-plots 
in Figure 45 show. 
 
Figure 43. Percentage change flight delay in FAC. 
Table 38. Departure delay statistics for the FAC scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean 
departure 
delay (min) 
10.51 10.41 10.54 25.86 25.69 26.17 
 10.11 10.04 10.19 25.17 24.97 25.57 
 10.69 10.65 10.81 26.27 26.19 26.7 
#flights with 
dep.del>15 
min 
6143.88 6129.23 6228.15 13560.2 13549.25 13764.01 
 6037.5 6033 6122 13411 13436.5 13634 
 6239 6235.5 6339 13700.5 13671 13901 
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Total dep 
delay >15 min 
200178.08 197700.15 199448.39 614651.32 610699.38 622165.35 
 189484.14 187974.18 190696.76 596452.79 592220.32 602788.49 
 204517.78 204210.27 206502.9 626200.08 624079.24 635930.78 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >15 
min 
32.58 32.26 32.02 45.33 45.07 45.2 
#flights with 
dep. del >60 
min 
450.61 430.23 430.28 3013.1 2973.82 3040.19 
 366.5 359 359 2834.5 2827 2868 
 490 479 482 3124 3111 3172 
Total dep. 
delay >60 min 
40172.87 37647.05 37028.78 274106.64 269395.67 276094.15 
 29543.56 29153.35 29121.52 255304 248352.8 257148.04 
 43460.13 43460.46 42091.34 285799.53 284049.43 292990.55 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >60 
min 
89.15 87.5 86.06 90.97 90.59 90.81 
#flights with 
dep.del>180 
min 
18.81 14.84 12.05 83.39 79.14 84.18 
 4 2 3 51.5 48 50 
 12.5 14 12 94 91 103 
Total dep. 
delay >180 
min 
4161.89 3302.88 2668.46 18016.96 16929.61 18127.95 
 777.3 570.74 613.26 11078.22 10203.23 10740.28 
 2734.54 3157.42 2820.81 20037.11 19175.69 22726.38 
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Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >180 
min 
221.26 222.57 221.45 216.06 213.92 215.35 
 
Table 39. Arrival delay statistics for FAC scenarios where it is implemented and the corresponding 
baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean arrival 
delay (min) 
5.18 5.1 5.21 29.09 28.94 29.41 
 4.81 4.74 4.85 28.43 28.22 28.76 
 5.35 5.33 5.55 29.56 29.47 29.87 
Mean arrival 
delay of 
delayed flights 
(min) 
10.49 10.38 10.46 30.87 30.7 31.15 
 10.1 10.04 10.14 30.22 30 30.51 
 10.64 10.61 10.75 31.33 31.23 31.62 
#flights with 
arr.del>15 min 
6614.13 6580.41 6653.3 15930.43 15924.32 16077.09 
 6504 6481.5 6546 15800 15815 15974 
 6674 6671.5 6748 16035 16050 16169 
Total arr. 
delay >15 min 
220541.86 217639.08 219359.62 758486.18 754579.7 766416.78 
 210083.98 208561.33 210704.1 740924.41 737172.32 747264.25 
 225008.08 224011.89 226657.29 770880.74 769983.12 780447.22 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >15 
min 
33.34 33.07 32.97 47.61 47.39 47.67 
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#flights with 
arr. del >60 
min 
523.45 506.45 506.6 3944.73 3904.3 3998.91 
 440.5 440.5 442 3797.5 3759.5 3849 
 565.5 560.5 552.5 4067.5 4029.5 4130 
Total arr. 
delay >60 min 
45928.83 43656.81 43154.69 360514.68 355631.38 364788.53 
 35987.14 35341.03 35604.32 340020.67 333589.21 345240.38 
 50130.78 48592.29 48096.23 372987.32 369942.87 381229.23 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >60 
min 
87.74 86.2 85.18 91.39 91.09 91.22 
#flights with 
arr. del. >180 
min 
19.51 15.56 13.43 108.15 102.4 107.1 
 4.5 4 4 72 70 68.5 
 14.5 14.5 13.5 124.5 115 131.5 
Total arr. 
delay >180 
min 
4323.19 3469.05 2963.92 23307.19 21965.68 23043.86 
 989.74 789.64 830.04 15350.88 14814.76 14521.19 
 3228.24 3194.05 3068.4 26928.5 24101.47 28815.49 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with arr. del. 
>180 min 
221.59 222.95 220.69 215.51 214.51 215.16 
 
Table 40. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FAC scenarios where it is implemented and the 
corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
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Mean gate-to-
gate delay 
(min) 
-5.92 -5.89 -5.89 3.25 3.26 3.26 
 -5.97 -5.95 -5.95 3.2 3.21 3.23 
 -5.86 -5.82 -5.83 3.3 3.31 3.31 
 
Table 41. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics for FAC scenarios where FAC is implemented 
and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
# cancelled 
flights 
1087.95 1075.08 1091.28 1160.20 1131.65 1145.29 
 1026.50 1043.50 1039.00 1096.50 1093.00 1088.00 
 1136.00 1115.50 1142.00 1185.00 1159.50 1188.50 
Mean 
reactionary 
delay (min) 
17.72 17.81 17.66 38.44 38.19 38.98 
 15.11 15.17 14.88 35.07 34.69 35.71 
 16.90 17.20 17.14 39.07 38.06 40.12 
# flights with 
reactionary 
delay 
2888.71 2869.36 2896.00 7197.35 7191.48 7272.01 
 2823.50 2812.50 2836.50 7114.00 7136.00 7200.00 
 2947.00 2924.00 2961.00 7268.50 7264.50 7348.50 
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Figure 44. QQ-plots flight delay distributions default scenario FAC Left: QQ-plot of departure delay; 
right: QQ-plot of arrival delay. Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The dashed line is the 1:1 line. 
 
 
 
Figure 45. QQ-plots flight delay distributions stressed scenario FAC Left: QQ-plot of departure 
delay; right: QQ-plot of arrival delay. Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The dashed line is the 1:1 line. 
Table 42, Table 43, Table 44 and Table 45 report the same delay statistics for the restricted sample of 
flights arriving at airports in which FAC has been implemented. Here, we see that both levels 
introduce improvements to average delays and to the tails in the default case. Level 1 decreases the 
average delay more than Level 2, although Level 2 has more effect on the tails, as can be noted in  
Figure 47, where the blue curve is slightly lower than the red one. The thinning of the departure and 
arrival delay distribution is enhanced with respect to Figure 44, where all flights were considered, 
showing that the mechanism has a stronger effect on the flights arriving to airports implementing 
FAC. In the stressed case, only Level 1 manages to diminish the average delays and the number of 
flights in the tails, while Level 2 increases both, and it also increases significantly the flights with 
reactionary delay. The thinning of the right tail of the delay distribution for Level 1 is anyway less 
pronounced than in the default case, as shown in Figure 48. As can be remarked by Figure 46, the 
percentage improvements with respect to the baseline are larger in this restricted sample than 
overall. 
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Figure 46. Percentage change flight delay in FAC restricted to airports with FAC. 
 
Table 42. Departure delay statistics for the FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC where it is 
implemented and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean 
departure 
delay (min) 
10.26 10.08 10.18 25.94 25.83 26.41 
 9.64 9.5 9.65 24.88 24.8 25.26 
 10.58 10.29 10.44 26.79 26.81 27.37 
#flights with 
dep.del>15 
min 
2163.29 2156.85 2187.13 4998.1 5000.62 5088.14 
 2096 2086.5 2130 4925 4930.5 5012.5 
 2228.5 2198 2234 5070 5077 5158 
Total dep 
delay >15 min 
71169.03 69405.09 69920.61 226184.78 225352.82 230692.84 
 64869.26 63754.58 64774.32 215998.07 215191.08 219923.65 
 74261.89 71293.85 72031.34 234546.78 234864.6 239620.14 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
112 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >15 
min 
32.9 32.18 31.97 45.25 45.06 45.34 
#flights with 
dep. del >60 
min 
165.84 151.57 150.83 1112.96 1104.65 1138.75 
 117.5 109 110.5 1029.5 1017 1046.5 
 190.5 166.5 166.5 1180.5 1196 1228.5 
Total dep. 
delay >60 min 
15378.37 13495.34 13231.83 100636.78 99528.28 103113.9 
 9605.83 8627.46 8665.17 89423.9 88289.38 92278.7 
 16596.47 14395.37 14004.99 109382.98 109989.87 112181.45 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >60 
min 
92.73 89.04 87.73 90.42 90.1 90.55 
#flights with 
dep.del>180 
min 
8.95 5.9 5 27.55 26.02 30.16 
 1 1 0 14 13 13.5 
 5.5 4 4 34 33.5 38 
Total dep. 
delay >180 
min 
1975.53 1307.78 1101.69 5912.59 5512.98 6445.49 
 186.91 180.48 0 3073.01 2755.61 2772.2 
 1244.85 1028.13 826.81 7334.32 7198.63 8037.48 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
dep. del. >180 
min 
220.73 221.66 220.34 214.61 211.87 213.71 
 
Table 43. Arrival delay statistics for FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC where it is 
implemented and the corresponding baselines. 
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Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean arrival 
delay (min) 
4.35 4.2 4.3 28.96 28.86 29.51 
 3.73 3.6 3.74 27.87 27.83 28.46 
 4.64 4.39 4.61 29.78 29.86 30.45 
Mean arrival 
delay of 
delayed flights 
(min) 
9.28 9.04 9.14 30.35 30.21 30.85 
 8.67 8.5 8.63 29.25 29.18 29.8 
 9.56 9.16 9.35 31.17 31.17 31.78 
#flights with 
arr.del>15 min 
2081.76 2055.31 2084.73 5851.11 5846.46 5927.99 
 2012 1988.5 2028.5 5794.5 5782 5870 
 2141.5 2105.5 2126.5 5924 5918.5 5988 
Total arr. 
delay >15 min 
68949.83 66704.18 67387.83 272320.53 271099.58 277611.26 
 63136.72 61315.28 62488.61 261784.78 260258.93 267112.42 
 71849.07 68316.59 69597.17 279626.55 280983.73 287250.06 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >15 
min 
33.12 32.45 32.32 46.54 46.37 46.83 
#flights with 
arr. del >60 
min 
164.29 150.78 150.76 1384.97 1370.53 1421.73 
 116.5 109.5 113 1297 1273 1339 
 184 166 164 1456 1457 1510 
Total arr. 
delay >60 min 
15326.04 13553.6 13370.95 125687.31 124109.86 129288.22 
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 9558.08 8961.31 9094.13 114545.69 112169.29 117940.58 
 15754.57 14567.05 14213.63 134927.41 134797.84 138487.15 
Mean delay of 
flights with 
arr. del. >60 
min 
93.29 89.89 88.69 90.75 90.56 90.94 
#flights with 
arr. del. >180 
min 
9.71 6.66 5.86 35.19 32.87 36.94 
 1 1 2 20 19.5 19.5 
 7 5 5 47 43 44 
Total arr. 
delay >180 
min 
2143.86 1486.55 1295.37 7548.2 7008.74 7927.64 
 249.19 234.99 399.1 4184.35 4070.4 4204.78 
 1558.53 1237.56 1179 9745.58 8999.88 9311.48 
Mean delay 
of flights 
with arr. del. 
>180 min 
220.79 223.21 221.05 214.5 213.23 214.61 
 
 
 
 
Table 44. Gate-to-gate delay statistics for FAC scenarios restricted to airports with FAC where it is 
implemented and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Mean gate-to-
gate delay 
(min) 
3.03 3.03 3.11 3.03 3.03 3.11 
 2.94 2.96 3.03 2.94 2.96 3.03 
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 3.12 3.11 3.19 3.12 3.11 3.19 
 
Table 45. Cancellation and reactionary delay statistics scenarios restricted to airports with FAC 
where FAC is implemented and the corresponding baselines. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
# cancelled 
flights 
380.46 375.08 383.01 387.90 378.43 379.03 
 357.50 357.50 363.50 356.00 354.00 355.50 
 406.00 390.50 400.50 396.50 391.50 392.00 
Mean 
reactionary 
delay (min) 
26.59 25.77 25.58 48.14 47.57 48.21 
 23.88 23.69 23.65 46.36 45.93 46.59 
 27.33 26.43 26.53 49.21 49.07 49.47 
       
# flights with 
reactionary 
delay 
976.22 965.00 988.25 2661.66 2651.94 2703.17 
 944.00 937.50 956.50 2626.50 2615.00 2669.00 
 1004.00 986.50 1015.50 2695.00 2687.50 2737.00 
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Figure 47. QQ-plots flight delay distributions default scenario FAC restricted airports with FAC Left: 
QQ-plot of departure delay; right: QQ-plot of arrival delay. Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The dashed 
line is the 1:1 line. 
 
 
 
Figure 48. QQ-plots flight delay distributions stressed scenario FAC restricted airports with FAC 
Left: QQ-plot of departure delay; right: QQ-plot of arrival delay. Red: Level 1, Blue: Level 2. The 
dashed line is the 1:1 line. 
In summary, the FAC mechanism brings the following changes: 
• It lowers average delays at Level 1, but increases them at Level 2. 
• It decreases the number of delays in the tail (>60 minutes) at Level 1, and also at Level 2 in 
the default case. 
• The improvements are larger in the default case than in the stressed one, where the 
mechanism does not seem to be very effective. 
• At Level 1 the mechanism has more positive effects on delays than at Level 2 which could be 
linked to the fact that at Level 2 is focused on cost and not on delay. 
4.3.3.2 Passengers delays 
In this section we show the same metrics presented in Section 4.3.2.2 but for the FAC mechanism. 
These results have also been obtained using 50 iterations. 
Both for stressed and non-stressed scenarios, the impact of FAC is very small. The averages are 
almost the same, both for the standard delay and its positive counterpart. In the non-stressed 
scenario, FAC does not seem to have any effect on high delays either, given that the number of 
passengers delayed more than 15, 60, and 180 are roughly the same across scenarios. In the stressed 
scenarios on the other end, passengers with very high delays seem to decrease with the 
implementation of the mechanism (see Table 46). 
Table 46. Passenger indicators statistics for FAC mechanism. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
117
 
 
Mean delay 17.2 17.1 17.2 40 39.3 39.6 
25% perc. 
delay 
-9.4 -9.3 -9.3 4.7 4.6 4.8 
75% perc. 
delay 
15.2 15.1 15.2 44.8 44.2 44.8 
Positive 
mean delay 
23.6 23.6 23.6 42.4 41.7 42 
Positive 25% 
perc. delay 
0 0 0 4.7 4.6 4.8 
Positive 75% 
perc. delay 
15.2 15.1 15.2 44.8 44.2 44.8 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>15 
859784.1 856507.5 862516.2 2005583.6 1993969.1 2010923.2 
Total delays 
with 
delay>15 
74470449.7 74193796.1 74208659.2 138623108 136258012.7 137320156.7 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>15 
86.6 86.6 86 69.1 68.3 68.3 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>60 
188560.8 188450.7 187441.8 561065.1 548094.8 557709.9 
Total delays 
with 
delay>60 
55486051.8 55301715.3 55103800.7 91227358.5 88832690.4 89556722.7 
Mean delay 
with 
delay>60 
294.3 293.5 294 162.6 162.1 160.6 
Number of 
pax with 
delay>180 
142665.4 142266.7 142262 158099.6 153008 153587.8 
Total delays 
with 
delay>180 
51765630 51556141.3 51479453.7 56374057.5 54771632 54759893.8 
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Mean delay 
with 
delay>180 
362.8 362.4 361.9 356.6 358 356.5 
 
 
Figure 49. Change in passenger delay for FAC: the mean delay (blue) and the mean positive delay 
(orange) with respect to baseline scenarios (default on the left, stressed on the right). 
Figure 49 shows that indeed the variations in the average delays are very small, even if they are 
clearly larger in the stressed scenarios. It is also interesting to note that, contrary to FP and 4DTA, the 
variations on the average of the positive delays seem to be comparable or even greater than the 
variations on the normal delay. This denotes the fact that FAC has an effect mainly on the positive 
delays. 
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Figure 50. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the FP at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
Finally, the QQ-plots in Figure 50 shows the above trends. On the no-stressed scenarios, the effect of 
FAC is negligible, even if a small squeezing trend can be seen on the right side of the distribution. On 
the other hand, the effect of FAC in the stressed scenarios can be seen very clearly, with a much 
thinner right tail for the distribution. Note also that Level 1 and Level 2 seem to have similar effects. 
In summary, the effect of the implementation of FAC is the following: 
• in non-stressed scenarios, the effect is negligible, both on negative or positive delay, and 
both on the tails and on the bulk. 
• in the stressed scenarios, there an improvement which is mainly seen for very high delays, 
with a corresponding limited effect for the average. Level 1 seems to have a slightly better 
effect than Level 2. 
4.3.3.3 Costs 
In this section we discuss the impact of the FAC mechanism on the different kinds of costs airlines 
incur because of both excess fuel and delay. 
 
Figure 51. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the FP at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
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Figure 52. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the FP at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
 
 
Figure 53. QQ-plot of arrival passenger delay in FAC in the baseline scenario (left) and stressed 
scenario (right). The blue circles correspond to the FP at Level 1, the orange ones to Level 2. The 
plots have been cut at 150 and 200 minutes respectively. 
The FAC mechanism has no impact on the excess fuel cost but tend to reduce significantly (on 
average) the costs of compensation and transfer, see Figure 51 and Figure 52. The only outlier is 
represented by the positive percentage variation of the cost of compensation for the stressed 
scenario with FAC at Level 2, observed in the restricted sample of flights landing at any airport where 
E-AMAN is implemented. However, this is a small effect. The decreasing of the two types of costs can 
be explained in terms of the implemented protocols of E-AMAN. At Level 1, the objective function of 
the E-AMAN is reducing the reactionary delays of the next flights associated with landing aircraft, 
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thus preserving, e.g., the flight connections. A consequence of preserving connections is reducing the 
cost of transfer by cutting off the cost of rebooking of passengers. This preserve of connections is 
implicit. At Level 2, this improvement is also more evident as a consequence of the objective 
functions including the airline utility, i.e., a priority is assigned to the most costly flights and cost is 
driven by passenger connections. As a consequence, a compensation and transfer costs reduce 
further with respect to the corresponding baselines. Also a smaller decrease of the duty of care of 
passengers can be noticed. 
The improvements in terms of costs is observed for both the aggregate system, the smaller sample of 
flights landing at some E-AMAN airports, and the complementary sample with flights landing at 
airports where E-AMAN is not applied (Figure 53). Hence, an externality is observed, i.e., the 
advantages of introducing the FAC mechanism in some airports (usually the ones characterised by 
higher traffic) propagate to the whole system, thus contributing to the decrease of these types of 
costs overall. 
 
 
 
 
FAC: detailed analysis of costs 
Table 47. Detailed costs for flights with delays<300 min FAC 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
136.0 136.2 135.9 182.9 182.9 185.4 
 135.0 135.1 134.7 181.2 181.3 183.6 
 137.1 137.4 137.1 184.7 184.9 187.2 
Cost of 
compensation 
8.3 8.2 7.9 14.1 13.9 13.5 
 7.3 7.3 7.4 12.8 12.7 12.3 
 9.1 9.0 8.3 14.7 14.8 14.4 
Fraction of 
compensations 
1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
1.8 1.6 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 
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 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.1 1.9 1.8 
 2.4 2.0 2.1 3.5 3.0 3.1 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Duty of care 229.8 227.2 228.8 284.9 278.7 279.7 
 219.8 219.6 217.5 270.0 267.7 266.2 
 237.2 235.2 237.7 290.0 284.6 288.1 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
13.5% 13.5% 13.4% 20.0% 19.8% 19.8% 
Soft costs 9.1 8.6 10.9 25.9 24.8 30.0 
 3.6 3.5 3.7 10.3 12.7 10.6 
 14.0 13.8 14.3 40.9 14.8 41.3 
Fraction of soft 
costs 
46.4% 46.5% 46.7% 57.5% 57.6% 57.5% 
Non passenger 
costs 
64.4 63.6 64.3 134.0 133.5 135.7 
 62.3 61.8 62.6 129.9 129.5 131.5 
 64.9 64.4 65.6 136.9 136.9 138.5 
Fraction of non 
passenger 
costs 
91.1% 91.1% 91.2% 93.2% 93.3% 93.4% 
Total excess 
cost 
449.5 445.5 449.7 644.8 636.7 646.9 
 436.6 435.0 437.2 619.8 619.9 632.0 
 457.9 452.9 459.8 658.3 651.3 661.5 
 
Table 48. Detailed costs with flights with delays<300 min restricted arriving at airports with FAC. 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
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Excess cost of 
fuel 
143.8 144.2 143.2 194.9 195.9 196.5 
 141.6 142.3 141.0 191.8 192.7 193.5 
 145.8 146.1 144.9 197.6 199.2 199.5 
Cost of 
compensation 
6.7 6.5 6.0 15.5 15.8 14.7 
 5.6 5.5. 5.1 13.9 13.6 12.9 
 7.4 7.2 12.6 16.9 17.0 16.0 
Fraction of 
compensations 
1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 3.7% 3.8% 3.5% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
1.4 1.2 1.0 3.6 3.4 3.1 
 0.9 0.9 0.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 
 1.6 1.6 1.3 4.1 3.9 3.6 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
Duty of care 235.0 232.4 234.6 294.5 288.9 288.8 
 221.7 218.4 219.9 270.5 268.7 270.3 
 243.9 244.4 249.3 304.4 300.7 300.1 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
15.7% 15.7% 15.3% 23.4% 23.1% 23.1% 
Soft costs 8.2 7.8 9.8 25.7 24.6 30.1 
 3.2 3.1 3.4 10.3 10.2 10.6 
 12.5 12.2 12.6 405 39.7 41.4 
Fraction of 
soft costs 
44.6% 44.8% 44.8% 58.1% 58.4% 58.1% 
Non 
passenger 
costs 
69.6 68.1 68.8 147.6 147.7 150.2 
 65.7 64.9 65.9 141.6 142.1 144.4 
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 71.1 69.5 70.3 153.2 153.3 157.3 
Fraction of 
non 
passenger 
costs 
91.0% 91.1% 91.1% 93.6% 93.7% 93.8% 
Total excess 
cost 
464.8 460.3 463.4 681.8 675.9 683.5 
 448.4 441.6 444.1 652.2 648.4 657.8 
 471.7 472.8 480.8 700.3 697.9 702.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 49. Detailed costs excluding cancelled flights FAC (with the exception of flights with delays 
larger than 300 min). 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Excess cost of 
fuel 
141.6 141.7 141.6 190.8 190.7 193.3 
 140.3 140.4 140.2 188.9 188.9 191.6 
 142.6 143.1 142.8 192.8 192.6 195.4 
Cost of 
compensation 
1.5 1.4 1.3 6.9 6.9 6.5 
 1.2 1.2 1.1 6.2 6.1 5.8 
 1.5 1.5 1.4 7.4 7.4 7.1 
Fraction of 
compensations 
0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.3 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 
 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 
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 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.3 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
5e-2% 5e-2% 5e-2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Duty of care 39.7 38.4 38.1 75.9 75.1 74.7 
 35 35.4 35.0 68.0 68.8 67.7 
 41 40.7 40.1 80.1 80.2 80.6 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
11.8% 11.8% 11.6% 18.2% 18.1% 18.1% 
Soft costs 7.3 6.9 8.8 24.6 23.6 28.6 
 2.9 2.9 3.1 9.8 9.8 10.1 
 11.1 11.1 11.5 38.8 38.4 39.3 
Fraction of soft 
costs 
46.1% 46.2% 46.4% 57.5% 57.6% 57.5% 
Non passenger 
costs 
67.0 66.2 66.9 139.8 139.2 141.5 
 64.8 64.4 65.2 135.4 134.9 137.7 
 67.4 67.0 68.2 142.7 142.6 144.2 
Fraction of non 
passenger 
costs 
94.8% 94.8% 94.9% 97.2% 97.3% 97.4% 
Total excess 
cost 
257.6 254.9 257.1 439.5 436.8 445.8 
 248.7 248.3 250.2 420.4 421.7 433.2 
 262.9 259.1 262.9 454.7 448.9 458.1 
 
Table 50. Detailed costs excluding cancelled flights restricted arrival airports with FAC (with the 
exception of flights with delays larger than 300 min). 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
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Excess cost of 
fuel 
149.4 149.7 148.8 202.5 203.5 204.1 
 147.3 147.6 146.9 199.2 200.4 201.4 
 151.2 151.7 150.9 205.5 206.4 206.7 
Cost of 
compensation 
2.9 2.6 2.4 11.7 12.1 11.2 
 2.2 2.1 2.0 10.5 10.5 9.5 
 3.0 2.8 2.5 12.6 13.3 12.5 
Fraction of 
compensations 
0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 3.4% 3.4% 3.1% 
Costs of 
'transfer' 
0.8 0.6 0.6 3.1 2.9 2.7 
 0.4 0.4 0.3 2.5 2.3 1.9 
 0.9 0.8 0.8 3.5 3.4 3.1 
Fraction of 
transfer costs 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Duty of care 48.6 46.4 45.2 99.3 98.5 98.3 
 41.9 40.7 39.6 86.3 86.4 85.0 
 50.2 49.3 48.4 107.2 109.6 109.7 
Fraction of 
'duty of care' 
14.1% 14.1% 13.7% 22.0% 21.7% 21.8% 
Soft costs 6.3 5.9 7.5 24.4 23.4 28.7 
 2.5 2.4 2.6 9.8 9.7 10.2 
 9.3 9.1 9.6 38.5 37.8 39.3 
Fraction of soft 
costs 
44.2% 44.4% 44.5% 58.1% 58.5% 58.2% 
Non passenger 
costs 
72.3 70.8 71.4 153.4 153.4 156.0 
 68.3 67.5 68.6 146.9 147.0 149.6 
 73.9 72.2 73.1 159.4 159.1 163.4 
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Fraction of non 
passenger 
costs 
94.5% 94.5% 94.6% 97.3% 97.3% 97.4% 
Total excess 
cost 
280.4 276.2 275.9 494.4 493.8 500.9 
 266.2 265.7 266.4 472.8 475.6 480.2 
 283.9 279.6 282.7 518.4 514.6 515.8 
 
In Table 47 and Table 48, we showed the detailed values of costs used to obtain Figure 51 and Figure 
52. Here, we consider the averages over the whole sample of flights, but excluding the ones with a 
delay larger than 300 min. Furthermore, in Table 49 and Table 50, we restrict further the sample by 
excluding the cancelled flights in order to capture how the FAC mechanism works for normal 
operations. We observe qualitatively the same behaviour. Then, in this case, cancellations do not 
affect crucially the impact of the mechanism. In effect, the FAC mechanism takes place at the arrival 
phase, whereas cancellations refer to departures. From the analysis of average costs, we are not able 
to capture some interdependences between the two phases. 
 
Figure 54. QQ-plot of costs in FAC baseline by comparing the default baseline scenario with the 
ones with the FAC mechanism but restricting to all flights landing in airports where E-AMAN is 
applied. Black is for FAC at Level 1, while blue is for FAC at Level. 
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Figure 55. QQ-plot of costs in FAC stressed by comparing the stressed baseline scenario with the 
ones with the FAC mechanism but restricting to all flights landing in airports where E-AMAN is 
applied. Black is for FAC at Level 1, while blue is for FAC at Level. 
In Figure 54 and Figure 55, we study how the distributions of costs (compensation, transfer, soft, and 
non-passenger costs) in the subsamples of flights landing at some E-AMAN airports, are affected by 
the introduction of the FAC mechanism. In the default case (Figure 54), we notice clear patterns, 
whereas the stressed case shows more homogenous distributions (Figure 55), with the exception of 
the extreme right tails. In both cases, we observe fewer extreme events for compensation, transfer, 
and non-passenger costs, consistently with the average values of the distributions. Finally, the reason 
of the increase of the mean soft cost is less clear: in both default and stressed scenarios, the 
distributions look quite equivalent, with the exceptions of fatter right tail in the default case, for both 
Level 1 and Level 2. However, in both default and stressed cases, we observe a decrease of the mean 
soft cost at Level 1, but an increase at Level 2. We argue that this is due to small fluctuations in the 
bulk of distributions. The distributions of the other types of costs are quite equivalent when we move 
from the baseline to any scenario with implemented FAC mechanism at any level. 
Comments 
According to the detailed analysis of costs, we point out that the FAC mechanism shows a clear 
advantage for airlines because of the reduction of the passengers' costs, in particular compensation, 
duty of care, and costs of transfer. At Level 1, this is the consequence of reducing the reactionary 
delays of flights landing at some E-AMAN airports. A further improvement is observed at Level 2, 
where flight priorities are considered by E-AMAN. Finally, an externality is observed: the advantage 
in terms of costs of introducing the FAC mechanism in a small set of airports propagate to the 
airports where E-AMAN is not implemented, thus improving the system overall. 
4.3.3.4 Centrality losses 
Passenger centrality 
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Table 51 reports the average loss of passenger centrality, incoming and outgoing, in the scenarios 
with FAC implemented and in the corresponding baseline.  Here, the centrality losses are averaged 
over all the airports, and we see small improvements in the centrality loss (i.e., smaller loss), except 
for Level 2 default. The percentage change with respect to the baseline amounts to 0.5-1.5% (see 
Figure 56), while the absolute change tells as that, on average over all airports, 1-3 more passengers 
manage to arrive to their final destination.  All changes are not statistically significant, however. 
 
Figure 56. Percentage change average passenger centrality loss FAC with respect to the baseline for 
the analysis on all airports, on the airports with FAC implemented and on the airports without FAC. 
Table 51. Average passenger centrality loss all airports FAC
 Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
186.03 184.97 187.28 201.48 199.00 199.35 
 177.93 179.51 178.90 192.20 192.39 190.53 
 194.01 191.53 195.82 206.50 203.94 209.28 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
206.25 204.71 206.78 232.88 230.00 229.48 
 196.81 197.74 198.36 223.26 222.63 219.21 
 215.26 212.68 215.96 238.94 236.14 238.79 
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Figure 57. Comparison change average passenger centrality loss FAC outgoing (left) and incoming 
(right) passenger centrality loss in the scenarios where FAC is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in 
the corresponding baselines. For each scenario, the average centrality losses in each of the 100 
iterations of the model are considered. 
Figure 57 compares the average outgoing and incoming passenger centrality loss in the scenarios 
where FAC is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. 
 
 
 
Table 52. Average passenger centrality loss all airports FAC airports with FAC
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(FAC airp) 
2294.29 2275.47 2313.79 2375.99 2351.03 2341.14 
 2147.29 2157.48 2161.35 2243.21 2232.48 2201.23 
 2423.71 2378.42 2432.04 2486.06 2449.94 2453.65 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-FAC airp) 
123.87 123.34 124.58 137.37 135.55 136.20 
 118.02 119.34 119.38 130.96 131.19 129.53 
 129.85 128.32 129.04 142.48 140.05 143.15 
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Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(FAC airp) 
2937.78 2894.64 2931.30 3349.44 3296.36 3282.05 
 2768.85 2779.27 2776.94 3194.85 3158.48 3128.67 
 3105.35 3011.33 3076.79 3478.75 3419.15 3405.71 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-FAC airp) 
125.72 125.40 126.45 140.99 139.59 139.48 
 120.36 120.96 120.36 134.75 134.87 133.93 
 131.06 130.56 132.57 146.17 143.89 145.22 
 
We then restrict our analysis to the set of airports where FAC is implemented, and compare it to 
the set of airport where it is not implemented, in order to see if there is a "local" improvement. if 
we look at absolute losses, the improvements are way larger in airports where FAC is implemented 
rather than where FAC is not implemented (see  
 
 
Table 52), except for the incoming centrality in Level 2 default, for which there is a worsening. 
Depending on the scenario, we have, on average in each FAC airport, that 15 to 60 passengers more 
arrive to their destination following their original itinerary (while for the non-FAC airports results are 
similar to the all-airports analysis). All changes are, however, not statistically significant. 
Since the airports with FAC implemented have a larger flux of passengers, and therefore larger 
losses, a fairer comparison would be the one of percentage change with respect to the baseline. 
Figure 56 shows the percentage change of the average centrality loss with respect to the baseline for 
the analysis on all airports, on the airports with FAC implemented and on the airports without FAC. 
We see that, especially in the stressed case, also the percentage improvement is larger for the 
airports with FAC implemented. The difference is more evident for the outgoing centrality, which is 
expected, given that the FAC mechanism aims to reduce the arrival and reactionary delays, 
consequently preserving connections at the airport where it is implemented and downstream. 
In all cases, Level 2 seems to cause a larger centrality loss than the baseline in the default case, while 
it brings an improvement in the stressed one. Given that Level 2 focuses on the costs, this could 
mean that the economic interest of the airline coincided with the passengers' interests only when 
the system is stressed, as in this case the passenger costs might be comparable to the fuel costs. 
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In conclusion what we can say is that, concerning the preservation of passengers' itineraries, FAC 
brings a small overall improvement in the entire network (except Level 2 default), and that, in 
percentage, this improvement is larger for airports that implement FAC, especially for the outgoing 
centrality. (However, almost all changes are not statistically significant.) 
 
 
Figure 58. Comparison change average passenger centrality loss FAC restricted flights arrival FAC 
outgoing (left) and incoming (right) passenger centrality loss in the scenarios where FAC is 
implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines. For each scenario, the average 
centrality losses in each of the 100 iterations of the model are considered. 
Figure 58 compares the average outgoing and incoming passenger centrality loss in the scenarios 
where FAC is implemented at Level 1 and 2 and in the corresponding baselines on the restricted 
dataset (only considering airports which implement the mechanism). 
Trip centrality 
Here we present results concerning changes in trip centrality loss for two different values of ;: 0.2 
and 0.02. The value of the parameter α determines the relative importance given to walks made of 
several legs with respect to shorter ones. For example, when ; = 0.2 a walk made of a single flight 
weights as much as 5 walks made of two flights, while when ; = 0.02 it weights as much as 50 walks 
made of two flights. Therefore, the relative impact of cancellations and connection disruptions on 
the centrality loss will also differ in the two cases, with the disruption of potential connections having 
a larger impact when α is larger. 
When considering all flights, we see small percentage improvements (i.e., smaller centrality losses) 
with respect to the baseline in Level 1, and also in Level 2 default for the larger value of α (see Figure 
59 and Figure 60). The percentage improvements are larger when α is larger, except for Level 2 
default. Note that Level 2 default has a smaller trip centrality loss than the baseline when ; = 0.2, 
but a larger one when ; = 0.02. This might be due to the fact that Level 2 default has an increase of 
cancellations with respect to the baseline, and this has more impact in the centrality loss when α is 
small, where it counters the positive effect of the smaller delays in preserving potential connections.  
However, all changes are not statistically significant. The average centrality losses are reported in 
Table 53 and Table 54. Note that, when computing the average on all airports, only the loss of 
outgoing centrality is reported because the incoming is exactly equivalent. 
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Figure 59. Percentage change of the average trip centrality loss all airports with α=0.2 with respect 
to the baseline for the analysis on all airports, on the airports with FAC implemented and on the 
airports without 
 
 
Figure 60. Percentage change of the average trip centrality loss all airports with α=0.02 with 
respect to the baseline for the analysis on all airports, on the airports with FAC implemented and 
on the airports without 
 
Table 53. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.2
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
134 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
 Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average trip 
centrality loss 
10681 10628 10639 12801 12795 12808 
 10509 10464 10462 12732 12724 12745 
 10817 10773 10794 12875 12862 12875 
 
Table 54. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.02
 Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
passenger 
centrality loss 
0.531 0.529 0.532 0.732 0.732 0.734 
 0.523 0.523 0.524 0.725 0.725 0.728 
 0.539 0.536 0.539 0.737 0.735 0.739 
 
When comparing the airports where FAC is implemented to those where it is not implemented, at 
Level 1 FAC is seen to imply a larger improvement in outgoing centrality loss to the airports where 
FAC is implemented, both in absolute and in percentage, although the changes are very small and 
not statistically significant (see Tables Table 55 and Table 56, and Figure 59 and Figure 60). At Level 2, 
for the default case the same effect is seen for =0.2, while in the stressed case and for =0.02 the 
average centrality losses increase, both in the FAC and non-FAC airports 
Finally, we remark that while in the default scenarios the improvements in trip centrality are quite 
similar to those in passenger centrality, in the stressed scenario the improvements in trip centrality 
are much smaller. This can be explained by the fact that in the default case, when delays are small, 
the diminishment of average delays implied by FAC is effective in preserving not only passenger 
itineraries, but also potential ones. In the stressed case, instead, the diminishment of delays is less 
effective in preserving itineraries, given that delays are larger, but passenger itineraries are actively 
targeted by the optimisation mechanism and therefore they are still preserved. 
In summary, the FAC mechanism brings a small improvement to potential connections especially at 
Level 1, and for the outgoing centrality this improvement is more pronounced for airports where FAC 
is implemented, similarly to what was found for passenger centrality. Differently for passenger 
centrality, for trip centrality improvements are mostly in the default scenarios, and only small effects 
are seen in the stressed scenarios. 
Table 55. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.2 restricted airports with FAC 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
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Average 
incoming trip 
centrality loss 
(regulated airp) 
71056 70581 70656 76465 76301 76467 
 69834 69070 69197 75954 75775 75963 
 72043 71858 71946 77057 76874 76934 
Average 
incoming trip 
centrality loss 
(non-regulated 
airp) 
9655 9609 9619 11085 11082 11092 
 9512 9458 9462 11029 11030 11035 
 9767 9743 9750 11146 11136 11152 
Average 
outgoing trip 
centrality loss 
(regulated airp) 
86991 86470 86409 89003 88910 89095 
 85460 84990 84565 88398 88332 88552 
 88231 88097 88105 89543 89448 89645 
Average 
outgoing trip 
centrality loss 
(non-regulated 
airp) 
9385 9339 9351 10747 10742 10751 
 9245 9189 9196 10693 10684 10697 
 9500 9471 9480 10803 10790 10804 
 
Table 56. Average trip centrality loss all airports FAC with α=0.02 restricted airports with FAC 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
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Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(FAC airp) 
5.895 5.878 5.911 8.255 8.243 8.265 
 5.796 5.814 5.802 8.182 8.170 8.186 
 6.011 5.963 6.011 8.315 8.305 8.331 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-FAC airp) 
0.373 0.371 0.373 0.510 0.510 0.512 
 0.367 0.367 0.368 0.506 0.505 0.508 
 0.379 0.376 0.378 0.514 0.514 0.516 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(FAC airp) 
5.921 5.884 5.931 8.384 8.374 8.412 
 5.827 5.794 5.786 8.295 8.314 8.322 
 6.039 5.957 6.049 8.462 8.440 8.505 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(non-FAC airp) 
0.372 0.371 0.373 0.507 0.506 0.508 
 0.367 0.366 0.368 0.502 0.503 0.504 
 0.378 0.376 0.377 0.510 0.510 0.512 
 
Local analysis in a regional airport 
Using centrality metrics, we can answer questions regarding the indirect effect of FAC in airports 
where it is not implemented. For example, let us consider a regional airport where FAC is not 
implemented and from which passengers depart to connect in hubs where FAC is implemented. Does 
such an airport receive an indirect gain because of the implementation of FAC in other airports? 
Let us consider the airport of Edinburgh, where FAC is not implemented and which has several flights 
to and from airports with FAC implemented, among which hubs like Heathrow, Frankfurt, Munich, 
D5.2 INVESTIGATIVE CASE STUDIES RESULTS 
  
 
 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi 
di Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the 
SESAR Joint Undertaking under conditions.
137
 
 
Madrid, Zurich. Looking at the loss of incoming and outgoing passenger centrality of Edinburgh, we 
can see if passengers arriving there (either directly of with a connection) and passengers departing 
from there arrive more often to their destination following their scheduled itinerary when FAC is 
implemented, with respect to the baseline. The loss of incoming and outgoing trip centrality, instead, 
tells us whether potential itineraries arriving incoming to Edinburgh or outgoing from it are 
increasingly preserved when FAC is implemented. 
Looking at Table 57 and at Figure 61 we see that in the default scenarios the centrality losses (both 
passenger and trip centrality, the latter computed with α=0.02) increase with respect to the baseline. 
Instead, in the stressed scenario the percentage improvements in passenger centrality loss are quite 
large, especially at Level 2 (while no change is seen for trip centrality). 
We can conclude that passengers departing from or arriving to the airport of Edinburgh have a larger 
probability to arrive to destination with their scheduled itinerary if the system is stressed, but a 
smaller one if the delays in the system are small, as a result of the implementation of FAC in hubs to 
which the airports is connected. The "potential connections" counted by trip centrality, which are not 
addressed explicitly by the mechanism, do not improve even in the stressed case. 
Table 57. Average trip centrality loss Edinburgh 
Metric Baseline Level 1 Level 2 
Stressed 
baseline 
Stressed 
Level 1 
Stressed 
Level 2 
Average 
outgoing 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(EGPH) 
826.47 878.17 852.41 933.39 916.79 869.03 
 541.00 610.50 563.00 691.50 621.50 573.50 
 1037.50 1153.00 1128.50 1197.50 1125.00 1125.50 
Average 
incoming 
passenger 
centrality loss 
(EGPH) 
800.10 874.29 857.40 947.26 894.27 825.00 
 517.50 539.00 570.00 667.50 584.00 490.00 
 937.00 1183.50 1089.00 1205.00 1163.00 1090.00 
Average 
outgoing trip 
centrality loss 
(EGPH) 
1.89 1.98 1.91 3.04 3.05 3.03 
 1.76 1.80 1.72 2.89 2.94 2.90 
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 1.99 2.13 2.05 3.17 3.17 3.16 
Average 
incoming trip 
centrality loss 
(EGPH) 
1.89 1.98 1.91 3.04 3.05 3.03 
 2.81 2.86 2.85 4.16 4.18 4.13 
 3.16 3.25 3.28 4.41 4.43 4.44 
 
 
Figure 61. Change of centrality loss with respect to the baseline for the airport of Edinburgh. 
4.3.3.5 Causality analysis 
In this section, we show the causality analysis applied to the scenarios where FAC mechanism is 
implemented and we compare the results with the corresponding baselines. In this section, we study 
the Granger causality (both in mean and in tail) networks built with both the state of delay and the 
state of congestion of the airports. 
Causality in mean 
Table 58. Metrics for the Granger causality in mean network FAC (delay) (both default and 
stressed) 
Delay. Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.0043 0.0034 
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Mean degree 1.09 0.87 
Clustering coefficient 0.52 0.53 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
908.3 353.7 
Reciprocity 0.28 0.23 
 
In this paragraph we show the results obtained for the Granger causality in mean networks. 
The selected network metrics measured on the Granger causality in mean network built for the 
baseline scenario, in both the default and stressed case, are shown in Table 58. We can notice that 
moving from the default case to the stressed one is associated with a decreasing level of causality 
(i.e., smaller link density) for the delay propagation mechanism. That is, the higher delays of the 
stressed scenario tend to be less correlated, thus the endogenous process of delay propagation 
becomes less important. 
 
Figure 62. Percentage change Granger causality in mean FAC, i.e., mean degree, clustering 
coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, when we compare the 
scenario with FAC mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default and stressed case). 
(In order to compare metrics between two different scenarios, we consider the measured value of 
each metric but normalised by the expected value for the random case. This is done for a fair 
comparison, because link density may vary from one scenario to another). 
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Figure 63. Percentage change Granger causality in mean FAC airports not implanting FAC, i.e., 
mean degree, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, when 
we compare the scenario with FAC mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default 
and stressed case) but restricting to the subgraph formed by node-airports where E-AMAN is not 
implemented. (In order to compare metrics between two different scenarios, we consider the 
measured value of each metric but normalised by the expected value for the random case. This is 
done for a fair comparison, because link density may vary from one scenario to another 
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Figure 64. Distribution of reciprocity Granger causality in mean FAC according to Monte Carlo 
simulations compared with the observed reciprocity for the FAC scenarios in the case of Granger 
causality in mean networks built with the state of delay. 
 
 
Figure 65. Number of reciprocal links (GC in mean network built with the state of delay) at the 
different levels of implementation for both the default and stressed case. FAC 
We measure the value of the same network metrics in Table 58 for the causality networks obtained 
for the scenarios where the FAC mechanism is implemented and show the percentage variations with 
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respect to the corresponding baseline in Figure 62 and Figure 63. Let us notice the overall decrease 
of link density at any level of implementations for both the whole network (Figure 62) and the 
subgraph obtained for nodes representing airports where E-AMAN is not implemented (Figure 63). 
The decrease of link density can be interpreted as a decrease of the level of causality, i.e., a smaller 
number of propagation channels for the delay. With the exception of the number of feedback triplets 
in the stressed scenario with FAC at Level 1, we observe a decrease of the over-expression of the 
clustering coefficient, the number of feedback triplets, and the reciprocity. Finally, in Figure 62 and 
Figure 63, we show that reciprocity is inversely correlated to the variation of link density. Similarly to 
the 4DTA mechanism, in order to better characterise this effect, we consider this simple Monte Carlo 
simulation: (i) given the network for the baseline scenario, and (ii) observed a given decrease of link 
density for one scenario with implemented FAC, (iii) we can randomly erase some links from the 
baseline network in order to target the same number of links of the network for the FAC scenario, 
and, finally, (iv) measure the value of reciprocity. The result of this simple Monte Carlo experiment is 
shown in Figure 64 for the Granger causality in mean networks built with the states of delay. Note 
that the expected measure of reciprocity according to Monte Carlo simulations is always smaller than 
the observed one. This suggests that: (i) the overall number of reciprocal links decreases by following 
the negative variation in the total number of links (see Figure 65), but (ii) the over-expression of 
reciprocity is inversely correlated with link density because (iii) some reciprocal subsystems are 
unaffected from FAC. 
 
 
Figure 66. Change of the mean degree (for GC in mean) when we move from the baseline to the 
scenario with implemented FAC mechanism at Level 1 and Level 2 (default case). We obtain 
qualitatively similar results for the stressed case  
When applying GC in mean to the state of delay of airports, we can notice an overall decreasing of 
the level of causality (in mean) when we move from the baseline to any scenario with FAC 
implemented. In particular, airports where E-AMAN is implemented (Granger) cause less the airports 
without the FAC mechanism (see Figure 66). A smaller level of causality is observed also in the 
subnetwork of airports where E-AMAN is not implemented, thus highlighting an improvement for the 
global system as a secondary effect of applying E-AMAN in the subset of the 24 airports 
(characterised by high traffic). This externality represents an overall improvement in the 
performance of the aggregate in terms of delay propagation. 
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Causality in tail 
Table 59. Metrics for the Granger causality in tail network FAC (delay), for the baseline scenario 
(both default and stressed). 
Delay Baseline default scenario Baseline stressed scenario 
Link density 0.1594 0.3460 
Mean degree 40.5 87.9 
Clustering coefficient 0.43 0.56 
Over-expression of feedback 
triplets 
3.7 1.9 
Reciprocity 0.21 0.28 
 
In this paragraph we show the results obtained for the Granger causality in tail networks, i.e., we 
study the channels of propagation of extreme delay events (Table 59).  
 
The selected network metrics measured on the Granger causality in tail network built with simulated 
data for the baseline scenario, in both the default and stressed case, are shown in Table 2. We can 
note that link density in the stressed scenario is about twice with respect to the default case. We 
argue that this difference is because of one leg effects which strongly correlate in the subnetwork of 
low traffic airports, see Figures 6 and 7. The largest number of causal links is among NO-E-AMAN 
airports which are largely the ones with low traffic. Here, a highly delayed flight affects importantly 
the state of delay of the airport, thus its state of congestion, because of the small number of flights 
departing from it within the 1 hour time window. Then, it is likely that this extreme delay is 
propagated by that aircraft to the airport where it will land and depart again. In the stressed case, 
when we observe more extreme delays, the described behaviour tends to increase the number of 
causal relations between low traffic airports. 
 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
144 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Percentage change of Granger causality in tail network, i.e., mean degree, clustering 
coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, when we compare the 
scenario with FAC mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default and stressed case). 
We measure the network metrics (clustering, feedback triplets and reciprocity) for the Granger 
causality in tail networks obtained for the scenarios where the FAC mechanism is implemented and, 
in Figure 67, show the percentage variations with respect to the corresponding baseline. Again, it is 
evident the inverse dependence between changes in link density and variations of the over-
expressions of the network metrics measured on the FAC scenarios at any level of implementations. 
As before, this is a signal of the over-expression (w.r.t. to the random case) of the amplifying 
subsystems which are preserved on average by the implementation of the FAC mechanism, both at 
Level 1 and 2 and for the default and stressed cases. 
 
Figure 68. Change of the mean degree (for GC in tail) FAC when we move from the baseline to the 
scenario with implemented FAC mechanism at Level 1 and Level 2 (default case) 
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Figure 69. Percentage change of Granger causality in tai network only airports with FACl, i.e., mean 
degree, clustering coefficient, number of feedback triplets, and reciprocity coefficient, when we 
compare the scenario with FAC mechanism with the corresponding baseline (for both default and 
stressed case). 
 
Figure 70. Change of the mean degree (for GC in tail) stressed case FAC when we move from the 
baseline to the scenario with implemented FAC mechanism at Level 1 and Level 2 (default case) 
We observe a similar behaviour of GC in mean in relation to the variation of the mean degree of the 
network when moving from the baseline to FAC scenarios. Let us focus on the default case in Figure 
68. We notice a decrease for the level of causality, which is measured as a reduction of the mean 
degree at the global level. In particular, this is due to less causal links from the E-AMAN airports to 
the NO-E-AMAN ones (purple stars in Figure 68) and in the subnetwork of airports where E-AMAN is 
not implemented. Interestingly, this improvement for the system (i.e., less channels of extreme delay 
propagation) is associated with an increase in the over-expression (w.r.t. the random case) of 
triangles, feedback triplets, and mutual links.  However, this behaviour is not observed in the 
subnetwork of airports where E-AMAN is implemented, see Figure 69. Here, we measure (with the 
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exception of reciprocity at Level 1) that the subsystem of E-AMAN airports perform better than the 
corresponding default baseline, and there are less subsystems amplifying delay propagation. Hence, 
in the subnetwork of E-AMAN airports, FAC mechanism has a positive impact overall from the point 
of view of delay propagation. Finally, when we consider the stressed scenarios, the implementation 
of FAC at Level 1 exhibit results similar to the default case but the implementation at Level 2 show 
quite the opposite (as we can expect because the link density increases), see Figure 70. 
Comments 
The FAC mechanism tends to increase the overall stability to the propagation of both delays and 
congestions among airports (because the overall link density decreases). By looking at the whole 
causality networks, FAC tend to preserve the subsystems amplifying the (extreme) delay, whereas, in 
absolute terms, the total number of mutual causal links decreases. Interestingly, by restricting to the 
subgraph of E-AMAN airports, the over-expression of clustering and feedback triplets decrease (on 
average) too, for both GC in mean and GC in tail. Hence, FAC represents an overall improvement for 
the restricted subsystem of airports where E-AMAN is implemented. 
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5 Conclusions 
This deliverable presented the results obtained with the first investigative case studies. The model is 
running smoothly on a European scale and is able to simulate 14 scenarios already. Its output can be 
analysed with powerful tools developed by the project, in particular with the new metrics of causality 
and centrality proposed in D5.1 [3]. 
The scenarios simulated for this deliverable are focused on trying to understand the impact of each 
of the mechanism (4D Trajectory Adjustments, Flight Prioritisation and Flight Arrival Coordination). 
These mechanisms are implemented at different levels, which gives some insight on the potential 
benefits on corresponding SESAR solutions. Moreover, the mechanisms are tested on two different 
baselines: a standard (default) one corresponding to a normal traffic volume and a stressed one, with 
high delays. This allows us to understand the benefits of the mechanisms in different operational 
environments. This is particularly important since higher delays are expected in Europe in the future 
due to increasing traffic volumes. 
The calibration of the model has been performed only approximatively for this deliverable, due to 
foreseen changes in the code. It has been calibrated using averages on a few key metrics, including 
departure delay. The point of comparison is the historical operational day for which the traffic is set 
(12th September 2014) and 2017 CODA reports [1]. When studying the output of the calibrated 
models, a few key points can be noted, including the fact that flights plan trajectories slightly too 
long and operate them too quickly, probably due to small taxi times and congestion at arrival. Some 
distributions of delays are also notably different, in particular the departure delay, where negative 
delays are absent from the model. Finally, the cancellation rate on this deliverable is significantly 
higher than it should be due to the introduction of explicit cancellation for missing curfews. This will 
be revised in the final version of the model. 
Many metrics can be computed from the output of the model due to its low-level detail. This 
includes standard metrics, such as average delays, but also other advanced metrics developed in this 
project specifically to capture subtle network effects in the system. The first one is a centrality 
measure able to indicate how a node in the network (an airport in this study) is important for the 
connectivity of the network. The second one is able to reflect indirect causality relationships 
between nodes in the network, in particular helping at understanding delay propagation. These 
metrics were defined in D5.1 [3] and applied now to the full outcome of the European wide model. 
Some of the new advanced network metrics have already show their potential to be used in a more 
operational manner. This will be explored further in the next activities of Domino, for example by 
relating them to other indicators, such as those that are cost-based. 
The analysis of the result has been structured by contrasting the different mechanisms, their 
different levels of implementation, and their effect in default and stressed baselines. Although lots of 
detailed results are interesting per se, one can extract a few key ones. First, it seems that in the 
stressed case, all levels and mechanisms improve the cost impact on the airlines. For some of them, 
EDITION 01.00.00 
 
148 
 
© – 2019 – University of Westminster, EUROCONTROL, Università degli studi di 
Trieste, Università di Bologna, Innaxis. All rights reserved. Licensed to the SESAR 
Joint Undertaking under conditions. 
 
 
this is counter-balanced by a deterioration of other KPIs, like average arrival delay. It happens also 
that passengers might experience a worsening on their trip experience as arrival delays might 
increase in some cases. The centrality of airports usually improves with the introduction of the 
mechanisms, even if sometimes the airports not concerned directly by the mechanisms see a 
deterioration of their situation. The results with causality are less unanimous, with some 
improvement or deterioration depending on the exact metrics and the airports considered. Overall, 
the mechanisms seem to have a lot more positive impact in a stressed environment, which indicates 
that they would be beneficial to implement in the future, where the traffic volumes are much higher. 
All these results indicate that, even if the model needs finer calibration and improvements, it is 
already able to capture the intricate effects coming from the massive number of interactions and the 
tight connection of the system elements, and to reflect the impact of changes in the ATM 
environment. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the results presented in this deliverable have been useful 
as part of the validation of the model and in the process of obtaining feedback from experts and 
stakeholders. This will be used to improve the model and target the final scenarios in Domino (see 
Section 6, Next steps and look ahead, for more details). 
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6 Next steps and look ahead 
D5.2 presents the results of the first investigative case studies focusing on the effect of the 
mechanism independently implemented. These results have been shared with experts and 
stakeholders in dedicated workshops (see D6.3 Workshop results summary). The feedback obtained 
from these activities along with the outcome of the validation of the model and the analysis of the 
mechanisms presented in this deliverable are the base of the changes in the model and the definition 
of new scenarios that will be presented in D3.3 - Adaptive case studies description (expected August 
2019). D3.3 will become the blueprint of the activities that will be done until the end of the project 
including: the evolution of the model (with its validation), modifications on the metrics (with special 
focus on their operability) and selection of scenarios to be analysed to highlight the capabilities of 
the model and metrics. 
The database structure that has been used to store the input and output of the model (including the 
needed adaptation to incorporate the changes considered for the final model implementation) will 
be reported in D2.2 - Database structure (due July 2019). 
D3.3 will be the starting point of the changes that will be performed to the model which will be 
released in D4.2 - Model source code (due September 2019). This final model version will be 
executed to generate the output that will be analysed and presented in D5.3 - Final tool and model 
description and case studies results (due October 2019). The final project results will be summarised 
in D1.2 - Final Project Results Report and delivered with the Project Dissemination Report (D6.4) 
closing the project by November 2019. 
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8 Acronyms 
4DTA: 4D Trajectory Adjustment mechanism 
ABM: Agent-based model 
AIRAC: Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control 
AMAN: Arrival Manager 
ANSP: Air Navigation Service Provider 
ATC: Air Traffic Control 
ATFM: Air Traffic Flow Management 
ATM: Air traffic management 
CI: Cost Index 
COBT: Calculated Off-Block Time 
CODA: Central Office for Delay Analysis 
DCI: Dynamic cost indexing 
DDR2: Demand Data Repository 
E-AMAN: Extended Arrival Manager 
FAC: Flight Arrival Coordination mechanism 
FP: Flight Prioritisation mechanism 
G2G: Gate to Gate 
GC: Granger Causality 
KPI: Key Performance Indicator 
Q-Q: Quantile-Quantile 
TOC: Top of Climb 
TOD: Top of Descend 
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